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Here
is the
UN Group of
Experts on the
Democratic
Republic of
the Congo
Midterm Report
under
Resolution
1533, Dated
June 20, 2013,
Exclusively
Put Online
by Inner City
Press
Letter dated
20 June 2013
from the Group
of Experts on
the Democratic
Republic of the
Congo
addressed to
the Chair of
the Security
Council
Committee
established pursuant
to resolution
1533 (2004)
concerning the
Democratic
Republic of
the Congo
The
members of the
Group of
Experts on the
Democratic
Republic of
the Congo have
the honour
to transmit
the mid-term
report of the
Group,
prepared in
pursuance of
paragraph 5 of Security
Council
resolution
2078 (2012).
Nelson Alusala
Daniel Fahey
Henry Fomba
Bernard Leloup
Marie
Plamadiala
Emilie
Serralta
I.
Introduction
1. By his
letter dated
28 December
2012
(S/2012/967),
the
Secretary-General
informed the Security
Council that
he had
appointed to
the Group of
Experts the
following
individuals:
Mr. Nelson
Alusala of
Kenya (arms);
Mr. Henry
Fombah of
Cameroon
(customs and
aviation); Mr.
Bernard Leloup
of Belgium
(regional
issues); Ms.
Marie
Plamadiala of
the Republic
of Moldova
(armed
groups); and
Ms. Emilie
Serralta of
France
(natural
resources and Coordinator).
2. By his
letter dated 2
January 2013
(S/2013/1),
the
Secretary-General
appointed the
sixth member
of the Group,
Mr. Daniel
Fahey of the
United States
(finance). Mr.
Stéphane Auvray,
Political
Affairs
Officer in the
Department of
Political
Affairs of the
Secretariat, assists
the Group.
3. Following
bilateral
consultations
with members
of the
Security
Council
Committee established
pursuant to
resolution
1533 (2004)
concerning the
Democratic
Republic of
the Congo
(hereafter
“the
Committee”)
and concerned
Member States
in New York,
the Group presented
its
investigative
priorities to
the Committee
on 1 February
2013. The
Group arrived in
the DRC on 9
February and
met with DRC
central and
provincial
government
authorities. Between
February and
May 2013, the
Group visited
the provinces
of Katanga,
Maniema, North
Kivu,
Orientale and
South Kivu.
4. During the
first part of
its mandate,
the Group
conducted two
official
visits to
Uganda, two official
visits to
Rwanda, and an
official visit
to Burundi.
The Group also
conducted
official visits
to Germany,
Belgium,
France, the
United Kingdom
and the United
States. The
Group wishes
to express its
gratitude to
these
governments
for their
availability
and
cooperation. However,
the Group
regrets that
the Government
of Rwanda did
not authorize
two members of
the Group (its
experts on
armed groups
and regional
issues) to
carry out
official
missions on
its territory
or to meet
with the
Rwandan
delegation in
New York on 29
January 2013.
5. The Group
of Experts
also wishes to
express its
appreciation
to MONUSCO
for its
support and
continued
cooperation
since the
beginning of
this mandate.
6. The Group
of Experts’
role is to
gather and
analyze all
relevant information
on flows of arms
and related
material, and
on networks operating
in violation
of the arms
embargo concerning
the DRC.
7. Pursuant to
paragraph 5 of
Security
Council
resolution
2078 (2012),
the Group of
Experts submits
the following
mid-term
report in
fulfillment of
its obligation
to report to
the Council, through
the Committee,
by 28 June
2013. The
purpose of the
report is: (a)
To describe
the Group’s
mandate and
methodology; (b)
To define the
framework of
the Group’s
current
investigations;
and (c)
To highlight
critical
events related
to the Group’s
mandate which
have taken
place since the
submission of
its final
report on 12
October 2012
(S/2012/843),
including
updates on sanctioned
individuals
and entities.
8. The Group
used
evidentiary
standards
recommended by
the report of
the Informal
Working Group
of the
Security
Council on
General Issues
of Sanctions
(S/2006/997),
relying on authentic
documents and,
as much as
possible, on
first-hand,
on-site
observations
by the experts
themselves.
The Group
corroborated
information by
using at least
three
independent and
reliable
sources. The
Group notably
used
eyewitness
testimonies
from former
and current combatants
of armed
groups, and
members of
local
communities
where
incidents took
place. In
addition, the
Group obtained
telephone
records, bank
statements,
money
transfers
records, photos,
videos, and
other material
evidence to
corroborate
its findings.
II- Congolese
armed groups
A- Mouvement
du 23 mars
(M23)
9. The Group
of Experts’
2012 final
report
(S/2012/843)
documented
arms embargo violations
committed by
the Government
of Rwanda and
by senior
officials of
the Government
of Uganda, in
their support
of M23 rebels
and their
allies. As
part of its commitment
to uphold the
right of
reply, the
Group annexes
to the present
report a
letter written
by the Prime
Minister of
Uganda
regarding the
2012 report
findings (see
annex 1). Since
the outset of
its current
mandate, the
Group has to
date found no
indication of
support to
the rebels
from within
Uganda, and
has gathered
evidence of
continuous - but
limited - support
to M23 from
within Rwanda.
The Group sent
a letter to
the Government
of Rwanda on
14 June 2013
asking for
clarification
about this
support and
looks forward
to a reply.
10. In early
2013,
leadership
struggles
between
sanctioned M23
leaders Gen.
Bosco Ntaganda
and his
deputy, “Brig.
Gen.” Sultani
Makenga, led
to a split in
M23, and
ultimately to
military
confrontations
between both
factions.
After a period
of two weeks
of combat, Makenga’s
troops,
supported by
demobilized
soldiers from
Rwanda,
defeated
troops loyal
to Ntaganda
on 15 March
2013. At the
same time,
Rwandan
officials
dismantled
Ntaganda’s network
of support and
recruitment in
Rwanda.
FN1
11. After
Ntaganda and
788 of his
loyal troops
and political
cadres fled
into Rwanda, Makenga
struggled to
rebuild a
weakened M23.
The movement
is unable to
control its
entire territory
and suffers
from poor
morale and
scores of
desertions.
FN2 During the
course of the Group’s
mandate,
Makenga’s M23
has continued
to recruit in
Rwanda and to
enlist demobilized
Rwandan
soldiers. Some
Rwanda Defence
Force (RDF)
officers have
also held meetings
with M23
commanders and
impeded the
voluntary
repatriation
of M23
combatants to
Rwanda.
1 See
para. 16-17
2 See para. 31
and 99
Ntaganda-led
M23
12. Fearing
arrest
pursuant to a
warrant from
the
International
Criminal Court
(ICC), M23’s senior
commander Gen.
Ntaganda
clandestinely
led the
rebellion from
a hideout near
the Rwandan
border, while
his deputy
Makenga acted
as the
official
leader of the
movement. FN3 Ntaganda
played a key
role in M23 by
developing a
recruitment
network within
Rwanda and forging
alliances
between M23
and other
armed groups.
Starting in
late 2012,
Ntagand increasingly
endeavored to
control M23
and
monopolized
leadership
positions for
his loyal officers.
While M23 attempted
to build an
image of a
political
movement with
legitimate demands,
such a
movement led
by Ntaganda
and his
officers, who
are notorious
for their poo human
rights
records, FN4
was not a
credible
interlocutor
during the
International
Conference on the
Great Lakes
(ICGLR)-led
negotiations
in Kampala,
Uganda.
13. Strong
disagreements
between
Ntaganda and
Makenga
concerning the
management of M23
eventually led
to a split and
subsequently
to open
military
confrontation.
Ntaganda used his
network of
contacts
within Rwanda
to support his
own M23
faction. To
halt
Ntaganda’s activities,
Rwandan
authorities
arrested some
of the
individuals
who were part
of this network
FN5. Some
Rwandan
officers also
provided
limited
material
support to
Makenga as he sought
to defeat
Ntaganda.
Divisions
within M23
14. The two
M23 commanders
first clashed
during their
November 2012
takeover of
Goma FN6. Ntaganda
moved into the
city, once it
fell into the
rebels’ hands,
despite
Makenga’s
advice to not
do so,
according to
two M23 cadres
and provincial
authorities.
Current M23
president Bertrand
Bisimwa
reported to
the Group that
Makenga
ordered his
soldiers to
vacate Goma following
international
pressure, but
Ntaganda’s
loyalists
attempted to
remain in the provincial
capital.
According to
M23 cadres and
politicians
close to M23,
M23’s then President
and Ntaganda’s
ally,
Jean-Marie
Runiga
Lugerero,
unilaterally
promoted Col. Baudoin
Ngaruye as a
“Brigadier
General,”
elevating him
to the same
rank as
Makenga to have
more leverage
on
decision-making.
15. Following
M23’s
withdrawal
from Goma on 1
December 2012,
the leadership
struggles continued.
Ntaganda and
Makenga
clashed over
the division
of the goods
looted from
Goma (see
box below),
and both
endeavored to
appoint their
officers and
cadres to key
positions within
the M23. FN7
According to
former M23
soldiers,
Ntaganda
bribed M23
officers to
gain their
loyalties and
managed to
mobilize a
majority of
M23 officers
around him.
Former M23 political
cadres and an
M23 supporter
stated that
Ntaganda
recruited in
Rwanda FN8 and maintained
supporters
within the
RDF.
3 See
S/2012/843;
para.6
4 Ntaganda’s
loyal officers
include
sanctioned
individuals
Col. Baudouin
Ngaruye, Col.
Innocent
Zimurinda, and
Lt Col Eric Badege,
whose names
were added to
the 1533
Sanctions
Committee List
on 31 December
2012 (Badege),
30 November 2012
(Ngaruye), and
1 December
2010
(Zimurinda)
respectively.
5 For more
details on
Ntaganda’s
network, see
S/2012/843;
para. 30
6 Ntaganda and
Makenga had
already
clashed
following
former CNDP
Gen. Laurent
Nkunda’s
arrest in
January 2009. Nkunda
was betrayed
by Ntaganda,
who took over
his position
as the
military
commander of
CNDP.
7 Ntaganda
accused
Makenga of
receiving
bribes from
the Congolese
delegation in
Kampala to
integrate in
the FARDC. Ntaganda
had imposed
his military
Aide de Camp,
Col. Alex
Bizimungu
Masozera, as
part of the
M23 political
delegation to receive
reports of the
negotiations.
Col. Masozera
had been
instrumental
in large scale
smuggle of
minerals in
Goma before the
2012 mutiny
(see
S/2011/738,
para. 613).
8 See
S/2012/843,
paras. 22-23
16. According
to M23 cadres,
a former RDF
officer, a
former M23
officer, an
M23 collaborator,
and two
Congolese
politicians,
Rwandan
officials who
had previously
supported Ntaganda,
and who could
no longer
control his
network in
Rwanda or his
actions in the
DRC, decided
to sideline
him from M23
and to
dismantle his
support in
Rwanda. In
late December 2012,
Rwandan
authorities
arrested RDF
Col. Jomba
Gakumba, due
to his close
ties with Ntaganda,
according to
former RDF
officers and
an M23
collaborator.
FN9 A former
Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF)
member, two
former RDF
officers and a
politician
loyal to
Ntaganda, told
the Group that
Bishop John
Rucyahana, a
Ntaganda ally
in Rwanda who
recruited politicians
and raised
funds for M23
FN10, had to
stop his
collaboration.
The Group has
sought clarification
from the
Government of
Rwanda on the
matter and is
awaiting a
response.
17. An RDF
officer, an
M23 cadre, and
two M23
collaborators
stated that on
10 March 2013, Rwandan
authorities
arrested
Gafishi
Semikore and
Theo
Bitwayiki,
while they
attempted to help
Ntaganda from
Rwanda by
supplying him
with small
quantities of
ammunition,
food and medical
supplies
during the
hostilities
between the
two factions
in Kibumba
FN11.
Begin box
M23 looted
Goma
M23 engaged in
extensive
looting while
in Goma in
November 2012.
M23 cadres and
several politicians
informed the
Group that
Ntaganda and
former M23
president
Runiga had appointed
loyal M23
members to
positions in
the DRC
customs
offices at the
border between Goma
and Gisenyi,
Rwanda, where
they embezzled
cash and other
goods (see
annex 2). On 26 November
2012,
Ntaganda’s
business
associate Logo
Kubu FN12
deposited USD
38,050 in an account
with Equity
Bank just
across the
border in
Gisenyi (see
annex 3). The
Group
hascontacted
Equity Bank
for further details.
Ntaganda
loyalist
Ngaruye
organized the systematic
looting of
Government
offices and
vehicles
(annex 4).
Officers loyal
to Makenga seized
one FARDC T55
tank (see
annex 5), as
well as an
extensive
stock of FARDC
heavy weapons
and mortars
(see annex 6).
A DRC
government
report
estimates that
M23-stolen goods
from
government
offices were
valued at over
USD 3,000,000
(see annex 7).
In April, the
Group observed
trucks stolen
in Goma
stationed in
M23-controlled
Bunagana, at
the border
with Uganda
(annex 8).
End box
Separation
between M23
factions
18. M23 split
in two
factions on 28
February 2013.
Ntaganda and
his officers
took up positions
at Kibumba, 27
kilometers
north of Goma
(see annex 9),
while Makenga maintained
control of
Rumangabo,
situated
further north
(see annex
10). Former
Ntaganda loyalists
reported that Ntaganda
had grown
suspicious,
fearing
arrest, and
increased his
own protection.
Ntaganda had
retained the
loyalty of
most of the
movement’s troops,
and M23 “Minister
of Finance”
Ephrem Bwishe
told the Group
that prior to
joining
Ntaganda in Kibumba,
Runiga took
with him most
of the M23’s
finances.
Makenga
retained most
of the movement’s
weapons and
ammunition
stock.
9 S/2012/843,
para. 83.
10
S/2012/843,
para.30.
11 Gafishi
Semikore and
Theo Bitwayiki
were part of
Ntaganda's recruitment
and support
network in
Gisenyi.
12 S/2011/738;
para. 601.
19.
The presidents
of both M23
factions
denied having
collaborated
with Ntaganda.
In February
2013, Bertrand
Bisimwa, the
president of
Makenga’s M23,
told the Group
that M23 leaders
had discovered
that Ntaganda
was hiding in
M23-held
territory. On
27 February, Bisimwa
issued a
communiqué
accusing
Runiga of
offering
Ntaganda
“political
leverage to influence
decisions of
the M23”, and
firing him as
president (see
annex 11). In
an interview with
the Group,
however,
Runiga denied
having allied
with Ntaganda
and said that
he had not seen
him since
January 2012.
20. In
late February
2013, Ntaganda
attempted to
prepare an
escape route
towards
Masisi. According
to an Ntaganda
loyalist, a
former M23
officer and a
M23
collaborator,
Ntaganda maintained
regular
contacts with
ex-Congrès
national du
peuple (CNDP)
Col. Francois Mudahunga,
the FARDC
812th Regiment
commander in
Kitchanga. In
collaboration
with Mudahunga,
Ntaganda sent
about 50 men
to prepare for
his eventual
escape to
Masisi and to collect
ammunition
from the
weapons caches
he maintained
there (see
para.
117-123).
Fight between
M23 factions
21. On 28
February 2013,
fighting broke
out between
the two M23
factions.
Three former RDF
officers, an
M23 cadre, an
M23
collaborator
and a
Congolese
politician
stated that
while some
Rwandan
officers had
ensured
Ntaganda of
their
assistance, in
reality they
had decided to
support
Makenga.
22.
Demobilized
Rwandan
soldiers
assisted
Makenga’s
advance
against
Ntaganda. Two active
M23 members
and an M23
collaborator
confirmed that
groups of
demobilized Rwandan
soldiers had
infiltrated
into the DRC
during the two
weeks of
fighting to
assist Makenga.
Five former
M23 officers
separately
witnessed the
arrival of
small groups
of men from
Rwanda, who
were
immediately
assigned
specific
military
roles, and
joined
Makenga’s forces
in combat
against
Ntaganda’s
troops. FN13
The Group
sought
clarification
about this matter
from the
Government of
Rwanda and is
awaiting an
answer.
23. Makenga
had a tactical
advantage
since he
controlled
most of the
heavy weapons
looted in
Goma, as well
as weapons M23
had captured
during
previous
operations and
the movement’s
ammunition
stock.
