Eritrea
Sanctions Set To Be Fully
Lifted In Blue UNSC Draft
Reaffirming Somalia Arms
Embargo
By Matthew
Russell Lee, Exclusive, Petition
UNITED NATIONS,
November 13 – Even with
Ethiopia calling for the
removal of UN sanctions on
Eritrea, the idea was removed
from the UN Security Council's
10 July 2018 Press Statement.
But now the final "blue" draft
UN Security Council resolution
set for a vote on November 14
still contains this as
Operative Paragraph 4, that
the UN Security Council
"Decides to lift from the date
of adoption of this resolution
the arms embargoes, travel
bans, asset freezes and
targeted sanctions imposed on
Eritrea by the Security
Council in its resolutions
1907 (2009) 2023 (2011), 2060
(2012) and 2111 (2013)." The
arms embargo on Somalia is
reaffirmed in the blue or
final draft. Inner City Press
having obtained the blue final
draft is today putting it
online on Patreon
here, as it did the
earlier first draft here
(and below). On November 5 the
Netherlands' deputy ambassador
made a point of saying that
her country wants to review
not just the lack of evidence
of support to Al Shabaab and
Ethiopia's request, but other
issues of concern to the
Netherlands. (Also, Al
Jazeera asked a question
about UAE which blockades
Qatar which funds the
channel.) Video here
of stakeout from which
Inner City Press has been
banned for 124 days and
counting by UNSG Antonio
Guterres with at a minimum the
full knowledge and apparently
non objection of the Dutch
mission. On November 14
the UN Security Council is
slated about Somalia Eritrea
sanctions - but Inner City
Press remained banned from
entering the UN, and still now
permanently
by UN Secretary General
Antonio Guterres, his Global
Communicator Alison Smale and
spokesman Stephane Dujarric. Fox
News story here,
GAP blogs I
and II. August
17 "ruling" here; petition
here. Inner
City Press has
asked the
Netherlands
for documents
to prove or
disprove
the Mission's
role in this
ban but every
single
document has
been withheld
under the country's WOB or
Freedom of Information
legislation.
Inner City
Press has
filed a notice
of objection.
Eritrea
Sanctions Would Be ...
by on Scribd
And here is
the draft
resolution:
The
Security
Council,
PP1
Recalling all
its previous
resolutions
and statements
of its
President on
the situation
in Somalia and
Eritrea, in
particular
resolutions
733 (1992),
1844 (2008),
1907 (2009),
2023 (2011),
2036 (2012),
2093 (2013),
2111 (2013),
2124 (2013),
2125 (2013),
2142 (2014),
2182 (2014),
2244 (2015),
2317 (2016)
and 2385
(2017),
PP2
Taking note of
the final
reports of the
Somalia and
Eritrea
Monitoring
Group (the
SEMG) on
Somalia
(S/2018/XXX)
and Eritrea
(S/2018/XXX)
and their
conclusions on
the situations
in Somalia and
Eritrea,
PP3
Reaffirming
its respect
for the
sovereignty,
territorial
integrity,
political
independence
and unity of
Somalia,
Djibouti and
Eritrea, and
underscoring
the importance
of working to
prevent
destabilising
effects of
regional
crises and
disputes from
spilling over
into Somalia,
PP4
Condemning
Al-Shabaab
attacks in
Somalia and
beyond,
expressing
concern that
Al-Shabaab
continues to
pose a serious
threat to the
peace and
stability of
Somalia and
the region,
and further
expressing
concern at the
presence of
affiliates
linked to
Islamic State
in Iraq and
the Levant
(ISIL, also
known as
Da’esh) and
the security
implications
of the
situation in
Yemen for
Somalia,
PP5
Reaffirming
the need to
combat by all
means, in
accordance
with the
Charter of the
United Nations
and
international
law, including
applicable
international
human rights
law,
international
refugee law,
and
international
humanitarian
law, threats
to
international
peace and
security
caused by
terrorist
acts,
PP6
Underlining
its support
for the
efforts of the
Somali
authorities to
deliver
stability and
security in
Somalia and to
reduce the
threats to
peace and
security posed
by Al-Shabaab
and affiliates
linked to ISIL
(also known as
Da’esh),
PP7
Condemning any
flows of
weapons and
ammunition
supplies to
and through
Somalia in
violation of
the arms
embargo on
Somalia,
including when
they result in
supplies to
Al-Shabaab and
affiliates
linked to ISIL
(also known as
Da’esh) and
when they
undermine the
sovereignty
and
territorial
integrity of
Somalia, as a
serious threat
to peace and
stability in
the region,
and expressing
concern at
reports of
increased
illegal flows
of weapons and
ammunition
supplies from
Yemen to
Somalia,
PP8
Welcoming the
cooperation
between the
Federal
Government of
Somalia (FGS),
Federal Member
States (FMSs),
and the SEMG,
and
underlining
the importance
of these
