Back on
November 17, four
days before a
rare Senate
hearing on the
regulatory
capture of the
Federal
Reserve, the
Federal
Reserve Bank
of New York
posed a series
of questions
to CIT Group,
trying to buy
OneWest.
CIT provided
Inner City
Press with a
copy of its
answer to the
Fed's November
17 questions
(answers to
the Fed's
November 25
questions have
not yet been
provided.)
CIT says
"OneWest has
discussed the
Transaction
with staff of
each of
FannieMae and
FreddieMac
(the 'GSEs')
and will be
filing an
application in
connection
with the
change of
control of OWB
in order for
OWB to
continue as a
seller/servicer
for the
respective
GSE. OneWest
is now in the
process of
preparing the
appropriate
applications,
which it
expects to
submit as soon
as possible,
and no later
than
year-end."
But will
OneWest
provide notice
of these
applications
to the GSEs to
the groups
which have
timely
protested its
applications
to the Fed and
OCC? The OCC
heard much
about OneWest,
and CIT, at a
December 2
EGRPRA hearing
in Los
Angeles. Why
not just hold
public
hearings on
this proposed
mega-merger?
And on another
one, announced
but not yet
applied for?
Here are the
still-outstanding
Fed questions
of November
25:
Based
on staff’s
review of the
applications,
the following
information is
requested.
Please provide
a complete,
detailed
response to
each of the
following
questions.
Provide
supporting
documentation
as
appropriate.
1.
From the
following
activities,
identify those
in which
either CIT
Group, Inc. or
its
subsidiaries
(“CIT”) or IMB
Holdco LLC or
its
subsidiaries
(“IMB”) is
involved. To
the extent not
already
provided in
the
applications,
describe the
nature of the
activities and
provide dollar
volumes for
CIT and IMB,
and include
any available
information
relating to
the national
market share
of CIT and
IMB, along
with a brief
description of
other firms
that engage in
the same
activity in
the United
States. You
may confine
your responses
to information
that is
maintained in
the regular
course of
business.
a.
Holding assets
under custody;
b. Provision
of short-term
funding
through
bilateral
repurchase
agreements;
c. Provision
of short-term
funding in the
tri-party repo
market;
d. Provision
of prime
brokerage
services;
e. Provision
of short-term
lines of
credit to
financial
firms;
f. Securities
lending;
g. Lending in
the Fed funds
market;
h.
Provision of
bond and
equity
underwriting
services in
any of the
following
markets:
i. Commercial
paper;
ii.
Asset-backed
commercial
paper;
iii. Corporate
bonds;
iv. High-yield
bonds;
v. Municipal
bonds;
vi. U.S.
Agency debt;
vii. U.S.
Agency
mortgage
backed
securities;
viii. Private
label asset
backed
securities;
ix. Seasoned
offerings; or
x. Initial
public
offerings;
i. Tri-party
repo dealing;
j. Clearing
and
settlement;
k. Provision
of business
credit in any
of the
following
markets:
i. Commercial
and industrial
lending;
ii. Commercial
real estate
lending;
iii.
Construction
loans;
iv. Middle
market
lending;
v. Small
business
lending;
vi.
Receivables
factoring;
vii. Equipment
financing/leasing;
or
viii.
Syndicated
lending;
l.
Direct dollar
lending to
foreign
institutions
and dollar
lending
through
foreign
exchange
swaps;
m. Trade
letters of
credit;
n. Interest
rate and
credit
derivatives
trading;
o. Commodities
trading;
p. Credit card
lending;
q. Mortgage
servicing;
r. Corporate
trust;
s.
Correspondent
banking; and
t.
Reinsurance.
2.
Describe any
financial
markets
(trading-type
activities) in
which either
CIT or IMB is
a
“market-maker.”
3.
Report the
current market
value, gross
and net of
collateral,
and other risk
mitigants for
the three
largest OTC
derivatives
counterparties
of each of CIT
and IMB as
measured by
the following
metrics:
a. by
positive
current market
value (after
netting
arrangements);
and
b.
by negative
current market
value (after
netting
arrangements).
We'll see.
On
November 21,
Federal
Reserve Bank
of New York
President
Dudley
described anti
revolving door
safeguards and
a desire for
"good culture"
at banks.
Good culture?
How then did
the predatory
lending
meltdown take
place? And
anti-revolving
door? How can
it be, then,
that a former
Federal
Reserve Legal
Division
supervisor is
writing for
BB&T's
deals to those
who used to
work under
her?
As soon as
Dudley left
the stand, a
more serious
anti revolving
door
protection was
proposed.
Dudley was
asked about
Goldman Sachs'
warehouses,
and JPM
Chase's abuse
of the energy
markets, but
didn't
directly
answer.
Since then he
has toured The
Bronx - we'll
see what if
any difference
it makes.
The Fed on
November 17
asked for
answers to
four questions
it sent to the
CIT Group,
with a copy to
Inner City
Press.