Makenga’s
commanders
used a tank, a
multi-barrel
rocket launcher
and 14.5 mm
heavy machine
guns to push
Ntaganda’s
soldiers
towards the
Rwandan border.
According to
one M23
officer, one
former M23
officer and
one M23
civilian member,
four
demobilized
Rwandan
soldiers
assisted
Makenga’s
troops to
operate the
heavy weapons.
13 These same
sources told
the Group that
this type of
immediate assignment
to military
roles only
takes place
when the recruits
have prior
military or
police
experience, in
contrast to
recruits who
have no experience,
who are
assigned to a training
program.
24. Rwandan
officers also
fed
disinformation
to Ntaganda
which
precipitated
his defeat. According
to two former
RDF officers,
an M23
officer,
former M23
officers, and
an Ntaganda
loyalist, some
RDF officers
met Ntaganda
in early March
2013, ahead of
the final battle,
and promised
to support him
with troops
and
ammunition.
Former M23
soldiers who fought
alongside
Ntaganda
reported that
soldiers of
the RDF
Special Forces
that were deployed
along the
border
provided
Ntaganda with
ammunition at
the outset of
the fighting, which
made him
believe that
he enjoyed RDF
support.
25. Two former
M23 officers
and one former
M23 soldier
told the Group
they overheard regular
telephone
communications
between
Ngaruye and
RDF officers
during that
week, following
which Ngaruye
ensured his
troops they
would receive
support from
Rwanda. However,
as the fight
progressed, it
became clear
the ammunition
would not
come. According
to three
former M23
soldiers,
Ntaganda’s
soldiers who
attempted to
flee to Rwanda
during the
week of 11
March 2013
were caught by
RDF soldiers
at the border
and
handed over to
Makenga’s
force.
Surrender of
Ntaganda’s M23
branch
26. As his
troops ran low
on ammunition,
Ntaganda fled
into Rwanda. According
to three loyalists,
former M23
officers, and
soldiers who
fought
alongside him,
Ntaganda
feared that the
RDF soldiers
deployed along
the border
would kill
him. Makenga’s
deputy,
sanctioned Colonel
Innocent
Kaina, also
told the Group
that he had
planned to
kill Ntaganda.
Two officers
loyal to
Makenga also
reported that
the latter had
ordered his
troops to kill
Ntaganda.
27. On 15
March 2013,
Ntaganda
clandestinely
crossed the
border into
Rwanda using a
small path
in the Gasizi
area, with one
escort. Four
of Ntaganda’s
troops, two
politicians
loyal to Ntaganda,
three M23
members, and
an Ntaganda
family member
told the Group
that he reached
Kigali with
the help of
his family,
and arrived at
the United
States embassy
on 18 March
where he
requested to
be transferred
to the ICC,
without the
prior
knowledge of Rwandan
authorities.
Subsequently,
Rwandan
authorities
arrested an
individual
suspected of having
aided
Ntaganda’s
escape, and
interrogated
Ntaganda’s
wife and
brother FN14.
28. According
to the ICGLR
Joint
Verification
Mechanism, 788
individuals,
consisting of 718
FN15 of
Ntaganda’s
troops and 70
political
cadres, began
crossing into
Rwanda on 15
March through
the Kabuhanga
and Gasizi
border points.
About 500
troops
surrendered to
Makenga in
the DRC on
Saturday 16
March (see
annex 12). RDF
soldiers
disarmed
Ntaganda’s
troops who
entered
Rwanda. In a
letter to the
Group in April
2013, the
Government of
Rwanda confirmed
that “upon
their arrival
on the
territory of
Rwanda, all
M23 combatants
were disarmed”.
According to
Rwandan
authorities,
the combatants
handed over a
total of 409 arms,
including 333
sub-machine
guns (see
annex 13).
14 In 2012,
Ntaganda’s
brother
facilitated
the travels of
recruits
through
Ntaganda’s
hotel –
Bushokoro - in
Kinigi,
Rwanda. See
S/2012/843
para. 22.
15 This figure
has also been
reported by a
foreign
diplomat to
the Group and
by the
Kigali-based
New Times in
an article on 18
March 2013.
29. Ntaganda’s
M23 faction
that crossed
the border
into Rwanda
from 15 to 16
March included
five
sanctioned
individuals.
While Ntaganda
was
transferred on
22 March 2013 from
Kigali to the
ICC in the
Hague, on 1
April 2013 the
Rwandan
authorities
relocated
Runiga,
Ngaruye, Col.
Innocent
Zimurinda and
Col. Eric
Badege to
Ngoma, about
300 km
away from the
DRC border.
The DRC
authorities
have issued
arrest
warrants for
these sanctioned
individuals.
On 22 March
2013, the
Group visited
the former M23
members in Rwanda.
Rwandan
officials
shared with
the Group a
list of 509 of
the 788
individuals
who crossed
into their
territory (see
annex 14).
30. Based on
the accounts
of former M23
officers and
M23 medical
personnel, the
Group estimates
that over 200
combatants
from both
factions died
during the
fighting. The
same sources
reported over
50 injured on
the Makenga
side, and that
some of the
injured on Ntaganda’s
side were
executed on
Ntaganda’s
orders (see
para. 141).
Rwandan
authorities told
the Group that
of the
Ntaganda
loyalists who
crossed into
Rwanda, 159
were injured.
Makenga-led
M23
31. After
Ntaganda’s
defeat,
Makenga
remained with
a weakened M23
of some 1,500 soldiers
spread out
over an area
of 700 square
kilometers.
From 20 March
to 19 June
2013, a total
of 349 M23
combatants
surrendered to
MONUSCO DDRRR
and many
others have surrendered
to the FARDC
or fled.
Moreover, M23
has lost the
support of
leaders and communities
which had
supported
Ntaganda in
northern
Rwanda, and
stopped
benefitting from
the
recruitment
and financial
networks he
had
established.
Troop
shortages
forced Makenga
to vacate
several M23
positions,
opening the
way to
incursions of
the Forces démocratiques
de libération
du Rwanda
(FDLR) and
Nyatura into
M23-held areas
(see annex 15).
32. Makenga
has attempted
to increase
the movement's
strength
through
recruitment in
DRC, Rwanda,
and Uganda.
Thanks to
assistance
from some
sympathetic
Rwandan
officials, Makenga
has been able
to recruit in
Rwanda, but
Ugandan
officials have
thwarted
several M23
attempts to
recruit on
their
territory.
Despite recent
recruitment,
M23’s failed
attempt at the
end of May
2013 to
recover a key
FARDC position
near Goma illustrates
the movement's current
inability to
carry out
large-scale
coordinated
military
operations. M23
prepares new
military
operations
33. After
Ntaganda’s M23
faction was
dismantled,
negotiations
between the
Government of the
DRC and
Makenga’s M23
resumed in
Kampala in
June 2013.
However, while
Makenga promised
his soldiers
that they
would be
integrated
into the FARDC
after
defeating Ntaganda,
eight former
M23 soldiers
interviewed by
the Group
indicated that
Makenga planned
a new attack
on Goma.
34. Subsequent
to the
adoption on 28
March 2013 of
Security
Council
resolution
2098 (2013) authorizing
the deployment
of a Force
Intervention
Brigade (FIB)
to neutralize
and disarm Congolese
rebels, M23
leaders
addressed
letters to
Member States
contributing
troops to the FIB
(South Africa,
Tanzania) to
dissuade them
from sending
their troops
to the DRC
(see annex
16).
35. According
to former M23
soldiers, M23
held military
training
sessions in
April and May 2013,
which included
training on
urban warfare
and guerilla
techniques to
defend against
the FIB.
Current and
former M23
members
informed the
Group that on
27 May 2013,
all M23 political
cadres
attended a
one-week
training
session in
leadership and
management,
during which
the rebels
apportioned
key
administrative
functions in
the event of a
recapture of Goma.
Recruitment
36. The Group
notes that M23
recruitment in
Rwanda has
decreased
since the
dismantling of Ntaganda’s
recruitment
network;
community
leaders in
northern
Rwanda who
supported Ntaganda
have ceased
collaborating
with the M23.
However, an
active M23
political
cadre, former
M23 officers,
and local
leaders
reported that
since the end
of March 2013,
M23 has recruited
approximately
200 new
recruits, some
of whom came
from refugee
camps in Rwanda,
while others –
including
children –
were recruited
in Rutshuru
and Masisi
territories in
the DRC. The
M23 also
attempted to
recruit in
refugee camps
in western
Uganda (see
para. 39).
37. Since
mid-February
2013, the
Group has
interviewed 66
surrendered
M23 officers
and soldiers,
including 23
Rwandan
nationals.
Between 1
January and 9
June 2013, the MONUSCO
DDRRR section
had
demobilized
and
repatriated 57
former M23
soldiers who declared
they were
Rwandan
nationals.16
However,
during its May
2013 visit to
Mutobo, the DDRRR
demobilization
camp in
Rwanda, a camp
official told
the Group that
no former M23 combatants
had ever
arrived at the
base.
38. Fourteen
former M23
soldiers told
the Group that
Rwandan
nationals who
deserted M23 and
tried to
return
directly to
Rwanda, were
forcibly
returned to
M23 by RDF
officers. Amongst
the 14, the
Group spoke to
two soldiers
who had
themselves
been forced
back to M23
in DRC by RDF
soldiers. One
of the two
soldiers had
fled to Rwanda
alongside four other
M23 soldiers
in March. The
soldier said
his group was
immediately
brought back
to the DRC
border by RDF
soldiers and
handed over to
M23 commanders,
who imprisoned
them at Rumangabo.
The other M23
soldier told
the Group he
fled from M23
in January and
was arrested
in Rwanda by
RDF officers
and sent back
to M23. In
April, another
former M23 soldier
witnessed RDF
soldiers
bringing a
group of 10
soldiers back
to Makenga
after they had
attempted to
flee to
Rwanda.
39. M23 has
also been
recruiting in
Uganda on a
limited scale.
The Group
interviewed
three Ugandan
citizens who
had been
recruited in
Kampala by an
M23 agent
called
Mufuruki in May
2013 and
subsequently
escaped.
Mufuruki had
promised them
lucrative jobs
in the DRC.
Upon their
arrival at the
Bunagana
border post,
they were
handed over to
another M23 agent
named Mr.
Kazungu who
ferried them
across the
border into
Congo and
delivered the to
M23
commanders.
The commanders
threatened to
shoot the
recruits when
they
protested. Ugandan
officials told
the Group that
on 7 May 2013,
they arrested
seven
individuals suspected
of recruiting
for M23. In
June 2013, six
Ugandan
nationals
deserted M23
and surrendered
to MONUSCO
DDRRR. FN16
During the
same period,
DDRRR also
repatriated 1
Ugandan and 1
Kenyan
nationals who
surrendered
from M23.
Infiltration
of demobilized
Rwandan
soldiers
40. In 2013,
M23 has
enlisted
demobilized
Rwandan
soldiers in
its ranks.
FN17 Three
former RDF
officers, ten
former M23
soldiers, and
five former
M23 officers
reported that
M23 agents
recruit
demobilized
soldiers in
Rwanda. Since
February, the
Group
interviewed
three demobilized
Rwandan
soldiers who
reported that
RDF officers
sympathetic to
M23 had recruited
them.
According to
three former
RDF officers,
an M23
collaborator,
and a M23 current
member, RDF
officers
sympathetic to
M23 have
facilitated
M23’s
recruitment
inside Rwanda
by asking
senior
demobilized
officers at
the district
level to work
with local
chiefs to enlist
demobilized
RDF soldiers
for M23.
Former RDF
officers, an
M23 cadre, and
a former M23
officer told
the Group that
M23 recruited
both former
RDF and former
FDLR soldiers in
Musanze and
Rubavu.
41. Since
March 2013,
former M23
officers
reported to
the Group that
demobilized
soldiers joined
M23 in
discreet
groups of 5 to
30 individuals
which were
also sighted
by local
leaders from
the Chanzu and
Kabuhanga
areas. Once in
M23-held
territory,
these recruits
received military
fatigues,
ranks, and
weapons at the
M23
headquarters
at Chanzu, and
at Rumangabo.
FN18 They
subsequently
received a
briefing at
Chanzu and
were mixed
into different
brigades.
Former and
current M23
cadres told
the Group that
demobilized
soldiers usually
performed
specialized
functions such
as the
operation of
heavy weapons.
42.
Demobilized
Rwandan
soldiers have
been killed on
M23 frontlines
in the DRC.
The Group
obtained the
identities and
addresses of
seven families
residing in
the northern Rwandan
villages of
Bigogwe and
Mukamira,
whose sons
fought in the
ranks of M23
as demobilized
soldiers and
died during
the fighting
between
Makenga and
Ntaganda.
43. Since the
beginning of
its current
mandate, the
Group has
interviewed
one active RDF soldier
who was
arrested in
the DRC at the
end of 2012.
However, since
the fall of
Goma in November
2012, the
Group has not
documented any
instances of
full RDF units
support to M23.
FN19
Begin Box
Mutaho
operation
On 20 May
2013, three
days prior to
the visit of
UN Secretary
General Ban
Ki-Moon to Goma,
M23
unsuccessfully
attempted to
seize Mutaho
hill, one of
the FARDC’s
positions defending
Goma (see
annex 17).
Current and
former M23
members
reported that
M23 redeployed
troops towards
Goma, vacating
other
positions (see
annex 18). The
rebels also moved
their heavy
weapons
southwards
(see annex
19). However,
faced with
strong
resistance
from the
FARDC, the
rebels
retreated to
their initial positions.
According to
former M23
officers who
participated
in the combat,
M23 soldiers ran
out of
ammunition,
lacked rockets
and shells,
suffered 40
dead and over
30 injured,
and were
compelled to
announce a
unilateral
cease-fire,
after failing
to receive
promised troo and
ammunition
support from
within Rwanda
(see annex
20). Between
21 and 22 May
2013, five
122mm cannon
rounds were
fired by M23
on a densely inhabited
area of Goma
and the
Mugunga IDP
camp (see
annex 21). Two
M23 members
and three
former M23
soldiers who
participated
in the
fighting told
the Group that
the rounds had been
fired on a
civilian
objective
following an
operator error
(see para.
142). In
early June
2013, an
active M23
member and two
M23
collaborators
told the Group
that M23
maintained
troops in
advanced
positions
close to Goma.
According to
the same
sources, during
a meeting held
on 1 June at
Chanzu,
Makenga told
his troops
that
operations on
Goma were
to be resumed.
End box
17 In
Rwanda, most
demobilized
RDF soldiers
and
demobilized
FDLR soldiers
become part of
the RDF
Reserve Forces
(see S/2012/843;
para. 20).
18 M23
administrative
headquarters
are in
Rumangabo and
the military
headquarters
in Chanzu.
19
S/2012/348/Add.1,
para. 31.
Meetings
with RDF
officers
44. The Group
received
information
that M23
commanders
have regularly
met with RDF officers.
Three former
M23 officers,
a former M23
cadre and
several local
authorities
told the Group
that, from
March through
May 2013, they
had witnessed
M23 Colonels
Kaina and Yusuf
Mboneza
meeting with
RDF officers
at the border
of Kabuhanga.
Current and
former M23
members
reported that
some RDF
officers, or
their
representatives,
have also
travelled to
Chanzu or
Rumangabo to
hold meetings
with Makenga.
Arms and
ammunition
used by M23.
45. FARDC
officers and
M23 members
told the Group
that, as it
left Goma on 1
December 2012,
M23 captured a
large quantity
of rockets,
mortars and
ammunition.
However,
current and
former M23
members
reported that
while much of
the ammunition
stolen by the
rebels in Goma
is still
available in
the movement’s
stocks, it
does not
always
correspond to
the types of
weapons the
rebels use.
Finance
46. According
to M23 cadres,
Ntaganda and
Runiga
financed M23
through a
network of individual
supporters and
business
dealings. They
used part of
their revenues
to bribe M23 officers
to join their
side. M23
officers who
had formerly
supported
Ntaganda told
the Group that
they had
received
salaries
during his
last few
months with
the M23
because he had attempted
to buy their
loyalties. All
of the M23
officers and
soldiers
interviewed by
the Group
who
surrendered
from Makenga’s
M23 stated
that they had
not received
salaries while serving
under Makenga.