relationships
improving
further and
strengthening
in the future,
PP9
Welcoming the
development of
a
conditions-based
transition
plan with
clear target
dates for the
progressive
transfer of
security
responsibilities
from AMISOM to
the Somali
security
institutions
and forces,
calling for
its swift and
coordinated
implementation
with full
participation
from all
stakeholders,
and recalling
the critical
importance of
accelerating
the
implementation
of the
National
Security
Architecture
agreement
between the
FGS and the
FMSs,
including
decisions to
define the
composition
and roles of
Somalia’s
security
forces and to
integrate and
provide
federal
support to
regional
forces, in
order to
provide the
foundation for
a successful
transition to
Somali-led
security,
PP10
Taking note of
the efforts of
the FGS to
improve its
notifications
to the
Committee
pursuant to
resolutions
751 (1992) and
1907 (2009)
concerning
Somalia and
Eritrea (“the
Committee”),
urging further
progress in
this regard,
and recalling
that improved
arms and
ammunition
management in
Somalia is a
fundamental
component of
greater peace
and stability
for the
region,
PP11
Commending the
efforts of the
FGS to restore
key economic
and financial
institutions,
increase
domestic
revenue and
implement
financial
governance and
structural
reforms,
welcoming the
continued
progress on
building a
track record
of reforms
under the
International
Monetary Fund
Staff-Monitored
Programme,
together with
progress on
the
anti-corruption
bill, and
highlighting
the importance
of continual
progress in
these areas,
PP12
Welcoming the
FGS’s efforts
to implement
the Anti-Money
Laundering and
Countering the
Financing of
Terrorism Act
(2015) and the
National
Communications
Act (2017),
underlining
the importance
of compliance
with the
counter-terrorism
and national
security
provisions in
this
legislation,
and further
welcoming the
establishment
of a Financial
Reporting
Centre to
serve as
Somalia’s
financial
intelligence
unit,
PP13
Underlining
the importance
of financial
propriety in
contributing
to stability
and
prosperity,
welcoming the
efforts of the
FGS to address
corruption,
and stressing
the need for a
zero tolerance
approach to
corruption to
promote
transparency
and increase
mutual
accountability
in Somalia,
PP14
Expressing
serious
concern at
reports of
illegal,
unreported and
unregulated
fishing in
waters where
Somalia has
jurisdiction,
underlining
the importance
of refraining
from illegal,
unreported and
unregulated
fishing,
welcoming
further
reporting on
the matter,
and
encouraging
the FGS, with
the support of
the
international
community, to
ensure that
fishing
licenses are
issued in a
responsible
manner and in
line with the
appropriate
Somali legal
framework,
PP15
Expressing
serious
concern at the
ongoing
difficulties
in delivering
humanitarian
aid in
Somalia, and
condemning in
the strongest
terms any
party
obstructing
the delivery
of
humanitarian
assistance,
any
misappropriation
or diversion
of any
humanitarian
funds or
supplies, and
acts of
violence
against and
harassment of
humanitarian
workers,
PP16
Recalling that
the FGS has
the primary
responsibility
to protect its
population,
and
recognising
the FGS’s
responsibility,
working with
the FMSs, to
build the
capacity of
its own
national
security
forces, as a
matter of
priority,
PP17
Commending
efforts
towards peace,
stability and
reconciliation
in the region,
including the
signing of the
Joint
Declaration of
Peace and
Friendship
between
Eritrea and
Ethiopia on 9
July 2018, the
signing of the
Joint
Declaration on
Comprehensive
Cooperation
between
Ethiopia,
Somalia and
Eritrea on 5
September
2018, and the
signing of the
Agreement on
Peace,
Friendship and
Comprehensive
Cooperation
between
Eritrea and
Ethiopia on 16
September
2018,
PP18
Expressing
concern at
ongoing
reports of
Djiboutian
combatants
missing in
action since
the clashes in
2008, calling
on Eritrea and
Djibouti to
continue to
engage in
resolving the
issues of
combatants,
and urging
Eritrea to
share any
further
available
detailed
information
pertaining to
the
combatants,
PP19
Taking note of
increased
engagement
between
Eritrea and
Djibouti
and strongly
encouraging
further
efforts
towards
normalisation
of relations
and good
neighbourhood
between
Djibouti and
Eritrea,
including
cooperation in
accordance
with
international
law to resolve
any disputes
regarding
their shared
border,
PP20
Determining
that the
situation in
Somalia
continues to
constitute a
threat to
international
peace and
security in
the region,
PP21
Acting under
Chapter VII of
the Charter of
the United
Nations,
Lifting of
arms