Inner City
Press and
others have
challenged
CIT's
application to
acquire
OneWest; as
set forth
below, Inner
City Press /
Fair Finance
Watch has been
challenging
BB&T even
before its
November 12
proposal to
acquire
Susquehanna
Bank for $2.5
billion.
What questions
will the
Federal
Reserve have
on that
one?
Here's
a new one that
we have: in
the December 4
presentation
by BB&T
CFO Daryl N.
Bible, there's
reference to
BB&T and
the
Pennsylvania
energy market.
Does that mean
fracking?
We'll have
more on this.
As to CIT -
OneWest, the
Fed on
November 17
asked:
Based
on staff’s
review of the
applications,
the following
information is
requested.
Please provide
a complete,
detailed
response to
each of the
following
questions.
Provide
supporting
documentation
as
appropriate.
1.
Provide a pro
forma
shareholders
list that
identifies any
shareholder or
group of
shareholders
that would own
or control,
directly or
indirectly,
five percent
or more of any
class of
voting
securities, or
10 percent or
more of the
total equity,
of the
combined
organization.
Your response
should
indicate
whether any
identified
shareholder is
a bank or bank
holding
company. In
calculating
the voting
ownership,
include any
warrants,
options, and
other
convertible
instruments,
and show all
levels of
voting
ownership on
both a fully
diluted and an
individually
diluted
basis.
Aggregate the
interests of
any related
shareholders,
including, for
example,
shareholders
that are
acting in
concert
(pursuant to
definitions
and
presumptions
in 12 CFR
225.41) and
shareholders
that are
commonly
controlled or
advised.
2.
Your October
8, 2014,
letter
responding to
staff’s
request for
additional
information
(the
“Response”)
states that
while “CIT and
OneWest do not
believe the
proposed
Transaction
requires the
consent of the
GSEs . . .
[t]he parties
will provide
the GSEs with
formal notice
of the
transaction
and engage
with them as
appropriate.”
Provide the
specific
timeframes in
which the
parties will
file a formal
notice and
consult with
the GSEs about
this proposed
transaction.
3. The
Response
indicates that
several
integration
planning
decisions and
actions have
already been
made or taken
with respect
to the
integration of
the CIT and
IMB
organizations.
Confirm or
clarify our
understandin
that the
decisions and
actions
identified in
the Response
will not apply
to the
companies and
their
operations
prior to the
Board’s
approval of
the proposed
transactions.
4.
The Response
also indicates
that the
parties will
execute a
number of
actions prior
to the closing
of the
proposed
transaction
“to ensure
that, on
‘Legal Day
One’, the
combined
institution
operates in
manner
consistent
with . . .
expectations.”
To the extent
not already
provided,
identify all
pre-closing
actions that
will be
executed in
connection
with the
integration of
the CIT and
IMB
organizations.
We will report
on the
responses,
upon receipt.
On BB&T,
well before
the bank's
November 12
mega-merger
announcement
seeking to buy
Susquehanna
Bancshares for
$2.5 billion,
Inner City
Press / Fair
Finance Watch
has been
showing the
disparities in
BB&T's
lending
record.
On BB&T's
application to
acquire 41
branches in
Texas from
Citibank, Fair
Finance Watch
showed the
FDIC for
example that
for
conventional
home purchase
loans in the
Houston
Metropolitan
Statistical
Area in 2013,
BB&T made
65 such loans
to whites, and
NONE to
African
Americans.
The
FDIC's Acting
Deputy
Regional
Director for
Compliance
replied that
"the FDIC
deems your
correspondence
to constitute
a protest."
BB&T
through law
firm Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen
& Katz
submitted a
response which
admitted that
in Houston
“the
percentage of
Mortgage Loans
made to low
and moderate
income
borrowers
during the
first six
months of 2014
was also below
the 2013
aggregate
industry
average.”
BB&T
Response at
Page 11, which
also notes at
10 that at
least one of
the Citibank
branches
BB&T seeks
to acquire, it
would shutter.
And so on
November 10
Fair Finance
Watch
submitted more
extensive
comment
opposing
BB&T's
application to
acquire Bank
of Kentucky,
including that
bank's
disparities in
the Cincinnati
regional area
and BB&T's
in the
Louisville
MSA, where in
2013 BB&T
made 229
conventional
home purchase
loans to
whites, and
only 12 to
African
Americans and
only six to
Latinos, while
denying 41.7%
of
applications
from Latinos
versus only
17.5 of
application
from whites, a
disparity of
2.38 to 1.
Now BB&T
announces a
much larger
proposal, to
buy
Susquehanna
and its 245
branches in
Pennsylvania,
New Jersey,
Maryland and
West Virginia.
Such an
application
requires
approval,
after a
comment period
and possible
public
hearings, by
the Federal
Reserve. We'll
have more on
this.