47. According
to current and
former M23
members, M23
continue
taxing
commercial
trucks crossing
its
checkpoints at
Kibumba and
Kiwanja, and
the border at
Bunagana;
these taxes are
currently the
main source of
revenues for
M23. M23 tax
USD 200 to USD
1000 per
truck, depending
on the load
(see annex
22). According
to M23
members, the
movement earns
an average
of USD 6.000
per day from
this taxation
or USD 180.000
per month.
Since Ntaganda’s
surrender,
Makenga has
attempted to
reorganize the
movement’s
finances (see annex
23).
B- Armed
groups allied
with M23
48. Since
2012, M23 has
attempted to
create a broad
coalition of
armed groups
in the expectation
that
simultaneous
attacks on
several fronts
would
overburden the
FARDC. During
2013, M23
continued to
foster
insecurity
while its
representatives
were at the negotiating
table in
Kampala. The
movement’s
objective was
to demonstrate
the existence
of a
wider
governance
problem in the
DRC, seemingly
unrelated to
M23. Following
M23’s brief takeover
of Goma, the
rebels
expanded their
alliances in
the DRC using
Rwandan
territory. After
Ntaganda’s
surrender,
Makenga
consolidated
M23’s
collaboration
with most
armed groups
that Ntaganda
and Runiga had
originally
mobilized.
However, many
of the M23-led alliances
were short
lived, as the
DRC government
managed to
arrest or
neutralize
several M23
allies
operating in
South Kivu and
the Beni area.
a- Union des
forces
révolutionnaires
du Congo
(UFRC)
49. In its
2012 final
report, the
Group
documented M23
attempts to
win allies in
South Kivu
FN20. However,
these
alliances have
not gained
much ground,
as M23 lacks
popular
support in
South Kivu.
After M23
withdrew from
Goma on 1
December, its
initiatives to
open a second
front in South
Kivu
continued.
Gustave
Bagayamukwe
Tadji, a
political
activist and former
employee of
the DRC
Central Bank,
attempted to
organize armed
groups in
South Kivu
on behalf of
M23.
50. In August
2012,
Bagayamukwe
travelled to
M23-held areas
to meet Col.
Albert
Kahasha, who
hails from
South Kivu and
had joined M23
in Rutshuru,
North Kivu.
M23 commanders decided
that Kahasha
was to become
the military
leader of the
M23 in South
Kivu (see
annex 24).
Makenga
coordinated
Kahasha’s move
to South Kivu
with
Bagayamukwe.
According to Bagayamukwe,
one of his
collaborators,
and a current
M23 cadre, in
November 2012 Kahasha
travelled
through Rwanda
where he held
a series of
meetings,
following
which he crossed
back into the
DRC. After a
failed attempt
to integrate
into the FARDC
in November 2012,
Kahasha fled
to Walungu
territory in
South Kivu and
continued his
collaboration
with
M23.
20 see
S/2012/843,
paras. 69-81
51. On 16
December 2012,
Kahasha and
Bagayamukwe
created a
political-military
group called
Dynamique
populaire pour
le changement
(DPC), to
bring together
various armed groups
for the M23.
The
declaration
signed by
Bagayamukwe
and Kahasha at
this occasion included
the phrase
“sent to M23
for approval”
and called for
all DRC
institutions
to be disbanded
(see annex
25).
52.
Bagayamukwe
travelled
again to
M23-held
Bunagana on 8
January 2013
to participate
in a
meeting led by
sanctioned M23
leaders
Runiga,
Makenga and
Ngaruye. The
purpose of the meeting
was to further
consolidate
M23 alliances
and open a
front in South
Kivu. Bagayamukwe,
a UFRC member,
and a UFRC
collaborator
confirmed the
details of
this meeting
to the Group.
Two
participants
in the
meeting, as
well as two
former M23 politicians,
told the Group
that
representatives
of several
armed groups
from South
Kivu had gathered
at Bunagana
that day.
Among the
attendees were
Benoît Kadage,
Sadock Kayira, and
Citoyen
Ruhema, who
lived in
Kigali at the
time and were
trying to
recruit
members of the
Banyamulenge
community
throughout the
Great Lakes
region for
M23.
53. According
to three
participants
in this
meeting,
Makenga
thanked the
attendees for
having turned
against the
DRC
Government,
promised
financial
support, and
stated that he maintained
a weapons
cache in South
Kivu. He added
that while M23
was not able
to carry out
military
operations
because it was
negotiating in
Kampala,
“salvation
needed to come from
South Kivu”.
After the
meeting,
Bagayamukwe
spent several
days in
M23-held areas
to learn
about the
movement (see
annex 26).
54. Three UFRC
members told
the Group that
through this
coalition, M23
leaders
intended to ally
with several
Raia Mutomboki
factions
operating in
South Kivu and
mobilize Banyamulenge
youth,
together with
Lt Col. Bede
Rusagara’s
group under
the command of Kahasha.
According to
the same
sources, Raia
Mutomboki
Colonels Kashi
Maheshe and Mukimbula
Ndushi allied
with M23, as
well as
Deogratias
Bizibu Balola,
the former opposition
party Union
pour la
démocratie et
le progrès
social (UDPS)
president in
Bukavu, who
resigned in
September 2012
to create an
armed group.
The Group
obtained a
copy of a declaration
made by
Bagayamukwe
during the
meeting with
M23 at
Bunagana, in
which he outlined
the details of
the armed
groups he
wished to
federate (see
annex 27). The
Group also obtained
the copy of a
text message
sent by
Bagayamukwe on
3 February
2013, in which
he claimed
that he would
soon liberate
the DRC (see
annex 28).
55.
Bagayamukwe
told the Group
that he
travelled to
and from
Bunagana
through the Cyanika
border between
Rwanda and
Uganda (see
annex 29), and
that he
subsequently
went to
Gisenyi,
Rwanda.
Bagayamukwe
also reported
that he had
prepared a
declaration
creating UFRC
in Gisenyi,
which he
released on 20
January 2013
(see annex
30); this was
confirmed to
the Group by a
UFRC
collaborator.
In addition,
M23 political
cadres told
the Group they had
met
Bagayamukwe in
Gisenyi.
56. UFRC
diaspora
members
interviewed by
the Group
confirmed that
Bagayamukwe
had coordinated
the creation
of the UFRC
while he was
in Rwanda. The
Group obtained
a rental contract
in the name of
Bagayamukwe
for a
residence in
Kamembe,
Rwanda (see
annex 31), as
well as a
letter dated 6
January 2013
in which
Bagayamukwe
requested to
set up his residence
in Rwanda (see
annex 32).
After spending
nearly three
weeks in
Rwanda between Kigali
and Kamembe,
Bagayamukwe
travelled
through
Burundi to
cross back
into the DRC on
9 February,
and was
arrested the
following day
by the DRC
authorities.
57.
Bagayamukwe
told the Group
that the UFRC
received the
support of
diaspora
members. In
this
connection,
the Group has
been in
contact with
Tamusa Lumembo
residing in Belgium,
Moké Silubwe
residing in
France, and
Gaudens
Bisimwa
residing in
Germany. All three
confirmed they
were active
UFRC members.
The Group
obtained the
copy of a
draft communiqué
nominating
Lumembo as the
coordinator of
the UFRC
diaspora (see
annex 33). After
Bagayamukwe’s
arrest,
Silubwe became
the president
of the UFRC
and issued a declaration
condemning the
arrest (see
annex 34).
58. UFRC
diaspora
members told
the Group that
the diaspora
is
specifically
tasked with collecting
money to
finance the
UFRC and that
its members
have opened a
bank account
for that
purpose (see
annex 35). The
same sources
reported that
diaspora
members
created a budget
based on the
estimated cost
of toppling
the DRC
Government
(see annex
36). To date, the
Group has
concluded that
the diaspora
linked to the
UFRC has
mainly carried
out propaganda
on behalf of
the movement;
the Group
intends to
further
investigate
other forms of
support.
59. The DRC
Government
cracked down
on the UFRC
and arrested
Bagayamukwe
and Colonels
Mushamuka and
Mbangu Mukaz,
two Raia
Mutomboki
leaders
operating
under Kahasha’s
command. As a
result, the
prospect of
forming a
coalition for
South Kivu has
lost momentum.
However,
Kahasha
continues
operating in
Walungu
alongside some
Raia Mutomboki
factions,
maintains his
alliance with
M23 and enjoys
the
cooperation of
the same diaspora
members. On
24-25 April
2013, Kahasha
attacked the
positions of
FARDC 1002 Regiment
in Chishadu in
South Kivu.
Silubwe issued
a communiqué
acknowledging
UFRC responsibility
for the attack
(see annex
37). While the
communiqué
claimed
victory for UFRC,
an FARDC
officer and a
UN source told
the Group that
several Raia
Mutomboki soldiers
had been
killed in the
battle.
b-Raia
Mutomboki
60. Since
2011, Raia
Mutomboki
rapidly
developed
throughout
South Kivu and
then North Kivu.
Most Raia
Mutomboki
members
organized
themselves as
local defence
groups against the
FDLR. In 2012,
the Group
reported
several cases
of massacres
of FDLR and
their dependants
committed by
Raia Mutomboki
(see
S/2012/843,
paras.
148-149). In
March 2013, Mutuza
Kasapa, a Raia
Mutomboki
commander in
Shabunda,
South Kivu,
told the Group
that Raia
Mutomboki
would not
cease
hostilities as
long as there
were
Rwandophones
in the Kivus.
Raia Mutomboki
groups have
replaced the
FDLR in
certain areas,
and levy taxes
on trading
routes and
mines. Raia
Mutomboki
commanders
Maj. Donat
Omari Kengwa,
Meshe, Constant
and Ngandu met
in
mid-February
2013 in
Kigulube to
settle their
differences,
create a
common
structure and
discuss their
financing
through
taxation.
Additional
meetings took place
in Shabunda in
May and June
2013.
61. The
Group’s final
2012 report
documented M23
support to
several Raia
Mutomboki groups
in southern
Masisi
territory,
North Kivu
FN21. The Raia
Mutomboki
commanders in Masisi
had mostly
maintained
ties with
Ntaganda and
another
sanctioned M23
leader, Lt.
Col Eric
Badege FN22.
In March 2013,
after
Ntaganda’s
loyal
officers,
including
Badege, fled
to Rwanda,
one Raia
Mutomboki
leader visited
M23 to
initiate
collaboration
with Makenga’s branch.
The Group
obtained a
draft document
produced by a
Raia Mutomboki
group from Masisi,
which
criticizes the
division
created within
M23 and aligns
with M23
agenda. It
also requests
the departure
of the FDLR
and threatens
to kill FDLR
members (see
annex 38). In spite
of the enmity
of the Raia
Mutomboki
towards
Rwandophones,
M23 managed to
ally with
certain Raia
Mutomboki
factions,
although this
has created
tensions
because of the popular
resentment
against the
M23 in South
Kivu (see
paras. 54 and
59).
c- Union pour
la
réhabilitation
de la
démocratie du
Congo (URDC)
62. In 2012
and 2013,
there has been
a
proliferation
of armed
groups in the
North Kivu territories
of Lubero and
Beni. These
militias
consist almost
entirely of
members of the Nande
community. The
most
significant
group is the
Union pour la
réhabilitation
de la démocratie
du Congo
(URDC), led by
“Brigadier
General”
Paluku Kombi
Hilaire, who defected
from the FARDC
in June 2012.
The URDC has
alliances with
other rebel
groups, including
M23.
63. According
to
ex-combatants,
local leaders,
and Congolese
officials,
URDC
represents the opposition
of local
politicians
and
businessmen to
the central
government. In
mid-2012, Mr. Mbusa
Nyamwisi, a
DRC opposition
politician
currently
residing in
South Africa,
acted on this
discontent by
encouraging
Congolese
soldiers –
many of whom
had served in
the armed wing
of Nyamwisi’s
RCD-K/ML rebel
group – to
defect and
join Hilaire’s
group. Nyamwisi’s
affiliate Andy
Laurent
Patandjila
Paluku also
recruited
demobilized
RCD-K/ML militants
and other
youth to join
URDC (see
S/2012/843,
para. 65).
64. Hilaire’s
group consists
of
approximately
300 combatants
operating in
three camps. Hilaire
leads the main
group based at
Bunyatenge in
Lubero
territory,
while a “Col.” Werrason
heads a second
group based at
Mumbiri in
Beni
territory.
“Col.” Eric
Kenzo, a former
member of
PARECO (see
S/2011/738,
para. 266),
leads a third
group at
Kyavinyonge in
Virunga
National Park,
in Beni
Territory.
This group
consists of
remnants of
the group formerly
headed by
“Col.” David
Lusenge.
Former
combatants,
local leaders,
and Congolese authorities
state that
Hilaire’s
groups obtain
weapons and
ammunition
from local
FARDC
soldiers
(either by
purchasing the
arms or
attacking and
looting FARDC
positions),
from M23
(see below),
and from
smugglers who
bring arms
from Uganda.
65. Mr.
Nyamiwisi
recruited
Lusenge, who
deserted from
FARDC in
November 2012
to join Hilaire.
According to
Congolese and
Ugandan
authorities,
Lusenge
carried out
recruitment
inUganda with
the support of
s anctioned
individual
Kakolele
Bwambale. The
Group interviewed
four Ugandan
nationals who
had been
recruited and
armed by
Bwambale and Lusenge,
and who were
arrested by
the DRC
authorities at
Kamango in
March 2013
(see annex
39). Lusenge
informed the
Group that he
coordinated
his operations
with Hilaire
and admitted
that he was in
regular
contact with
M23 commanders
after his
desertion in November
2012. In April
2012,
Congolese
authorities
requested
Bwambale to
come to Kinshasa
while Lusenge
surrendered to
the FARDC. In
May 2012,
Ugandan
authorities arrested
Loli Adrain,
aka Muhumuza,
who recruited
on behalf of
Lusenge and
Bwambale in Kampala.
21
see
S/2012/843,
para. 63
22 see
S/2012/843,
paras. 62-63
66.
According to
local
authorities
and escapees
or former
abductees
interviewed by MONUSCO,
Kenzo’s group
is responsible
for some of
the 160
kidnappings of
children and adults
in Beni
territory
since the
beginning of
2013 (see
annexes 40and
41). Escapees
and former
abductees
stated that
some of them
underwent
military
training,
while others
were used
for forced
labor. The
Group
continues to
investigate
the identities
and motives of
the kidnappers
and the fate
of the
abductees.
67. On 15 May
2013, Kenzo’s
troops,
including
child
soldiers, led
members of
other local militias
in an attack
against the
FARDC base in
Beni town to
liberate
prisoners and
loot weapons.
Seven FARDC
soldiers
wounded in the
attack told
the Group that
most of the attackers
were armed
with spears
and machetes,
and some
AK-47s. FARDC
suffered nine dead
and 17
wounded, while
33 Mai Mai
combatants
were killed
and eight were
captured.
68. According
to
ex-combatants,
local leaders,
and Congolese
government
officials,
Hilaire maintains
close ties
with M23 (see
S/2012/843,
para. 66).
These same
sources told
the Group that
during May
2013, M23 sent
troops and
arms to
Hilaire in an
attempt to
establish a
M23 presence
in Lubero and
Beni
territories
before the
deployment of
the FIB.
Hilaire communicates
with M23
through Lt.
Col. Tahanga
Nyoro
Kasereka, an
FARDC deserter
who acts
as a political
liaison
between Mbusa
Nyamwisi, M23,
and Hilaire. A
former
combatant, two
local leaders
and three
Congolese
government
officials
informed the
Group that
Andy Patandjila
was one of
several
Nyamwisi
associates
among the
pro-Ntaganda
M23 political cadres
who
surrendered on
16 March 2013
in Rwanda (see
annex 42).
69. URDC also
works closely
with “Major
General”
Kakule Sikula
Lafontaine,
who leads the Union
des patriotes
du Congo pour
la paix
(UPCP),
operating
around
Bunyatenge in
Lubero Territory
(see annex
43). After
defecting from
the FARDC,
Hilaire was
initially
subordinate to
Lafontaine.
Former
combatants,
government
officials, and
UN sources
indicated to
the Group
that Hilaire
now wields
greater
operational
power than
Lafontaine
over militias
in Beni
and Lubero
territories.
70. Hilaire
also
coordinates
with the
militia
controlled by
Paul “Morgan”
Sadala (see
para. 70).
Former
combatants and
local leaders
stated that
Hilaire
supplied
Morgan with
weapons and
ammunition in
exchange for
gold and
ivory. The
same sources
reported that
Hilaire has occasionally
dispatched
some of his
combatants to
support
operations
conducted by
Morgan, including
the 6 January
2013 attack on
Mambasa town
(see para.