embargoes,
travel bans,
asset freezes
and targeted
sanctions on
Eritrea
OP1
Recalls
paragraphs 16
and 17 of
resolution
1907 (2009)
and recognises
that during
the course of
its current
and four
previous
mandates the
SEMG has not
found
conclusive
evidence that
Eritrea
supports
Al-Shabaab;
OP2
Welcomes the
meeting on 25
September 2018
between the
representative
of the
Government of
Eritrea and
the Chair of
the Committee,
and further
welcomes the
meeting on 5
October 2018
between the
representative
of the
Government of
Eritrea and
the
Coordinator of
the SEMG;
OP3
Welcomes the
meeting
between the
President of
Djibouti and
the President
of Eritrea in
Jeddah on 17
September
2018;
OP4
Decides to
lift from the
date of
adoption of
this
resolution the
arms
embargoes,
travel bans,
asset freezes
and targeted
sanctions
imposed on
Eritrea by the
Security
Council in its
resolutions
1907 (2009)
2023 (2011),
2060 (2012)
and 2111
(2013);
OP5
Urges Eritrea
and Djibouti
to engage on
the issue of
the Djiboutian
combatants
missing in
action and
calls on
Eritrea to
make available
any further
detailed
information;
OP6
Urges the two
parties to
continue
efforts to
settle their
border dispute
peacefully in
a manner
consistent
with
international
law, and
reaffirms that
it will
continue to
follow
developments;
Committee
OP7
Decides that
the mandate of
the Committee
pursuant to
resolutions
751 (1992) and
1907 (2009),
hereafter to
be known as
the Committee
pursuant to
resolution 751
(1992) (“the
Committee”),
shall include
the tasks as
set out in
paragraph 11
of resolution
751 (1992),
paragraph 11
of resolution
1844 (2008),
and paragraph
23 of
resolution
2036 (2012);
OP8
Requests the
Committee to
amend its
guidelines,
its
implementation
assistance
notice and its
website
accordingly;
Somalia and
Eritrea
Monitoring
Group
OP9
Decides to
terminate the
mandate of the
Somalia and
Eritrea
Monitoring
Group (SEMG),
with effect
from 16
December 2018;
Somalia
Monitoring
Group
OP10
Decides to
establish,
with effect
from the date
of adoption of
this
resolution,
until 15
December 2019,
the Somalia
Monitoring
Group (SMG),
further
decides that
the mandate of
the SMG shall
include the
tasks as set
out in
paragraph 13
of resolution
2060 (2012)
and updated in
paragraph 41
of resolution
2093 (2013),
paragraph 15
of resolution
2182 (2014),
paragraph 23
of resolution
2036 (2012)
and paragraph
29 of this
resolution as
they relate to
Somalia, and
expresses its
intention to
review the
mandate and
take
appropriate
action
regarding any
extensions of
the SMG
mandate no
later than
15 November
2019;
OP11
Requests the
Secretary-General
to take the
necessary
administrative
measures as
expeditiously
as possible to
establish the
SMG,
consisting of
six members,
in
consultation
with the
Committee,
until 15
December 2019,
drawing, as
appropriate,
on the
expertise of
the members of
the SEMG
established
pursuant to
previous
resolutions;
Somalia Arms
embargo
OP12
Reaffirms
the arms
embargo on
Somalia,
imposed by
paragraph 5 of
resolution 733
(1992) and
further
elaborated
upon in
paragraphs 1
and 2 of
resolution
1425 (2002)
and modified
by paragraphs
33 to 38 of
resolution
2093 (2013)
and paragraphs
4 to 17 of
resolution
2111 (2013),
paragraph 14
of resolution
2125 (2013),
paragraph 2 of
resolution
2142 (2014),
paragraph 2 of
resolution
2244 (2015),
paragraph 2 of
resolution
2317 (2016)
and paragraph
2 of
resolution
2385 (2017)
(hereafter
referred to as
“the arms
embargo on
Somalia”);
OP13
Decides to
renew the
provisions set
out in
paragraph 2 of
resolution
2142 (2014)
until 15
November 2019,
and in that
context
reiterates
that the arms
embargo on
Somalia shall
not apply to
deliveries of
weapons,
ammunition or
military
equipment or
the provision
of advice,
assistance or
training,
intended
solely for the
development of
the Somali
National
Security
Forces, to
provide
security for
the Somali
people, except
in relation to
deliveries of
the items set
out in the
annex to this
resolution;
OP14
Decides that
supplies of
items in the
annex to this
resolution to
the FGS by
Member States
or
international,
regional and
sub-regional
organisations
require an
advance
approval by
the Committee
on a
case-by-case
basis;
OP15
Reaffirms its
decision that
the entry into
Somali ports
for temporary
visits of
vessels
carrying arms
and related
materiel for
defensive
purposes does
not amount to
a delivery of
such items in
violation of
the arms
embargo on
Somalia,
provided that
such items
remain at all
times aboard
such vessels;
OP16
Reiterates its
decision that
weapons or
military
equipment sold
or supplied
solely for the
development of