For
now, here's
the absurd
line of the
week:
“analysts at
BB&T Corp.
downgraded
shares of
Susquehanna to
a “market
perform”
rating in a
research note
on Wednesday,
November
12th." How can
BB&T
objectively
rate
Susquehanna?
The secret
recordings of
then
Federal
Reserve
examiner
Carmen Segarra
about Goldman
Sachs and
regulatory
capture have
given rise to
calls for
oversight
hearings by at
least two US
Senators.
Their hearing
will now occur
on November
21. Relatedly,
BB&T's
response from
the law firm
of Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen
& Katz is
penned by a
former Federal
Reserve Board
Legal Division
supervisor.
On
November 7,
Inner City
Press was sent
a redacted
copy of CIT
Group's "Cash
Flow
Projections"
and "Risk
Management"
from its
application to
acquire
OneWest and go
above the $50
billion, Too
Big Too Fail
threshold.
Inner City
Press
immediately put the
partially
redacted
document
online on its
website, here.
First, how
could such
information be
withheld for a
bank seeking
to become Too
Big To Fail?
Second, how
could the
Federal
Reserve insist
that the
comment period
is closed,
while
information
that was
improperly
withheld is
belatedly
released?
On October 10,
Inner City
Press was sent
heavily
redacted
copies of two
letters from
the CIT Group
concerning its
proposed
acquisition of
OneWest to the
Federal
Reserve Bank
of New York,
supposedly in
compliance
with the
Freedom of
Information
Act - now uploaded
to Scribd here
and here.
On October 18,
Inner City
Press &
Fair Finance
Watch
challenged
these
redactions
under FOIA,
and
submitted
comments on
CIT's mockery
of the
Community
Reinvestment
Act to both
the Federal
Reserve and
the Office of
the
Comptroller of
the Currency.
CIT sought to
withhold even
its CRA plan.
Inner City
Press raised
the issue to
Fed Chair
Yellen in
Washington -
and on October
15, the
Federal
Reserve called
Inner City
Press and left
a voice mail
to say its
request for
extension of
the comment
period,
because of the
incorrectly
withheld CIT
documents, has
been granted
until October
22.
While
appreciating
the Fed's
comment period
extension, the
context and
public policy
questions
recently
raised must be
noted.
For now, on
October 18
Inner City
Press &
Fair Finance
Watch
submitted a
fourth timely
comment to the
Fed,
critiquing the
belatedly
released CRA
Plan, and
demanding
release of
still -
withheld
information:
The CIT CRA
Plan which CIT
improperly
withheld
states, in
Section III,
that “the Bank
has lending
and support
operations
primarily
located in
Florida, New
York and New
Jersey” --
then states
its CRA
Program is in
Salt Lake
City, Utah and
“the western
United
States.”
This is
makes a
mockery of
CRA,
explicitly
separating the
bank's lending
operations
from its “CRA”
operations.
In
Section IV,
CIT makes
claims about
outreach and
“public
participation”
in its CRA
Plan - but in
outreach and
participation
excluded the
communities in
which CIT has
its lending
operations
(FLA, NY and
NJ) and from
which, on
information
and belief, it
collects
insured
deposits.
This is
makes a
mockery of
CRA,
explicitly
separating the
bank's deposit
taking from
its “CRA”
operations and
outreach. See
limited list
of contacts in
Appendix C,
and proof of
publication in
(only) the
Salt Lake
Tribute and
Deseret News.
Even in
its artificial
limited
assessment
area, CIT's
“New CRA
Assets” are
less than 1%
of its Assets.
While
still
improper, the
above provide
a motive for
CIT's attempt
to withhold
its CRA Plan
from the
public...
As to CIT's
October 8
letter, ICP
has already
timely
commented
“there is also
the question
of the
agreement the
FDIC reached
with IndyMac /
OneWest, and
whether
wannabe SIFI
CIT would
assume it, as
a windfall.
These are
important
questions
militating for
both the
required
extension of
the comment
period, and
for public
hearings.”
In the
October 8
letter, CIT
begins a
sentence on
page 3
“Clawback
provisions
exist for the
First Fed and
La Jolla
portfolios
[REDACTED.]”
CIT also
redacts, on
page 6,
information
related to the
OnWest /
IndyMac
Consent Order;
HAMP (Page 7);
deposits
collected over
the Internet
(Page 8);
Lending (Page
9); Governance
and Risk
Management
(page 10-12);
and Resolution
Plan (Page
12). CIT also
heavily
redacts what
it calls
“confidential
questions”
(pages 14-16),
and exhibits.
This
information
must be
released, and
the comment
period
extended.
In an
abundance of
caution, ICP
has submitted
a FOIA request
to this
effect.
The Fed's
secrecy is
endemic.
The head of
the FRBNY
since 2009,
William
Dudley, has
insisted that
supervision by
the Fed and
its regional
banks is
"completely in
the public
interest." He
cites, in
support of
this,
something he
calls
"horizontal"
supervision,
which to many
has the
context of
being supine.