73).
71. According
to former
combatants,
local leaders
and Congolese
government
authorities, URDC
and other
militias
primarily
finance
themselves by
exploiting
natural
resources, especially
gold and
ivory, and
trading these
resources with
businessmen in
Beni, Butembo, and
Kasindi.
According to
these sources,
during 2012
and early
2013,
Congolese businessman
Muhindo
Kasebere was
the most
prominent
financier and
supplier of
arms and ammunition
to Hilaire’s
militias (see
para. 198). In
December 2012,
Congolese
authorities arrested
Mr. Arnold
Musinganinya,
a businessman
and relative
of Mbusa
Nyamwisi, for recruiting
ex-RCD/K-ML
soldiers for
Hilaire’s
group by
offering them
100,000
Congolese francs
($111).
C- Other
Congolese
armed groups
Mai Mai Morgan
72. Paul
Sadala (alias
Morgan) is an
armed group
leader
operating in
the
territories of Mambasa
and Bafwasende
of Orientale
Province (see
S/2012/843,
paras.
128-132).
Morgan commands
several dozen
combatants who
operate in
small groups
out of
shifting camps. Morgan
frequently
swells his
ranks with
recruits from
Kisangani or
troops
dispatched
from allies
such as Col.
Hilaire
Kambale Kombi
of URDC (see
para. 70) and
Mai Mai Simba
(see S/2011/738,
paras.
246-251), when
he carries out
major attacks.
73. On 6
January 2013,
Morgan led a
group of
approximately
150 armed
troops,
including some
of Hilaire’s
soldiers, in
an attack on
Mambasa town,
the capital of Mambasa
Territory in
the Ituri
District.
According to
local
authorities
and UN
sources,
during this
attack, Morgan’s
forces looted
goods and
money, and
raped
approximately
50 women.
Soldiers from the
FARDC 905th
Regiment,
under the
command of
Col. John
Tchinyama,
pushed
Morgan’s forces
out of
Mambasa, with
support from
the Ituri
Brigade of
MONUSCO. Nine
FARDC soldiers,
six civilians,
and about 45
Mai Mai were
killed during
the retaking of
Mambasa.
74. Two people
who had been
abducted by
Morgan and one
former Mai Mai
combatant told the
Group that on
several
occasions,
they overheard
Morgan talking
to FARDC
officers on a satellite
phone prior to
and during the
attack on
Mambasa. These
people further
informed the Group
that allies
within FARDC
guided Morgan
along routes
through which
he could avoid encountering
government
forces.
75. After
recapturing
Mambasa town,
some FARDC
soldiers
committed
human rights
abuses while
searching for
remnants of
Morgan’s
forces. Local
populations
and civil
society representatives
reported that
some FARDC
troops had
engaged in
rape,
harassment,
extortion and
arbitrary
arrests. The
Group obtained
video footage,
which it
intends to
archive,
showing that
on 7 January
2013, FARDC
soldiers had
engaged in
cruel,
degrading, and
inhumane treatment
of Mai Mai
suspects at
Hotel Pygmy in
Mambasa town
(see annex
44).
76. According
to civil
society groups
and MONUSCO
investigators,
between 1 and
5 November
2012 alone,
Morgan’s group
raped or
sexually
mutilated more
than 150 women during
a series of
attacks on
villages in a
gold-mining
area south of
Mambasa.
Former captives
told the Group
that on
several
occasions,
Morgan’s group
had engaged in cannibalism
and killed and
injured people
by setting
them on fire
(see annex
45). Six
former captives
told the Group
that Morgan’s
group had
captured more
than 50 women
and used them
as sexual
slaves (see
para. 146).
While Morgan
is the overall
commander,
other leaders include
his
lieutenant,
Manu, and a
witch doctor
named Jean
Pierre (alias
JP or
“Docteur”) (see
annex 46).
77. Morgan is
a long-time
poacher of
elephants in
and around the
Okapi Fauna
Reserve, but in
the last year,
he has
increasingly
sustained his
group by
stealing and
selling gold,
as well as
by pillaging
the property
of local
populations.
In late 2012
and early
2013, Morgan’s group
attacked mines
near Biakato,
Elota and
Pangoy, stole
gold from
miners, and
killed at least
two elephants
for ivory. The
Group
confirmed this
with four
people
abducted by Morgan’s
group as well
as from
several
community
leaders in
Epulu and
Mambasa. The Group
continues to
investigate
Morgan’s
connections to
criminal
networks in
Orientale Province
(see
S/2012/843,
para. 129).
78. FARDC
attacked
Morgan’s group
in early 2013,
causing it to
fragment into
small armed criminal
bands. His
force
continues to
carry out
attacks. For
instance, on 2
June 2013, Morgan
and his troops
attacked two
sites near
Adusa village
(west of
Epulu),
killing 2 FARDC
soldiers,
wounding three
women and one
soldier,
stealing
weapons and
gold, and abducting
several
people,
including
women and
children.
FRPI and COGAI
79. There has
been little
progress since
the Group’s
final 2012
report on
integrating
into FARDC,
or defeating,
the Forces de
résistance
patriotiques
en Ituri
(FRPI), led by
“Brig. Gen.”
Justin
Banaloki,
alias “Cobra
Matata” (see
S/2012/843,
paras. 83-84).
FRPI controls
a large
part of
eastern and
southern Irumu
territory in
Orientale
Province’s
Ituri
District, centered
on Walendu
Bindi
chefferie,
where it has
resisted
government
control since
2001.
80. Cobra
Matata
nominally
remains the
head of the
Coalition des
groupes armés
de l’Ituri (COGAI),
which
destabilized
Ituri during
2012 but was
weakened by
FARDC
operations
(see S/2012/843,
para. 85).
Five local
leaders and
civil society
representatives
in Ituri and Kampala
informed the
Group that
Mateso Savo,
who was the
main financier
of COGAI, has been
living in
Kampala since
FARDC raided
his farm in
September 2012
near Jiba in
the Ituri
District (see
S/2012/843,
para. 85).
Among the five
groups that
are officially
part of COGAI,
FN23 only FRPI
is currently
active. The
remnants of
other groups
were
integrated
into FRPI.
81. On 22 May
2013, seven
senior FRPI
leaders,
including
“Col.” Mbadhu
and “Col.”
Hitler (see
annex 47),
told the Group
they wanted to
reach an
agreement with
the central government
similar to the
23 March 2009
accord that
Kinshasa made
with CNDP and
other armed
groups (see
S/2010/596,
para. 165).
FRPI leaders
told the Group
that their
main objectives
were to be
integrated
into the FARDC
at their
current
(self-proclaimed)
ranks, to remain
in Ituri, and
to have the
government
liberate and
grant amnesty
to FRPI
prisoners.
23 Col.
Hitler told
the Group that
the five
members of
COGAI are:
FRPI, General
Cobra
commanding,
based in Irumu territory;
FRPI-Aru, Col.
Eneko
commanding,
based in Aru
territory;
FPDDI (Front
populaire pour
la défense et
le développement
de l’Ituri),
Col. Hitler
commanding,
based in Djugu
territory;
FAII (Force
armée
d’intégration
Iturienne), Col.
Semire
commanding;
and FAR (Force
armée de la
révolution),
Col. Kabu
commanding.
82.
FRPI claims to
represent the
Ngiti (Lendu)
community in
Walendu Bindi,
but enjoys
only limited
local support.
Six local
leaders and
residents of
Walendu Bindi
told the Group
that FRPI
harasses and
collects taxes
from local
populations.
For example,
each household
is required
to pay 500
Congolese
francs ($0.55)
plus a basin
full of food
on a monthly
or sometimes
a weekly
basis. FRPI
also sustains
itself with
funds from
artisanal gold
mining in Bavi
(see
S/2012/843,
para. 84).
Since the
beginning of
2013, FRPI
militias have
looted several
thousand head
of cattle from
ranchers
within and
around their
area of
control. Walendu
Bindi leaders
have publicly
opposed the
cattle thefts.
Four local
leaders and residents
in Walendu
Bindi and
Bahema Sud
collectivities
told the Group
that Hema and
Bira leaders
in areas
around FRPI
territory were
creating
self-defence
groups to
protect cattle herds
and local
communities.
Kata Katanga
83. Kata
Katanga (a
Swahili phrase
meaning “cut
off Katanga”)
is a loosely
structured
armed group
that brings
together
individuals
and groups
advocating for
the secession
of Katanga Province
from DRC. The
most
significant
armed group
leader is
Kyungu
Mutanga, aka Gédéon,
who operates
in the areas
of Manono,
Mitwaba and
Pweto. Gédéon
is allied with
the armed
wing of
Coordination
pour le
référendum et
l’autodétermination
du Katanga (CORAK)
(see
S/2011/738,
paras.
272-277),
which calls
itself CORAK
Kata Katanga,
or simply
Kata Katanga.
84. Four
senior Kata
Katanga
leaders told
the Group that
Kata Katanga
is not a Mai
Mai organization,
but rather a
group
consisting of
“Katangan
Tiger”
soldiers who
fought against the
Mobutu regime
in the 1970s
and against
the AFDL in
1998. It also
includes
younger followers.
Eight Kata
Katanga
members among
those arrested
in March 2013
and
transferred to
Kinshasa (see
below) told
the Group that
the leader of
CORAK is
Ferdinand
Ntanda Imena,
who lives in
exile.
However, in a
sign that
CORAK’s
leadership
remains
disputed, the four
Kata Katanga
leaders
interviewed by
the Group
stated that
Ntanda Imena
only directs certain
groups within
Kata Katanga,
while others
operate
semi-autonomously.
85. The Kata
Katanga
movement is
linked to
debates over
Katanga’s
future
political
status. While
Kata Katanga
represents the
radical wing
of a
long-standing
movement for
Katanga to become
an independent
state, other
political
interests
favor
decentralization
(dividing Katanga
into four
provinces), or
federalism
(leaving
Katanga intact
as a province
of the DRC but
giving it
greater
autonomy).
Politicians in
southern
Katanga, where most
of the province’s
vast mineral
wealth is
concentrated,
generally
support
decentralization,
but politicians
in northern
Katanga, which
is poor by
comparison,
generally
oppose such a
move and
favor Katanga
remaining
intact as a
province or an
independent
country.
Although the secession
sentiment is
strongest
among older
Katangans who
were part of
provincial independence
movements in
the 1960s and
1970s, Kata
Katanga has recently
attracted many disaffected
youth into its
ranks.
86. Kata
Katanga states
that its
principal
objective is
to fight for
the
independence
of Katanga.
Its leaders
told the Group
that they have
troops in
Kamina,
Manono,
Mitwaba, Kalemie,
Pweto, and
Bendera, as
well as in
Lubumbashi.
The group
claims to be
recruiting new
members and
providing them
with military
training. The
group also
claims to have
links with
Katangan
political
leaders at the
national,
provincial,
and local
levels;
sympathizers within
the FARDC and
the PNC; and
Katangan
diaspora in
Europe and
North America.
87. In late
2012 and early
2013, armed
activities in
Katanga
resulted in
serious human
rights violations
and breaches
of
international
humanitarian
law. The
perpetrators
of these violations
are both armed
groups, some
of which are
aligned with
Kata Katanga,
and the FARDC,
which has been
conducting
operations
against Kata
Katanga (see
annex 48). Violence
in Katanga has
been
characterized
by massacres,
summary
executions,
ethnically targeted
attacks, and
burning of
people, homes,
and property.
This violence
has led to an increase
in internally
displaced
persons
(IDPs), which
number
approximately
365,000 as of June
2013. Most of
these
displacements
are in the
area between
Manono,
Mitwaba, and Pweto,
with the
latter
recording the
highest number
of the IDPs
(159,000). In
total, 10 out
of the
22 territories
of the
province are
affected.
88. On 23
March 2013, a
group of 336
Kata Katanga
members
entered
Lubumbashi.
During their
march to the
MONUSCO
headquarters
in town, where
they planned
to make a plea
for independence,
Congolese
soldiers
(Republican
Guard and
FARDC
soldiers) and
police shot at
the
lightly-armed
Kata Katanga
group, killing
and injuring
scores. When
the group
entered MONUSCO
headquarters,
the Republican
Guard fired
dozens of
shots at the
MONUSCO base,
causing damage
to MONUSCO
premises (see
paragraph 139
and annex 67).
89. Following
the 23 March
incident,
FARDC embarked
on operations
against armed
groups in
Katanga. There
have been
numerous
clashes
between FARDC
and Kata
Katanga during April
and May 2013,
but Kata
Katanga has
also battled
newly formed
self-defense
groups in central
and northern
Katanga. These
self-defense
groups fight
Kata Katanga
in order to control
mining sites,
such as the
gold mine at
Ntoya and to protect
communities
that oppose Kata
Katanga’s
objectives.
III – Foreign
armed groups
A - Allied
Democratic
Forces
90. The ADF is
an Islamist
rebel group
led by Ugandan
fighters and
operating
northwest of the
Rwenzori
Mountains in
North Kivu.
ADF’s current
strength is
estimated to
range between 800
and 1200
soldiers. FN24
ADF is a
tightly
controlled
organization,
with close to
no combatants
who surrender,
and there are
persistent
reports that
ADF has
attempted to increase
its numbers
through
recruitment
and
kidnappings
during early
2013.
24 The Group
is
investigating
claims that
ADF has
greater
numbers of
combatants.
91. Since
2011, Jamil
Mukulu, the
ADF’s
sanctioned
leader who
previously
undertook extensive
travel, has
been primarily
based in the
DRC, according
to Ugandan
intelligence,
an ADF
collaborator,
and a former
ADF soldier.
The same
sources
informed the
Group that Mukulu’s
headquarters
is currently
located
north-east of
Eringeti at a
camp called
Madinat Tawheed
Muwaheedina
(MTM). ADF
maintains two
other camps
called Canada
and Commander
Ibrahim Battle
Group (CIBG).
MONUSCO and
Ugandan
intelligence
reported that
the ADF has
recently
opened new
camps east of
Eringeti.
92. According
to a former
ADF soldier,
an ADF
collaborator
and Ugandan
authorities,
ADF maintains
regional
networks for
recruitment in
Uganda and
Burundi. As of
June 2013, Ugandan
authorities
had arrested
several people
they accuse of
recruiting
adults and
children for
ADF on Ugandan
territory. Two
former ADF
soldiers and
UN sources
stated that
ADF engage
in voluntary
recruitment in
Uganda, but
also deceives
potential
recruits with
promises of
employment or
education. It
primarily
recruits in
eastern Uganda
and transports
the recruits
into the DRC
through the
border village
of Bwera.
Ugandan
authorities
also reported that
in 2012, ADF
elements in
Uganda killed
five former
ADF
collaborators;
two former ADF
collaborators
confirmed this
to the Group.
Ugandan
authorities
arrested the
individuals suspected
of the
killings.
93. According
to FARDC and
former ADF
elements, ADF
has also
recruited in
the DRC in 2013
and carried
out a series
of abductions
of Congolese
nationals in
Eringeti and
Oicha areas
for
recruitment
purposes.
Congolese
authorities
estimate that
ADF abducted
about 80 civilians
since the
beginning of
2013,
including
women and
children (see
annex 41).
94. A former
ADF soldier
and Ugandan
intelligence
told the Group
that Mukulu
requires all women
and children
present in ADF
camps, both
dependents of
ADF soldiers
and recruits,
to receive
military
training. The
same sources
stated that
compulsory
military
training commences
for boys at
the age of 10
and for girls
at the age of
15. The Group
obtained video material
of training
sessions of
children and
women carried
out in ADF
camps in 2012.
95. A former
ADF soldier
and Ugandan
intelligence
estimate that
ADF’s arsenal
consists of mortars,
machine guns,
and
rocket-propelled
grenades
(RPG). Former
ADF soldiers
told the Group
that when
foreign
trainers
visited ADF in
the past, they
instructed
them on the assembly
of improvised
explosive
devices.
96. Two former
ADF soldiers
and Ugandan
intelligence
reported that
ADF received
money transfers
from London,
Kenya, and
Uganda, which
are collected
by Congolese
intermediaries in
Beni and
Butembo.
According to
the same
sources, ADF
commander
Benjamin Kisokeranyo
is in charge
of
intelligence,
finances, and
supplies
within the ADF
(see annex 49).
Two former ADF
soldiers and
Ugandan
authorities
stated that
ADF also
derives
funding from
its network of
car and
motorcycle
taxis
operating in
and between
Butembo, Beni
and Oicha.
ADF also
derives
profits from
gold and
timber exports
to Uganda.
Ugandan and Burundian
intelligence
told the Group
that the ADF
continues to
collaborate
with
Al-Shabaab in
2013 (see
S/2012/843,
para.105). The
Group is
further
investigating
financial
support to the
ADF and
potential
links with
Al-Shabaab.
B - Forces
démocratiques
de libération
du Rwanda -
FDLR
97. The FDLR
continued to
weaken during
the first half
of 2013. FDLR
currently has approximately
1,500
soldiers25,
the majority
of whom
deployed in
North Kivu and
the remainder
in South Kivu.
The decrease
in the
strength of
FDLR is mostly
due to a high surrender
rate. During
2012, MONUSCO
DDRRR
repatriated
1,441 foreign
FDLR combatants,
and
demobilized
398 FDLR
Congolese
combatants.26
However, the
rate of FDLR
surrenders has
declined since
the beginning
of 2013. As of
14 June 2013,
only 309 FDLR
combatants
have
surrendered to
DDRRR.
98. During
2012, Raia
Mutomboki
attacks
against the
FDLR forced
the latter to
redeploy towards
the east of
North Kivu,
and towards
the south of
South Kivu. As
a result,
there is a gap
of 400
kilometers
between the
northern and
southern FDLR
sectors, and
hardly any movement
of troops
between the
two sectors
(see annex
50). As a
consequence of
the Raia Mutomboki
threat, Maj.
Gen. Sylvestre
Mudacumura,
FDLR’s
military commander,
shifted his
headquarters
northward to
the Ngango
area, in
Walikale,
North Kivu
(see annex
51).
99. The FDLR
suffers from
internal
divisions and
a weak
hierarchy that
lacks the
capability to
command and
control the
organization’s
entire
operations.
The movement’s
leadership is divided
between
hardliners
such as
Mudacumura who
want to
continue the
armed
struggle, and
moderates
belonging to
younger
generations,
who favor
demobilization
and
reintegration. The
FDLR command
has been
further
weakened by
the arrest in
Tanzania in
early 2013 of FDLR
deputy
commander and
sanctioned
individual
General
Stanislas
Nzeyimana, aka Izabayo
Bigaruka, who
had travelled
on a
clandestine
mission and in
violation of
the travel ban.
FDLR officers
and
intelligence
sources from
the region
confirmed
Nzeyimana’s
arrest and
told the Group
that Rwandan
officials are
currently
detaining
Bigaruka.
However, in a letter
to the Group,
the Government
of Rwanda
denied having
arrested or
detained
Bigaruka.
100. The Group
has not found
any evidence
that FDLR
receives
significant
financial or
other support
from abroad.
The Group has
investigated a
diaspora
network led by
Bernard Twayiramungu,
Felicien
Barabwiriza,
and Jean Bosco
Uwihanganye,
who have been
residing in
Germany. In
December 2012,
German
authorities
arrested these
individuals
and charged them
on suspicion
of belonging
to a terrorist
organization.
The Group
continues to
investigate FDLR
support
networks that
may be
maintained in
Europe.
FDLR attacks
in Rwanda
101. Since M23
took control
of the area
along the
border with
Rwanda in
Rutshuru
territory, FDLR
concentrated
its troops
adjacent to
M23-controlled
areas and
carried out
three attacks on
Rwandan soil
in late 2012
and mid-2013.
FDLR officers
told the Group
that the
objective
of these
attacks was to
show the FDLR
was not a
dying force.
The same
sources stated
that the
incursions
into Rwanda
have boosted
the morale of
FDLR troops,
and encouraged
their leaders
to plan other
attacks.
25 The Group
based its
estimates on
MONUSCO DDRRR
figures, as
well as on
interviews
with current
and former
FDLR soldiers.
However, in a
communication
to the Group,
the Rwandan
Government
estimated the
current FDLR
strength to be 5000
troops.
26 During
2012, DDRRR
also
repatriated
1,587 FDLR
dependents.
102. On 27
November 2012,
taking
advantage of
M23’s movement
toward Goma,
which left its
western flank
exposed, about
160 FDLR
soldiers
crossed into
Rwandan
territory
through Gasizi.
According to
FDLR officers,
a Commando de
recherche et
d’action en
profondeur (CRAP)
unit operating
from
Nyamulagira
had crossed
into Rwanda
ahead of the
attack. The FDLR
targeted RDF
positions at
Kabuhanga and
Muti, in
Rubavu
district (see
annex 52). On 2
December,
about 80 FDLR
soldiers
infiltrated
into Rwanda
near Mount
Visoke and attacked
the RDF
position
nearby Kinigi,
killing one
park ranger
(see annex
53).
103. FDLR
spokesperson
La Forge Fils
Bayeze
publicly
claimed FDLR
responsibility
for these
attacks. FDLR
cadres and
surrendered
soldiers
reported that
FDLR North
Kivu Sector deputy
commander Col.
Stanislas
Gakwerere,
alias Stany,
coordinated
these
incursions, acting
under Sector
commander Col.
Pacifique
Ntavunguka,
alias Omega,
and ultimately
on
the orders of
Mudacumura.
104. Rwandan
officials told
the Group that
the RDF killed
30 FDLR
soldiers and
captured one
FDLR soldier
during the
November and
December
attacks. RDF
officers
recovered weapons
used by the
FDLR during
their
incursion, as
well as
telephones,
sim cards,
identity cards,
and FDLR
documents (see
annex 54). RDF
officers also
discovered a
hand-drawn map of
the DRC-Rwanda
border area,
and a list of
radio signs in
the belongings
of the dead
FDL soldiers
(see annex
55).
105. According
to FDLR and
M23
commanders, on
24 May 2013,
when most of
M23’s troops
were engaged
in a failed
offensive near
Goma, FDLR
infiltrated
again into
Rwanda through
Gasizi to
launch another
attack.
FDLR – FARDC
cooperation
106. Faced
with the
rapidly
evolving M23
rebellion in
2012, the
FARDC first
abided by a tacit
non-aggression
agreement with
the FDLR.
However, the
declining
security
situation in eastern
DRC,
culminating
with the fall
of Goma on 20
November 2013,
enhanced the collaboration
between some
FARDC units
and the FDLR
in areas of
close
proximity with M23-controlled
territory. The
Group has
documented
local-level
collaboration
between the FARDC
and the FDLR,
and continues
to investigate
the extent to
which the FARDC hierarchy
may be
involved in
such
collaboration.
The Group sent
a letter on 12
June 2013 to the
Government of
DRC asking for
clarification
about this
support and is
awaiting a
reply.
107. The Group
interviewed 10
FARDC soldiers
in Tongo, in
North Kivu,
who reported
that FARDC
and FDLR
regularly meet
and exchange
operational
information.
These same sources
stated that
FARDC soldiers
supplied
ammunition to
the FDLR. Col.
Faida Fidel Kamulete,
the commander
of FARDC 2nd
battalion of
601st Regiment
based at
Tongo, denied such
collaboration,
but declared
to the Group
that FARDC and
FDLR do not
fight each
other. FDLR
officers and
an FDLR
collaborator
told the Group
that “Col.”
Jean-Baptiste
Gakwerere aka
Esdras Kaleb,
who commands
the FDLR
deployed in
Tongo is in
charge of the coordination
between FDLR
and FARDC
officers in
the area.
108. Four
former FDLR
soldiers from
Tongo and
Bambo
confirmed to
the Group that FARDC
soldiers had
transferred
ammunition to
FDLR, with the
instruction
that it had to
be used
against M23.
In January
2013, two FDLR
former
soldiers
witnessed
separately
meetings between
FARDC and FDLR
in the Tongo
area, at which
they exchanged
operational information.
One of the
soldiers told
the Group that
he saw FARDC
transfer
ammunition to FDLR
during one of
these
meetings,
while the
second saw an
FARDC officer
give boxes of submachine
gun ammunition
to the rebels.
Between
January and
April 2013, a
former FDLR soldier
witnessed four
distinct
ammunition
transfers by
the FARDC
based at Bambo
to the FDLR,
while in
February,
another former
FDLR soldier
saw FARDC hand over
ammunition to
the FDLR, also
at Bambo.
109. An FARDC
officer and
local leaders
from Muja, 10
kilometers
north west of
Goma, also reported
to the Group a
pattern of
collaboration
between the
FARDC and the
FDLR. The FARDC
has
established
positions at
Muja and
Rusayo to
defend Goma
against the
M23. According
to FDLR
commanders,
the FDLR North
Kivu Sector
CRAP unit
under “Maj.” Alexis,
usually based
at the
Nyamulagira
volcano in the
Virunga
National Park,
carries out regular
operations in
that area. The
Group
interviewed
two former
FDLR soldiers
who surrendered
from Muja, and
both were
aware of
ammunition
transfers from
FARDC commanders.
One of the
former
soldiers
claimed to
have witnessed
the supply of
boxes of submachine
gun ammunition
from FARDC
soldiers to
the FDLR.
C- Forces
nationales de
libération
110. Forces
nationales de
libération
(FNL) operates
in South Kivu
province and
consists mainly
of Burundian
combatants
whose stated
aim is to
overthrow the
Government of Burundi.
In 2013, FNL
remains
divided and
weakened (see
S/2012/843,
paras.
112-113). On 14
January 2013,
an FNL press
release
announced the
dismissal of
its president
Agathon Rwasa
and his
replacement by
Isidore
Nibisi, with
“General”
Aloys
Nzamapema as
the military
commander-in-chief.
Since then,
FNL has
attempted to
build up its
strength in
South Kivu
to carry out
attacks in
Burundi.
111. FNL has
two main
military
factions.
“Gen.”
Nzamapema, who
split from
“Gen.” Antoine
“Shuti”
Baranyanka in
2012, leads
the strongest
faction.
Former FNL
combatants and
FARDC officers
stated that Nzamapema’s
headquarters
is still
located in
Mushule, with bases
in Magunda and
Ruhuha, in
Uvira
plateaux, in
Uvira
territory.
While in 2012
Mai Mai Mayele
hosted Shuti
and his troops
in Lusambo,
Fizi
territory,
they have
since left the
group (see
S/2012/843,
para.112).
112. FNL
conducted
raids in DRC
and Burundi to
forcibly
recruit youth
and obtain
food supplies.
In February
2013, FNL
troops raided
cattle in
Buringa, in
Burundi.
Former FNL soldiers
and Burundian
intelligence
told the Group
that FNL’s
head of
operations,
Innocent Ngendakuriyo,
aka Nzarabu,
led the raid.
Nzarabu was
convicted
during the
trial for the
2011 Gatumba
massacre, west
of Bujumbura,
but escaped
from prison in
late 2012. In
mid-May 2013,
the FNL
carried out
another raid
in Buringa.
113. FARDC and
the Force de
défense
nationale du
Burundi (FDN,
the Burundian
national army)
continued to
attack FNL on
both sides of
the border.
According to
FARDC
intelligence and
Burundian
civil society,
“Colonel”
Negamiye,
Nzamapema’s
deputy, was
killed during FARDC
operations
following FNL
attacks in
late October
2012 in
villages near
Magunda, in the
Uvira plateau,
in which FNL
soldiers
looted goods,
burned
hundreds of
houses and
killed at
least 6
people.
114. According
to an FDLR
combatant and
Burundian
intelligence,
FNL and FDLR
troops conduct
joint
operations in
South Kivu. At
the end of
January, they
fought
together
against a local
armed group in
Masango, and
burnt houses
and schools
during the
raid. The FDLR
also provided
training in
heavy weapons
to the FNL at
the Namaramara
base near
Itombwe.
D - Front du
peuple murundi
115. In 2012
the Group
reported that
the Front du
peuple
murundi/alliance
divine pour la nation
(FPM/ADN), a
group of 40
Burundian
Tutsi
soldiers, had
joined with
the Mouvement congolais
pour le
changement
(MCC), an M23
ally in South
Kivu, led by
“Col.” Bede Rusagara
(see
S/2012/843,
paras. 70-76).
In March 2013,
the commander
in chief of
FPM, “Col.”
Jean-Claude
Mutoni, aka
Kasongo, was
killed during
fighting
between the
FPM and a Congolese
armed group
under the
orders of Col.
Richard
Tawimbi FN27,
according to
FARDC, Burundian
intelligence
and armed
groups
members. In
June 2013, the
president of
the FPM/ADN,
Guillaume
George
Majambere, who
currently
resides in
Belgium (see S/2012/843,
para. 114),
confirmed to
the Group that
he had become
the leader of
an alliance called
Intore. This
group is a
coalition of
several armed
groups and
political
parties, with
the objective
of challenging
the party in
power in
Burundi.
116. In
October 2012,
Rusagara told
the Group that
MCC was
responsible
for the death
on 4 October
of a Burundian
military
intelligence
officer on
mission in the
DRC. The spokesperson
of the FPM,
Major Fidèle
Nzambiyakira,
an ex-member
of the FDN
dismissed in
October 2010,
also claimed
responsibility
for this death
in a press
statement (see
annex 56).
117. FPM aims
at organizing
sabotage
actions in
Burundi and is
training
troops
accordingly. In
November 2012,
FPM/ADN posted
pictures of
combatants
undertaking
training in
the Uvira
Plateaux in
the DRC on its
website (see
annex 57). On
22 October
2012, after 25
to 30 FPM
soldiers
launched an
attack in the
Cibitoke area
of Burundi,
the FDN
conducted
operations
against the
group for
several days.
Burundian
intelligence
services told
the Group that
they killed
and injured
several FPM
soldiers.
According to
FDN, they
captured two combatants
and seized
several
weapons (see
annex 58).
Burundian
intelligence
later told the Group
that FPM’s
objective was
to establish a
base in the
Nyungwe forest
in Rwanda, at
the border
with DRC and
Burundi, as
FARDC and FDN
operations
impeded their
movements in the
Ruzizi plain
in the DRC,
which is their
usual route
into Burundi.
27
See
S/2011/738,
paras. 285 and
656. IV
- Integration
challenges
facing armed
groups
118.
Overstretched
by the rapidly
expanding M23
crisis,
starting in
mid-2012 the
FARDC undertook
an accelerated
integration
program into
FARDC of armed
groups opposed
to the M23.
In its 2012
final report,
the Group
reported on
the
integration of
Nyatura (see S/2012/843,
paras.
120-125). In
2013,
integration
exercises
continued,
with mixed
results.
Failed
integration:
Alliance pour
un Congo libre
et souverain
in Kitchanga
119. On 9
January 2013,
as part of an
attempt to
integrate Gen.
Janvier
Buigo’s
Alliance pour un
Congo libre et
souverain
(APCLS), a predominantly
Hunde armed
group, the
FARDC 8th Military
Region
commander Gen.
Bauma ordered
300 APCLS
soldiers under
“Col.” Musa
Jumapili to be
integrated in
situ into the
FARDC at
Kitchanga,
North Kivu.
While the
812th FARDC
regiment
commanded by
Col. Mudahunga
was then based
at Kitchanga,
FARDC commanders
had not taken
steps to
coordinate the
integration of
APCLS into
this local
unit.
120. The
integration
was hindered
by Mudahunga’s
collaboration
with
Ntaganda’s
M23. An M23
collaborator,
a former M23
soldier and an
APCLS officer
reported that
Ntaganda’s allies
in Kitchanga
worked
clandestinely
with Mudahunga
and his deputy
Lt Col. Alexis Muhire
to recruit for
M23 and
establish a
rear base for
the movement
at Kitchanga.
M23 cadres
and an FARDC
soldier told
the Group that
Mudahunga also
protected land
owned by M23
commanders in
that area.
Former M23
soldiers and
armed groups
operating in
the Virunga
National Park
told the Group
that Ntaganda
had sent
patrols to
Kitchanga on
regular occasions.
121. According
to authorities
in Kitchanga,
after
integrating
into FARDC,
APCLS
patrolled the
town and
arrested
individuals
with suspected
links to the
M23. According
to an FARDC officer,
Mudahunga
wanted to
prevent the
APCLS from
controlling
Kitchanga and
interfering with
M23
recruitment.
Mudahunga told
the APCLS to
disarm, but
the APCLS
refused.
Gradually, the
tensions
between the
FARDC and the
APCLS acquired
an ethnic
character, as FARDC
accused the
ethnic Hunde
residents of
Kitchanga of
supporting
APCLS.
122. A former
M23 officer
and two FARDC
officers
operating
under
Mudahunga’s
orders told
the Group that
on 24 February
2013 both
Mudahunga and
Muhire
distributed
arms to Rwandophone
youth and
cattle herders
in Kitchanga
and in the
nearby Kahe
IDP camp, and incited
them to attack
ethnic Hundes.
One of the
officers saw
Muhire
distribute
weapons in
his compound
at Kitchanga,
while another
officer saw
Mudahunga distribute
AK-47 rifles
to cattle
herders.
Mudahunga and
Muhire told
Rwandophone
populations
they needed
their help to
combat the
Hunde.
According to
FARDC
soldiers,
those who
received the
weapons fought
alongside
FARDC during
the combat
against APCLS.
123. Local
authorities
stated that
tensions rose
after FARDC
executed an
APCLS major on 26
February 2013.
Former APCLS
soldiers told
the Group that
APCLS
subsequently
killed one
of Mudahunga’s
soldiers,
following
which the
APCLS advanced
towards the
FARDC position
in Kitchanga
and the IDP
camp at Kahe.
IDPs from Kahe
declared that
APCLS soldiers
entered the
camp saying
they wanted to
rid the area
of
Rwandophones,
and burned 20
huts (see
annex 59).
124. According
to two FARDC
soldiers
serving under
Mudahunga, he
ordered his
soldiers to “kill
everybody
without
distinction in
Kitchanga”, as
he considered
that all of
the ethnic Hunde
were APCLS
supporters.
The Group
obtained a
recorded
statement in
which Mudahunga
ordered his
officers to
“kill whoever
they find in
Kitchanga”.
FN28 FARDC
soldiers
fired mortar
rounds into
Kitchanga to
prevent APCLS
from
advancing;
however, many mortar
shells landed
in civilian
areas (see
annex 60). The
Group was able
to examine recovered
mortar shells
when it
visited the
area (see
annex 61).
Local
authorities
told the Group
that FARDC
soldiers
actively
searched for
ethnic Hunde
chiefs to kill
them. The Group
spoke to a
local chief
who survived,
and who heard
soldiers
looking for
him saying that
“they do not
want to see
Hundes in
Kitchanga
anymore”.
Local
authorities
reported that another
local chief
did not manage
to escape and
was killed
(see para.
129).
125. After the
events, the
812th Regiment
was redeployed
from
Kitchanga, and
on 25 March Bauma
announced that
the
integration of
the APCLS will
not be
completed.
V - Violations
of
international
humanitarian
and human
rights law
Killings
FARDC and
APCLS killings
in Kitchanga
126. Fighting
in February
and March 2013
in Kitchanga
(North Kivu)
between the
812th FARDC
Regiment and
the APCLS
resulted in at
least 90 dead,
and over 500
houses burnt (see
annex 62).
According to
Médecins sans
Frontières
(MSF), more
than 140
people were injured,
and hundreds
of houses and
key
infrastructures
destroyed,
including part
of the hospital
(see para. 122
and annex 63).
According to
OCHA, the
fighting
temporarily
displaced
about 100,000
people.
127. The Group
visited
Kitchanga and
interviewed
local
authorities,
survivors of
the battle, and
APCLS and
FARDC
soldiers. The
Group’s
investigation
revealed that
FARDC Col. Mudahunga
issued orders
to his
soldiers to
carry out
attacks
targeting
civilians at
Kitchanga, including
shelling of an
area inhabited
by civilians,
causing
considerable
collateral
damage (see
para. 122).
128. Local
authorities
and FARDC told
the Group that
most of the
victims were
Hunde populations
and most of
the houses
targeted
belonged to
ethnic Hundes.
The same
sources stated
that FARDC
soldiers under
Mudahunga and
young men
armed by them,
specifically targeted
Hunde
civilians and
killed them.
The same
sources
revealed that
APCLS under
Col. Musa
also committed
targeted
killings of
Rwandophone
civilians in
the Kahe IDP
camp, where
they burned 20
huts (see
para.121).
28
The Group has
filed the
recording in
the UN
archives.
M23
129. Between 8
and 15 March
2013, during
the M23
infighting
between forces
loyal to Ntaganda
and forces
loyal to
Makenga,
Ntaganda
ordered the
execution of
his own combatants
who attempted
to desert in
Kibumba.
Former M23
soldiers
witnessed
Ntaganda ordering
the execution
of at least 20
of his
combatants,
who were
either shot or
stabbed to death.
Two former
Ntagada’s
fighters saw
about 20
bodies of
fellow
combatants.
Another former
M23 soldier
witnessed
Ntaganda order
the execution
of a group of
eight
soldiers. Two additional
former M23
soldiers
witnessed the
execution of
six soldiers
within their
unit.
130. The Group
also
documented a
pattern of
execution of
war wounded,
on the orders
of Ntaganda
and Ngaruye.
According to
current and
former M23
officers, who
participated
in combat
alongside
Ntaganda
during the M23
scission,
Ntaganda and
Ngaruye
ordered the execution
of wounded
soldiers.
Former M23
soldiers
witnessed
Ntaganda
personally
shoot war
wounded with
his pistol.
131. Between
21 and 22 May
2013, five
122mm rounds
fired from the
M23 position
landed on
Ndosho and in
the Mugunga
IDP camp (see
Mutaho box).
The rounds
killed two
civilians and
injured nine.
Current and
former M23
officers
interviewed by
the Group
declared that this
happened due
to calculation
error by M23.
Sexual
violence
FARDC
132. From 20
to 30 November
2012, FARDC
soldiers
committed mass
rapes in
Minova (South
Kivu) and the
surrounding
villages of
Bwisha,
Buganga,
Mubimbi,
Kishinji,
Katolo, Ruchunda,
and Kalungu. A
joint MONUSCO
and OHCHR
investigation
documented at
least 135
cases of
rapes,
including of
minors, and
other acts of
sexual
violence
perpetrated in
a
systematic
manner and
with extreme
violence by
FARDC
soldiers. To
date, the
government’s investigation
is continuing.
Twelve unit
commanders
have been
suspended and
two FARDC soldiers
arrested in
relation to
the
investigations.
According to
an FARDC
intelligence
officer and
a local NGO,
the commanders
of the units
in the area
lost control
over their
units as they retreated
from North
Kivu. Given
the large
number of
soldiers
present at the
time in the
area, it
is a challenge
to identify
which
soldiers, and
which units,
were
responsible
for the rapes. The
Group obtained
a list of the
commanders who
were suspended
following the
attack. Most of
them belong to
the 8th
Military
Region (North
Kivu).
Mai-Mai Morgan
133. Morgan’s
group has been
responsible
for rape,
sexual
slavery, and
sexual
mutilation
(see para.
76). The Group
mentioned
previously
that between 1
and 5 November
2012 alone, Morgan’s
group raped or
sexually
mutilated more
than 150 women
(see para.
76). During
its March
2013 visit to
Ituri, the
Group
interviewed
separately 20
former Morgan
combatants
and escaped or
liberated
abductees.
Among them,
seven were
women, who
told the Group they
were forced to
become “wives”
of various
militia
members.
134. In late
2012, Morgan
abducted other
women during
attacks on
villages and
gold mines. Former
abductees told
the Group that
Morgan’s
soldiers beat
the women they
hold captive, which
is
corroborated
by images
obtained by
the Group.
135. Former
abductees and
UN sources
report that
Morgan had
50-60 abducted
women with him
in January
2013 when he
attacked
Mambasa town
(see para.
73). Some of
these women managed
to escape.
Attacks on
MONUSCO and
Humanitarian
Workers
136. Since the
beginning of
the Group’s
mandate, there
have been
numerous
attacks on MONUSCO
peacekeepers
and staff - in
violation of
the sanctions
regime and on humanitarian
workers. In
one case,
unknown gunmen
killed a
Pakistani
peacekeeper on
7 May
2013 near
Bukavu, South
Kivu. Following
are examples
of other,
large-scale
attacks.
Kisangani
137. On 20
November 2012,
demonstrators
in Kisangani
(Orientale
Province)
protesting M23’s
capture of
Goma attacked
two MONUSCO
facilities.
The
Headquarters
suffered only minor
damage, but
protestors
caused more
extensive
damage at the
Logistics
Base,
including the
destruction of
four vehicles
and the main
gate (see
annex 64).
Bunia
138. On 20-21
November 2012
in Bunia
(Ituri
District,
Orientale
Province), PNC
and FARDC
organized the
looting of
more than
three-dozen
facilities
belonging to
MONUSCO, various
United Nations
agencies, and
international
humanitarian
organizations,
as well as residences
of UN and
humanitarian
staff (see
annex 65).
Eyewitnesses
in Bunia and a
report by
the District
of Ituri
specifically
identified
Col. Willy
Bonane
Habarugira
(see annex
66), FN29 who
was acting
commander of
FARDC forces
in the Safisha
Operational
Zone (Ituri),
as having
organized and
participated
in the
ransacking of
UN and
humanitarian
facilities. In addition,
eyewitnesses
told the Group
that Colonel
Juvénal Bideko
(see annex
66), then
Chief of
the Police
Nationale
Congolaise
(PNC) in
Bunia, also
organized
looting of UN
and humanitarian
compounds.
Following the
attacks,
military
authorities
arrested ten
PNC and 3 FARDC
personnel. The
Military
Tribunal in
Bunia
convicted 5
PNC and 1
FARDC of pillaging;
however, the
government has
brought no
charges
against either
Col. Bideko or
Col. Bonane
despite their
well-known
roles in the
pillaging.
29 In 2009,
the U.S.
Government
rejected Col.
Bonane for
participation
in a U.S.-run
military
training
course dueto
his poor human
rights record.
Lubumbashi
139.
On 23 March
2013,
Republican
Guard and
FARDC soldiers
shot at the
MONUSCO Headquarters
in Lubumbashi
after a group
of Kata
Katanga
entered the
compound (see
paras. 88
and annex 67).
The attack
caused minor
damage to
MONUSCO
facilities and
a PNC post next
to the
compound’s
back gate.
Child soldiers
140. The Group
investigated
cases of
recruitment of
children in
Katanga, North
Kivu, Orientale,
and South Kivu
provinces. The
Group
interviewed 23
former child
soldiers, between
8 and 17 years
old. It also
interviewed 34
former
combatants who
witnessed the presence
of children in
their armed
groups. In
addition, the
Group received
information
from the
MONUSCO Child
Protection
Section (CPS),
and other
partners. On
the basis of
the data
it collected,
and in
furtherance to
paragraph 3 of
resolution
2078 (2012),
the Group
notes that sanctioned
individual
Col. Innocent
Kaina of M23
remains
engaged in the
recruitment of children.
Trends
141. The Group
continues to
collect data
and analyze
trends on
recruitment of
children by armed
groups. The
Group has
confirmed that
between
January and
May 2013,
armed groups in
eastern DRC
have recruited
at least 200
children.
MONUSCO (CPS)
documented
that during
the first four
months of
2013, armed
groups
recruited 183
children,
including 36
girls. Of
these
children, most
were recruited
and served in
North Kivu
(82), with the
rest split between
South Kivu
(28), Katanga
(38), and
Orientale
(35). Between
January and
April 2013, the
CPS recorded
641 cases of
children
escaping from
various armed
groups, of
which 109 were
girls. Of the
total, most
children were
originally
from North
Kivu (314),
while others hailed
from Katanga
(79) Orientale
(157), South
Kivu (78),
Rwanda (11),
Central
African Republic
(1), and Sudan
(1).
M23
142.
Desertions
within M23
have been on
the increase
(see para.11).
While M23
denies recruiting
children,
between
January and
April 2013,
CPS identified
33 boys who
deserted from
M23, aged
between 15 and
17 (see annex
68). Out of
the 33, 11 had
been recruited
in Rwanda.
In addition,
the Group
interviewed
nine M23
deserters who
confirmed that
some children
had escaped
and returned
directly to
their families
without
surrendering
to
authorities,
confirming
that there are
undocumented
cases of child
soldier
desertions. According
to these
sources, this
practice has
been more
common among
deserters who
had been
recruited in
Rwanda and who
seek to
directly
return home.
143. M23
continued to
carry out
forced
recruitment
within its
area of
operation in
an effort to compensate
for the
desertions.
Four former
child soldiers
told the Group
how an unknown man
had captured
them while
they were
herding cows
in Chanzu.
This man then
handed them over
to two
anonymous men,
who delivered
them to Col.
Innocent Kaina
at Rumangabo.
The children
subsequently
served Kaina
as cooks.
144. The Group
also
interviewed
seven adult
former
combatants who
had been
recruited in Rwanda;
these men
stated that
recruiters had
promised them
and some
children
“lucrative jobs
in Congo”, but
instead they
were delivered
to M23. These
sources also
disclosed that they
had been
recruited in
Rwanda’s
Nkamira
Refugee Camp
and the
villages of
Mizingo, Bigogwe,
Byumba, and
Nkuri. They
added that
while training
in Rumangabo
they had met other
recruits who
came from
Kitotoma,
Gitega,
Musanze
(Ruhengeri),
Kichumbi,
Rukomo and
Gisenyi town
in Rwanda. The
Group also
interviewed
nine M23
deserters and
24 civilians
in Kiwanja,
Kanyaruchinya,
Rutshuru town
and Bunagana
who also
confirmed
cases of
forced
recruitment of
children in
their
communities.
FDLR
145. According
to 23 ex-FDLR
combatants
interviewed by
the Group,
FDLR has been attempting
to recruit
children among
the Rwandan
refugee
population in
DRC, and among Congolese
Hutu
populations,
but with
limited
success. The
Group
interviewed 15
children who
escaped from
the FDLR and
who had all
been forcibly
recruited. One
16-year-old
boy, born
to FDLR
parents told
the Group he
had
automatically
become a FDLR
soldier when
he was
thirteen.
Kata Katanga
146. MONUSCO
and UNICEF
separated 45
children from
the group of
242 Kata
Katanga members
who sought
refuge at the
MONUSCO base
following
their 23 March
2013 protest march
through
Lubumbashi
(see para. 88
and annex 69).
UNICEF
separated an
additional 30 children
from the group
upon its
arrival at
Ndolo military
prison in
Kinshasa. The
Group is continuing
to investigate
reports that
Kata Katanga
and other
armed groups
in Katanga Province
are recruiting
children.
Raia Mutomboki
147. Raia
Mutomboki
remains the
most
geographically
widespread
armed group in
North and South
Kivu, with a
high rate of
recruitment
and use of
children (see
S/2012/348,
para. 181). The
Group
estimates that
25-30 percent
of RM
combatants are
children. In
2012, a local NGO
in Walikale
territory
assisted 415
former RM
child soldiers
(aged 8 to 15
years old) to reintegrate
into their
communities.
By May 2013,
the same NGO
was in the
process of reintegrating
an additional
310 children.
Mai-Mai Morgan
148. During
its
investigation
in Orientale,
the Group
interviewed
five
eyewitnesses
who testified
to the
presence of at
least 15
children
serving with
Mai Mai Morgan
(see para 78).
FARDC
149. The Group
is also
investigating
cases
involving the
illegal
detention and
use of
children for
military
purposes by
the FARDC.
According to
FARDC and
MONUSCO
sources as
well as
local
authorities in
the Kisala
area of
Butembo
territory,
between
February and
April 2013, FARDC’s
1032nd
Battalion
arrested four
boys aged
between 15 and
17 on charges
of belonging
to the Nyatura
rebel group.
An FARDC Major
subsequently
enlisted three
of them as
cooks, while
assigning the
fourth to be a
soldier in
Mushaki with
the 106th
Regiment commanded
by Col.
Civiri.
150. In April,
UNICEF
separated 19
children from
the FARDC
812th Regiment
located at Camp
Bobozo in
Kananga, in
Kasai
Occidental
province. The
Regiment had
rotated from North
Kivu to
Kananga in
March, and had
forcefully
recruited the
children
before their departure
from North
Kivu. Four
soldiers from
this Regiment
acknowledged
to the Group that
they had been
aware of the
presence of
the minors
(commonly
referred to as
‘kadogo’) in their
ranks. In
April, UNICEF
separated two
minors (one of
them a girl)
from the same Regiment;
both had been
forcefully
recruited.
VI - NATURAL
RESOURCES
151. In
pursuance of
resolution
2078 (2012),
the Group is
investigating
the
involvement of armed
groups and the
FARDC in the
illegal
exploitation
and illicit
trade of
natural resources,
FN30 as well
as the impact
of due
diligence
measures. The
Group is
focusing on minerals
such as gold,
tin, tantalum,
tungsten, as
well as on
ivory, and is
documenting, whenever
possible, the
commodity
chains of
these
resources from
local to
international markets.
152. In its
2012 final
report, the
Group
discussed how
tin, tantalum
and tungsten
(3Ts) recorded
exports from
eastern DRC
had nearly
ceased (see
S/2012/843,
paras.
159-181), apart
from north
Katanga where
mineral
tagging was
introduced in
2011. Partly
as a consequence
of the low production
and prices of
the 3Ts, most
armed groups
have shifted
to exploiting
gold, which is
easier to
smuggle, has a
high value per
volume, and
has almost no due
diligence
oversight.
153. As
companies
proved
reluctant to
purchase
untagged
minerals from
eastern DRC,
local traders
continue
buying at
lower prices
for untagged
minerals.
These traders
also deal in minerals
coming from
conflict zones
and engage in
smuggling
across borders
to neighboring countries.
As one
exporter
explained to
the Group: “as
long as nobody
is buying from
DRC, there
will be
smuggling to
neighboring
countries”.
Smuggling not
only
undermines due diligence
efforts aimed
at stamping
out conflict
minerals in
DRC, but also
jeopardizes traceability
schemes within
DRC and
neighboring
countries, as
it negatively
affects the perception
of exports
from the whole
region.
154. The Group
notes,
however,
positive
initiatives in
eastern DRC to
monitor cases
of conflict
minerals and
smuggling. For
instance, in
North Kivu,
the Follow-up
Committee on Mining
Activities
(Comité de
suivi des
activités
minières)
monitors cases
of smuggling
and illegal
imposition of
taxes, and
maps out mines
occupied by
armed groups.
30
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/egroupguidelines/shtml
155. Despite
some progress,
significant
obstacles
remain. In
particular,
the Group
notes the on-going
tension
between
organizations
or individuals
committed to
expand due
diligence, on the
one hand, and
individuals,
notably in the
armed forces,
who continue
to be involved
in the sector
through
illegal
taxation or
smuggling. The
DRC government
must address
the issue of FARDC
complicity,
criminality
and impunity
if it aims to
convince the
international community
that it
genuinely
wants to
legalize and
formalize the
minerals
sector.
A - Gold trade
156. In
accordance
with paragraph
15 of
resolution
2078 (2012),
the Security
Council encouraged
all States,
particularly
those in the
region, to
continue to
raise
awareness of
the Group
of Experts due
diligence
guidelines,
particularly
in the gold
sector. In
2013,
artisanal gold
production
remains
important in
eastern DRC,
while due
diligence
efforts in the
sector are
still minimal.
157. Gold is
still mostly
smuggled along
the routes
identified in
previous Group
of Experts reports
and by the
same players
(see
S/2012/843).
However,
traders
complained to
the Group that
the sharpest
drop in gold
prices in 30
years on the
international
market has
negatively affected
the trade. The
presence of
armed groups
at some mines
has also
negatively
impacted the
trade, as
miners and
traders faced
growing
insecurity at
mine sites.
1- Without
official
trade, nearly
no due
diligence
158. Two gold
traders, local
officials, and
civil society
representatives
in Bunia
stated that gold
production in
Ituri has not
declined in
recent years;
in fact, it
may have
increased as
the price
of gold
increased
dramatically
after 2007.
Yet gold
traders and
Congolese
government authorities
informed the
Group that
during 2012,
only 16.17 kg
of gold was
legally
exported from
Ituri.
159. In North
Kivu, the
government did
not register
any gold
comptoir
during the
first five months
of 2013, and
there has been
no recorded
export of gold
during this
same period.
AR Gold,
an export
house based in
Goma
(S/2012/843,
para. 185),
exported 10.15
kg of gold from
Lubero in
November 2012
to its own
branch in
Dubai, but did
not renew its
export
house license
in 2013 (see
annex 70).
Glory Minerals
(S/2008/773,
para. 97;
S/2009/603, para.
128-136, 156
and 307), the
other gold
export house
operating in
North Kivu
during 2012
also failed to
register in
2013.
160. During
2012,
businessmen
exported only
39 kg of gold
from South
Kivu.
According to official
mining
statistics,
between
January to May
2013, Mining
Congo exported
27.7 kg of gold
to Dubai.
Local
authorities,
miners, and
businessmen
informed the
Group that production
is on the
order of
several tons a
year in South
Kivu.
Consequently,
the Group continues
to investigate
the smuggling
of gold from
South Kivu.
2- Gold
smuggling
161. The Group
notes that
nearly all
gold smuggling
continues to
follow the
same path from eastern
DRC through
Kampala and
Bujumbura, and
involving
largely the
same networks,
as documented
in previous
Group of
Experts
reports (see
S/2012/843,
para.
188-193).
162. According
to two gold
traders and
local
authorities in
Ituri, most
gold from
Ituri continues
to be exported
to Uganda,
where it is
purchased by
Rajendra
“Raju” Vaya of
the sanctioned
entity
Machanga Ltd
(see
S/2012/843,
para. 183),
while a small
amount (particularly
from Mambasa
territory)
goes to
Butembo before
being smuggled
to Uganda. Despite
numerous
testimonies
from gold
dealers, local
officials, and
civil society
representatives
in Ituri and
North Kivu
that virtually
all gold
produced in
these areas is exported
to and traded
in Kampala,
the Government
of Uganda told
the Group it
officially exported
only 286 kg of
gold during
2012 (see
annex 71).
163. During
its April 2013
visit to
Burundi,
Burundian
mining
authorities
informed the Group
that there is
currently no
traceability
in the gold
sector in
Burundi. They
also declared that
while
trafficking of
minerals
across borders
is taking
place, they
have not made
any seizure
in 2013.
However, they
explained that
plans for
traceability
schemes,
including for gold,
are being
considered. In
March 2013,
the President
of Burundi
imposed a
2-month ban on
mining
activities,
with a view to
formalizing
the artisanal
mining sector.
Authorities confirmed
to the Group
that a new
gold refinery
in Cibitoke
will refine
all Burundian
gold before
exportation.
The Group
notes that
between 1
January and 31
March 2013,
552.4 kg of gold
had been
exported from
Burundi (see
annex 72).
3- Conflict
gold
164. In its
2012 final
report, the
Group
concluded that
criminal
networks
within the
FARDC and
armed groups
profit from
the production
and trade of
gold (see
S/2012/843,
paras. 185- 187).
The Group has
documented
that armed
groups
continued to
be involved in
the production
and trade of
gold during
the first half
of 2013.
165. The 10th
Military
Region of
FARDC controls
the Mukungwe
gold mine, in
Walungu territory,
South Kivu
(see
S/2011/738,
paras.
528-532). At
this site,
FARDC soldiers
collect illegal
taxes weekly
from artisanal
miners. Miners
who fail to
pay are
arrested and
held in an underground
prison until
payment of the
tax is made.
The Group
obtained an
October 2012 letter
from the
president of
one of
Mukungwe’s
local
cooperatives
that reminded
the local army
intelligence
officer that
the weekly tax
of 1000FC (USD
1.11) per
miner needs to
be split
between the
ANR, the
police and the
army (see
annex 73). A
former FDLR
officer in charge
of logistics
told the Group
that the FDLR
also collected
taxes from
miners working
in Mukungwe,
as well as in
Rukatu mine,
in Mwenga
territory;
FDLR accrues
USD 2000 per month
from both
mines.
166. According
to a former
FDLR officer
and gold
traders in
Butembo, the
FDLR are involved
in gold mining
in North
Kivu’s Lubero
Territory.
According to
several former FDLR
combatants,
FDLR
commanders are
also drawing
profits from
gold mines in
Walikale. In
some
instances,
FDLR
combatants
search for
gold
themselves,
and in other
cases, they
tax gold
miners,
demanding
their
production one
day per week.
167. In
Walikale
territory,
local
authorities
told the Group
that Raia
Mutomboki
elements are present
at gold mines
in Bakano,
while Mai Mai
Simba are at
mines near
Osso river.
Mai Mai Sheka
is benefiting
from taxes on
almost one
hundred mining
sites in
Walikale, some
of them previously
controlled by
Raia
Mutomboki.
168. In
Orientale,
several miners
told the Group
that Mai Mai
Morgan’s modus
operandi is to attack
gold mines,
such as
Pangoy, Ilota
and Itembo
sites, every 3
days to 2
weeks, and rob miners
of some of
their gold
(see para.
77-78).
B- Tin,
tantalum and
tungsten trade
1- Production
and trade
trend
169. In 2013,
the production
and exports of
3Ts varied
greatly among
provinces. In
Maniema, mining
authorities
recorded a
gradual
increase in
tin exports,
but no
tantalum or
tungsten exports.
In North Kivu,
mining
authorities
told the Group
they had no
official tin
or tungsten exports,
but that
tantalum
production and
exports had
significantly
increased. In
South Kivu, only
exports of tin
were recorded.
170. Several
factors
explain the
differences in
3T exports.
First, as a
consequence of
Section 1502
of the July
2010 Dodd
Frank Act,
many companies
simply ceased
purchasing
minerals from
the Great
Lakes region.
Secondly, from
1 April 2011
onwards,
smelters and
refineries seeking
conflict-free
smelter status
from the
Electronics
Industry
Citizenship
Coalition started
processing
minerals
tagged
exclusively by
ITRI Tin
Supply Chain
Initiative
(iTSCi). The
iTSCi scheme
has superseded
other
approaches
towards
carrying out
due diligence.
The prospect
of legal sale
for untagged
minerals is
therefore
limited. Only
a handful of
companies
on the
international
market are
willing to
purchase
untagged
Congolese
minerals,
which explains
the low level
of exports
from some
provinces in
eastern DRC.
Thirdly,
progress towards
expanding
traceability
schemes such
as iTSCi
remained slow
in North and
South Kivu,
partly due to
the volatile
security
situation in
the area.
171. In
Maniema
Province,
Governor Tutu
Salumu Pascal
has taken
actions that
have positively
impacted legal
trade in tin
and increased
provincial
revenues. On
26 February 2013,
in a bid to
fight
trafficking,
the Governor
reinforced the
Congolese
Mining
Minister’s verbal
order banning
the export of
minerals from
Maniema to
North and
South Kivu by
air by signing
an official
letter to that
effect. This
encouraged the
legal export
of minerals to
Kindu, the
capital of
Maniema, from
where
exporters can
legally ship
tin ore by
train to
Kalemie (Katanga
province), and
on to the
Tanzanian port
of Dar Es
Salaam.
172. Following
this air
transport
export ban,
the provincial
government
recorded an
increase in
revenues from
legally traded
minerals,
partly due to
this measure,
and the start
of tagging tin
ore in the
province.
Production for
the period
January to May
2013 increased
to 576 metric
tons, which
were exported
to China, Hong
Kong and
Panama.
However, in
the absence
of tagging, no
other mineral
was exported
from Maniema.
173. In North
Kivu,
production and
exportation
differed
depending on
the type of
mineral. Due
to the ban on
air transport
of minerals
from Maniema
through North
and South
Kivu, and
the absence of
tagging and
validation at
North Kivu’s
main tin mine
of Bisie,
there was no
export of tin
ore between
January and
April 2013.
During the
same period in
2012, companies
had exported a
total of 485
metric tons of
tin ore.
Production in
the province continued
in 2013,
however.
174. In late
May 2013, the
Group observed
people bagging
minerals when
it visited the village
of Njingala,
near Bisie
mine (see
annex 74). It
counted 12
bags, each
weighing 50
kg; i.e.
600kg of tin
ore. While
most Bisie production
is consigned
and stored,
some of the current
production is
being smuggled
(see below
smuggling
section).
North Kivu
exporters told
the Group they
are anxious
for a prompt
validation of
Bisie and
other mines so
that they can
re-start the
tin trade.
Regarding
production and
export of
tantalum,
mining
authorities recorded
an increase in
2013. Between
January and
April,
companies
exported 47.4
metric tons
of tantalum
ore from North
Kivu to the
companies
Tolead Group
and Guilin
Jinli New Chemical
Materials, in
China; during
the same
period in
2012, exports
totaled 21.2
metric tons.
175. South
Kivu is home
to the only
validated mine
in the Kivus
where tagging
is taking place.
For the first
three months
of 2013,
exports from
South Kivu
amounted to
190 metric tons
of tin ore;
tagged
minerals
represent the
majority of
these exports.
Other
validated and non-validated
mines in South
Kivu do not
have tagging.
While there
was continuing
production in
Walungu,
Shabunda,
Mwenga, and
Idjwi
territories,
amongst other
sites, the province
did not record
any export of
tantalum and
tungsten
between
January and
March 2013.
In 2013, the
local price
for tungsten
continued to
decline, from
USD 9 per kg
in July 2012
to USD 6.5 in
May 2013 (see
S/2012/843,
para. 228).
However,
between
February and May
2013, miners
on Idjwi
Island (in
Lake Kivu)
produced 491
metric tons of
tungsten, which
was later
purchased and
stored by
local traders.
During its
visit in late
May to Idjwi, the
Group received
information
regarding
continuing
smuggling from
the island to
nearby ports
(see
S/2012/843,
para. 163).
2-Due
diligence
efforts in DRC
a- Integrating
the Note
circulaire’s
due diligence
requirements
into
companies’
policies
176. On 3
March 2013,
the Ministry
of Mines
reinstated the
rights of
Congo Minerals
and Metals
(CMM) and
Huaying, which
had been
prohibited
from exporting
in 2012 (see S/2012/348,
paras.
141-142).
These
companies have
since opened
offices in
Kindu and Bukavu.
While Huaying
continues
exporting
untagged
minerals
extracted from
non-validated mines
in Maniema and
South Kivu,
CMM has signed
a protocol
agreement on
11 validated tin
mines in
Maniema. The
owners of both
CMM and
Huyiang have
made a written
pledge to implement
due diligence
procedures
(see annex
75).
177. Following
the reopening
of the
processing
companies, the
Minister of
Mines unsuccessfully
called for a
mission of
certification
and validation
of Bisie mine
in Walikale territory
of North Kivu,
which would
allow minerals
to be
purchased and
exported (see
annex 78).
In the
interim, in
the absence of
certification
of the mine,
the
ministerial
ban on sale of Bisie
minerals
remains in
place. The
question of
the minerals
stocks from
Bisie also persists. After
the suspension
in May 2012,
the provincial
mining
authorities
set up a
Commission of Verification
of Stocks
(Commission de
vérification
des stocks).
In July 2012,
and in
February and
June 2013, the
Commission
registered the
number of bags
of red tin ore
and black tin
ore held
by each
négociant in
Mubi, Njingala
and Makana, to
ensure that
already stored
minerals were
not sold,
moved, or
smuggled (see
annex 76).
However,
during the
first
registration,
the Commission
did not record
the number of
bags, only the
total weight,
and did not
number the bags
(see annex
77). The Group
was informed
of the
practice of
replacing bags
of tin ore
with bags
full of reject
materials, so
that the tin
ore can be
sold and the
stocks look
unchanged to inspectors.
178. On 22 May
2013, aware of
this ongoing
problem of
movement of
bags and the confusion
it created,
local
authorities
took the
decision to
stop any
movement of
bags from Bisie
mine to the
village of
Njingala,
where minerals
are stored or
transported to
Goma. On 27
May, in a
letter to the
Congolese
Minister of
Mines, the
governor of
North Kivu,
Julien Paluku,
requested
authorization
to release all
the minerals
stored in the
village of
Mubi (see annex
78). No
decision on
this request
has been made
prior to this
report’s
publication.
The Group
continues to
monitor
smuggling and
due diligence
efforts in
North Kivu.
179. In South
Kivu, mining
authorities
also noted the
challenges in
expanding and strengthening
due diligence,
as the
majority of
the actors in
the mining
sector in the
province are
refusing to
get involved
in due
diligence and
traceability
efforts. In
April 2013,
the Group met
miners at the
tin ore mine
of Zola-zola,
near Nzibira
in Walungu
territory. The
miners told
the Group that
SAESCAM31 had
sensitized
them about the
issues of
conflict
minerals and
child labor at
mining sites.
However, the
miners
complained
that as long
as the mine is not
validated and
there is no
tagging, they
will have
difficulties
selling their
minerals. To address
some of their
demands, the
Trading
Counter
project is
being
restarted FN32.
b- The
progressive
development of
validation,
tagging and
certification
180. The
cautious
approach to
expand
validation and
tagging
throughout the
Kivus resulted
in impatience
amongst the
artisanal
mining
community,
which is the
sole producer
of 3Ts. In some
areas, the
government has
successfully
demilitarized
mining zones,
notably in
parts of South
Kivu, thus
creating a
situation
favorable to
the validation
of several
mines in the province.
In June 2013,
a new program
of validation
started in
South Kivu,
with plans to expand
during the
last quarter
of 2013 in
Maniema.
181. There are
11 validated
“green” mines
in North Kivu,
including 8
tantalum ore
mines, but no
tagging
process. In
April 2013,
CMM started
exporting
tantalum again
from North
Kivu, and
sent 39 metric
tons to Tolead
Group Limited
in Hong Kong.
In April 2013,
AMR Mugote also
started
exporting
tantalum from
the “green”
site at
Bibatama to
mainland China.
31 Service
d’assistance
et
d’encadrement
du Small Scale
Mining
32 In 2011,
the DRC
government and
MONUSCO
started a
parallel and
complementary
system of
traceability
of minerals through
the
validations of
mining areas
and the
creation of
trading
counters
(Centres de
Négoces) in
North and
South Kivu.
182. Following
the
Government’s
validation in
July 2012 of
six mines
surrounding
the Kalimbi
mine in
Nyabibwe in
South Kivu as
“green”,
tagging
started in
Nyabibwe in
October 2012.
In addition to
tagging at the
mine, a good
step in itself
towards
traceability,
only one processing
company in
Bukavu, World
Mining Company
(WMC),
purchases
these
minerals, further
simplifying
the supply
chain. Pact,
the
non-governmental
organization
in charge of the
tagging, tags
minerals from
T20 and Koweit
mines at the
Kalimbi mine
site. WMC purchases
the minerals
from two local
cooperatives,
and then sells
them to Traxys
in Belgium.
FN33
183. In April
2013, the
Group visited
the mining
sites at
Nyabibwe.
Prices at the
mines were between
USD 3 per kilo
for raw
minerals and
USD 5 for
washed
minerals.
While this
price was
lower than
past prices,
miners told
the Group that
the buyers
prefer to buy
in Kalimbi than
at other mines
in the area
because of the
demand for
tagged and
“well-traced”
minerals on
the
international
market.
184. In July
2012 in
Maniema
Province, the
Joint
Validation
Team headed by
MONUSCO and
the Maniema
Ministry of
Mines
qualified 20
mining sites
in Kailo and
Punia
territories as “conflict
free”. The
Congolese
Minister of
Mines further
validated the
20 sites on 19
October (see
annex 79). On
17 December
2012, the
provincial
government
officially
authorized tagging
in Kailo and
Kalima, two
centers of tin
production.
Maniema Mining
Company SPRL
(MMC) (a
Malaysia
Smelting
Corporation-led
(MSC)
consortium and
a member of ITRI34)
is currently
the sole
processing
entity buying
minerals from
Kailo and
Kalima. By May
2013, MMC had
100 tons of
tin ore in
stock from 11
mining sites,
and was
planning to export
by the end of
May.
185. On 12
April, as
minerals from
9 out 20 of
the validated
mines were not
receiving
tags, the
provincial
Minister of
Mines banned
comptoirs from
purchasing
minerals from
these nine sites
(see annex
80). On 9
June, the
Congolese
Minister of
Mines visited
Kindu and
reiterated the
Governor’s ban
on purchase of
minerals from
the nine mines
and promised
that the validation
process for
the remaining
non-validated
mines would
begin soon.
c-
Certification
186. The Group
is also
closely
following the
implementation
of the ICGLR
Regional Certification
Mechanism.35
This mechanism
intents to
address the
illicit trade
of minerals at the
regional level
by “providing
sustainable
conflict free
mineral supply
chains,”
notably with the
delivery of
ICGLR
Certificates
for
satisfactory
compliance
with due
diligence
guidelines (see
annex 81).
Such a scheme
could partly
address
smuggling
issues as
there are
safeguards built
in to the
system such as
the regional
tracking of
mineral flows
via the ICGLR Database,36
regular
independent
third party
audits, and
creation of an
independent
Mineral Chain
Auditor.
Minerals from
different
mines could
also be
identified
through the
German Office
for
Geosciences
and Natural
Resources
(BGR) system
of
fingerprinting.
FN37 BGR has a database
where minerals
from different
mines in the
DRC and Rwanda
have been
analyzed and
their chemical
fingerprint
stored in the
database.
33
See
S/2008/773,
para.88
34
International
Tin Research
Institute
35
https://oecd.org/investment/mne/49111368.pdf
36
https://icglr.org/spip.php?article94
3-
Continued
smuggling
187. The Group
has confirmed
that smuggling
of minerals
continues
within and
from eastern DRC.
Miners,
traders, local
residents, and
civil society
representatives
have told the
Group that
businessmen
smuggle
minerals by
cooperating
with corrupt
mining and
military authorities.
The Group has
documented
smuggling from
Maniema
province to
Bukavu (South Kivu)
and Goma, and
from Bisie to
Goma and
Bukavu. The
Group intends
to continue investigating
this matter,
to investigate
the networks
that
facilitate
smuggling, and
to follow commodity
chains through
neighbouring
countries to
international
markets.
188. In spite
of measures
taken by
various
provincial
authorities,
the Group was
informed during
its visits to
Maniema and
Walikale
provinces at
the end of May
2013 that
smuggling of
minerals from
Maniema to
North and
South Kivu
continues.
Négociants
smuggle
tantalum ore
from Punia and
Kasese to
Bukavu in
South Kivu.
They give USD
2 to the local authorities
at the
airports in
Kindu and
Bukavu for
every kilogram
of tantalum
ore they
export. They
also smuggle
minerals from
Maniema by
road to Goma
via Walikale,
or via Walikale
through
Hombo-Bunyakiri
to Bukavu, all
with the
complicity of
some military officers
and the local
mine agents.
189. At Bisie,
where minerals
cannot be
bought
legally,
négociants
from Goma and
Bukavu are
exploiting the
situation and
buying tin ore
at a low price
(USD 2 per
kg). Smugglers
work with
some of the
local civil
and military
authorities to
move the
minerals by
road to Goma
or Bukavu.
They transport
minerals at
night in
military
vehicles to
avoid the
checkpoints in Njingala.
They then move
the minerals
to civilian
vehicles. The
Group
documented two incidents
of illegal
transport of
minerals from
Bisie in the
course of the
last two weeks
of May.
In addition,
on 7 June
2013, Goma
police seized
1.3 metric
tons of tin
coming from Walikale
(see annex
82). Various
governmental
authorities
complained to
the Group
about the
smuggling by
the FARDC, and
its
detrimental
impact on the
possible
validation of
Bisie.
190. During
its field
mission to
Idjwi in May,
the Group
documented
cases of
smuggling of tungsten
to Goma and
Gisenyi,
indicating
that smuggling
continues as
documented in
the Group’s
final report
of 2012 (see
S/2012/843,
para 163).
According to
local mining
agents, miners
and ANR38
agents, the
smuggling is
facilitated by
local military
and naval
force. On the
night of 13-14
April 2013, a
boat smuggling
3 tons of
tungsten from
Idjwi (Nord)
towards Goma
capsized on
Lake Kivu.
37
http://www.bgr.bund.de/EN/Themen/Min_rohstoffe/CTC/Downloads/AFP_update.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
38 Agence
nationale de
renseignements
4-
Efforts to
tackle
smuggling in
the region
Seizures in
Burundi
191.
During its
official visit
to Burundi in
April 2013,
Burundian
customs agents
showed the Group
bags of
minerals they
had seized in
2012 (see
annex 83). The
customs agents
informed the
Group that
they seized
10-20 tons of
tin ore from
traffickers in
2012 at the
border with DRC,
and at the
port of
Bujumbura.
Seizures in
Rwanda
192. In a
letter to the
Group dated 7
June 2013,
Rwandan mining
authorities
told the Group that
they had
seized 8.4
metric tons of
minerals in
2012 and are
in the process
of handing over
the minerals
to the DRC
authorities.
They stated
they would be
working with
the DRC “to
devise
together means
of curbing
this
smuggling”.
The
authorities
informed the
Group they
have not
seized any
minerals from
the DRC
between
January and
May 2013.
Seizures in
Uganda
193. On 14 May
2013, Ugandan
mining
authorities
told the Group
that during
2013, they had not
seized any
illegal tin,
tungsten, or
tantalum
coming from
the DRC.
5- Conflict
3Ts
194. The Group
has confirmed
that armed
groups are
still
controlling
mines and
illegally taxing
the trade in
minerals. In
particular,
the Group
documented the
activities of
Raia Mutomboki
in South Kivu.
Local
authorities
and NGOs
informed the
Group that
different factions
of Raia
Mutomboki
control
several 3Ts
mines in
Kalehe and
Shabunda
territories.
The Group
continues to
investigate
the
involvement of
Raia Mutomboki
and other
armed groups
in the
production and
trade of the
3Ts.
195. During
its March 2013
visit to
Shabunda in
South Kivu,
the Group
confirmed Raia Mutomboki’s
control over
3T mines and
strategic
locations in
the territory.
In October
2012, Raia
Mutomboki
troops had
attacked the
FARDC base in
Lulingu.
Though the
rebels sustained
heavy
casualties,
they took
control of
Lulingu
airstrip, the
usual exit
route for minerals
from Shabunda.
The Governor
of South Kivu
responded by
banning the
use of the Lulingu
airstrip.
Minerals from
Raia
Mutomboki-controlled
zones which
were formerly airlifted
from Lulingu
to Bukavu were
henceforth
transported by
porters and
motorbikes to Shabunda
for
transportation
by air to
Bukavu.
196. In March
2013, the
Group
witnessed the
loading of tin
ore from
Lulingu and
other mines into
airplanes at
the Shabunda
airstrip for
transportation
to Bukavu (see
annex 84). The Mines
agents issue
official
documents
without
properly
ascertaining
the origin of
the minerals.
The Group also
documented how
Raia Mutomboki
fought FARDC
in November
2012 in order
to stop their
deployments in
tantalum and
tin-rich mines
in Kigulube.
In addition,
sources in the
mining sector,
local
administration
and civil
society in
Kindu confirmed
to the Group
that Raia
Mutomboki
stole minerals
during a
February 2013
attack on Kasese,
and sold them
to négociants
in Goma.
197. The Group
was also
informed that
Raia Mutomboki
is levying
taxes on
trading roads
in Shabunda
and Kalehe
territories.
The Group
obtained notes
from a Raia
Mutomboki
meeting in
February 2013
listing four
checkpoints in
Shabunda where
the armed
group taxes
all vehicles
and goods,
including
minerals.
Mining
authorities
separately
informed the
Group that
Raia Mutomboki
levies a tax
of half a
kilogram of
minerals per
50 kg bag at
checkpoints on
key trading
roads in
Shabunda
territory.
Near Hombo,
Raia Mutomboki
also taxes USD
5 per
bag of tin ore
carried on
motorbikes
from Walikale
on the
Walikale-Bukavu
road. FARDC
and other
Congolese
services are
also levying
illegal taxes
on this road.
C - Ivory
198. The Group
has confirmed
that ivory
poaching is
taking place
in many areas
of eastern DRC
Congo,
especially in
Virunga
National Park,
Maiko National
Park, the
Okapi Fauna Reserve,
and Garamba
National Park.
The Group
observed ivory
in North Kivu
and Orientale that
local
craftspeople
had made into
scrimshaw or
jewelry (see
annex 85), but conservationists
and Congolese
authorities
told the Group
that most
ivory is
exported raw through
neighboring
countries.
199. The
Government of
Uganda
reported eight
seizures of
ivory between
1 January and
16 September
2012 (see
annex 86), but
reported no
seizures
between 17
September 2012
and 14 May
2013. The
origin of the
seized ivory
is unclear,
but former
poachers,
ex-combatants,
and local
leaders in
eastern DRC
have told the
Group that
Uganda is the
most common
transit country
or destination
for poached
ivory from
northeast DRC.
200.
Ex-combatants
and local
leaders in
North Kivu’s
Grand Nord
told the Group
that ivory poached
in Virunga
National Park
is traded in
Butembo, Beni,
and Kasindi. A
prominent purchaser
of ivory is
Muhindo
Kasebere, a
businessman
from Butembo
who lives in
Kasindi, on
the border
with Uganda.
Congolese
authorities
arrested
Kasebere in
March 2013 for supporting
militia groups
allied to URDC
(para. 62),
but following
his release
two days
later, Kasebere
fled to
Uganda, where
former URDC
combatants and
Congolese
authorities
told the Group
he is
currently
residing.
201. A former
poacher and
local
authorities
told the Group
that in
exchange for
ivory, Kasebere
gave Hilaire’s
militias arms,
money, or
supplies,
depending on
the militia’s
desires. The
poacher told
the Group that
Kasebere paid
him $90 per
kilogram for
ivory. The
same sources
mentioned
above stated
that Kasebere
obtained arms
and ammunition
from sources
in
Uganda, and
that Kasebere
coordinated
his smuggling
with political
and military
officials in Kasese
District
(Uganda).
VII –
Recommendations
202. The Group
of Experts
makes the
following
recommendations:
To the
Security
Council
Committee
established
pursuant to
resolution
1533 (2004) concerning
the Democratic
Republic of
the Congo:
203. The
Committee to
renew its
commitment to
consider
recommendations
of the Group
of Experts
proposing the
designation of
specific
individuals
and entities
for targeted
sanctions;
To Member
States of the
Great Lakes
region:
204. The
eleven
signatories of
the Framework
Agreement
(S/2013/131)
to respect the accord’s
obligations,
in particular
the commitment
of the
Government of
the Democratic Republic
of Congo to
continue and
deepen
security
sector reform
with respect
to the Army and
Police;
205. Member
States of the
region to
refrain from
harboring
sanctioned
individuals or providing
protection of
any kind to
persons
falling under
the sanctions
regime, in
accordance with
the Framework
Agreement;
206. The
member States
of the
Economic
Community of
the Great
Lakes
Countries (ECGLC/CEPGL)
- Burundi, the
Democratic
Republic of
the Congo and
Rwanda - to
revive the
extradition
provisions of
their
tripartite
convention;
207. Member
States to
promote
regional
integration
through the
development of
mutually benefiting
infrastructure,
and to guide
and monitor
private
initiatives in
this regard in
a transparent
manner, with a
view to
safeguarding
the interests
of all
parties;
208. The
Democratic
Republic of
the Congo and
Rwanda, acting
with the
support of international
partners, to
clarify the
status of M23
surrenderers
to the MONUSCO
DDRRR programme
who declare
that they are
Rwandan
nationals, and
address the
problem of the repatriation
of these
ex-combatants
to Rwanda;
To the
Government of
the DRC:
209. The
Government of
the Democratic
Republic of
the Congo to
expand
validation missions
to mining
sites where
such missions
have not taken
place to date,
including
Nzibira and
Bisie, as soon
as the
security
situation
allows;
210. The
Military
Prosecutor’s
office to
investigate
and prosecute
all military
personnel involved
in the trade
of natural
resources, as
well as
individuals
and entities
supporting
these criminal
networks
within the
Congolese
armed forces;
211. The
Government to
appoint a
"Special
Envoy" to be
in charge of
negotiations
with specific
rebel groups,
to facilitate
demobilisation
and possible
integration in
the FARDC;
212. The
Government to
cease its in
situ
integration of
armed groups
in the FARDC without
proper
vetting;
To the
Government of
Rwanda:
213. The
Government of
Rwanda to
submit to the
Committee,
copying the
Group of Experts,
a list of the
remaining
former M23
combatants who
crossed into
Rwanda during 2013;
214. The
Government of
Rwanda to
investigate
and prosecute
individuals
supporting M23 activities
on its
territory;
To the
Government of
Uganda:
215. The
Government of
Uganda to
demonstrate a
renewed
commitment to
restructuring its
gold trade
sector and
combat gold
smuggling, and
inform the
Committee
regarding progress
achieved.
[End]
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