the Somali
National
Security
Forces may not
be resold to,
transferred
to, or made
available for
use by, any
individual or
entity not in
the service of
the Somali
National
Security
Forces, and
underlines the
responsibility
of the FGS and
the FMSs to
ensure the
safe and
effective
management,
storage and
security of
their
stockpiles;
OP17
Welcomes in
this regard
the
improvements
made by the
FGS in weapons
registration,
recording and
marking
procedures and
encourages
further
improvements,
expresses
concern at
reports of
continued
weapons
diversion from
within the FGS
and FMSs,
notes that
further
improved
weapons
management is
vital in order
to prevent the
diversion of
weapons, and
reiterates
that the
Security
Council is
committed to
monitoring and
assessing
improvements
in order to
review the
arms embargo
when all
conditions as
set out in
Security
Council
resolutions
are met;
OP18
Requests the
FGS to
facilitate
full access
for the SMG,
on the basis
of written
requests by
the SMG
submitted at
least ten days
in advance, to
all FGS
armouries in
Mogadishu, all
FGS imported
weapons and
ammunition
prior to
distribution,
all FGS
military
storage
facilitates in
SNA sectors
and all
captured
weaponry in
FGS custody,
and to allow
photographs of
weapons and
ammunition in
FGS custody
and full
access to all
FGS logbooks
and
distribution
records, in
order to
enable the
Security
Council to
monitor and
assess
progress in
this area;
OP19
Welcomes the
ongoing
efforts of the
FGS to develop
detailed
Standard
Operating
Procedures for
weapons and
ammunition
management
including an
issue and
receipt system
to track all
weapons post
distribution,
further
welcomes the
development of
a mechanism to
distribute
weapons and
ammunition to
regional
forces,
consistent
with the
requirements
of this
resolution
including
paragraph 16,
encourages
that such a
mechanism be
expanded to
include other
military
equipment and
supplies,
consistent
with the
requirements
of this
resolution
including
paragraph 16,
and urges the
FGS to
finalise and
implement
these
procedures as
soon as
possible;
OP20
Welcomes the
establishment
of the Joint
Verification
Team (JVT) and
urges Member
States to
support
improved
weapons and
ammunition
management to
improve the
capacity of
the FGS to
manage weapons
and
ammunition;
OP21
Takes notes of
FGS reporting
to the
Security
Council
pursuant to
paragraph 9 of
resolution
2182 (2014)
and as
requested in
paragraph 7 of
resolution
2244 (2015),
calls on the
FGS and FMSs
to accelerate
the
implementation
of the
National
Security
Architecture
agreement, the
Security Pact,
and the
transition
plan in order
to provide
Somali-led
security and
protection to
the people of
Somalia, and
requests the
FGS to report
to the
Security
Council in
accordance
with paragraph
9 of
resolution
2182 (2014)
and as
requested in
paragraph 7 of
resolution
2244 (2015),
by 28 February
2019 and then
by 31 August
2019, on the
structure,
composition,
strength and
disposition of
its Security
Forces,
including the
status of
regional and
militia
forces, and to
include as
annexes the
reports of the
JVT requested
in paragraph 7
of resolution
2182 (2014);
OP22
Recalls that
the FGS has
the primary
responsibility
to notify the
Committee of
any deliveries
of weapons,
ammunition or
military
equipment or
the provision
of advice,
assistance or
training to
its Security
Forces,
pursuant to
paragraphs 3
to 8 of
resolution
2142 (2014),
and calls upon
the FGS to
improve its
notifications
to the
Committee;
OP23
Calls upon the
FGS to
continue to
improve the
timeliness and
content of
notifications
regarding the
completion of
deliveries, as
set out in
paragraph 6 of
resolution
2142 (2014);
OP24
Requests the
FGS to
incorporate
the
notifications
regarding the
destination
unit in the
Somali
National
Security
Forces upon
distribution
of imported
arms and
ammunition,
detailed in
paragraph 7 of
resolution
2142 (2014),
into the
regular FGS
reporting to
the Security
Council
requested in
paragraph 20;
OP25
Stresses
Member States’
obligations
pursuant to
the
notification
procedures set
out in
paragraph 11
(a) of
resolution
2111 (2013),
urges Member
States to
strictly
follow the
notification
procedures for
providing
assistance to
develop Somali
security
sector
institutions,
and encourages
Member States
to consider
the
Implementation
Assistance
Notice of 13
July 2018 as a
guide;
OP26
Recalls
paragraph 2 of
resolution
2142 (2014)
and notes that
support for
the
development of
the Somali
National
Security
Forces may
include, inter
alia, building
infrastructure
and provision
of salaries
and stipends
solely
provided to
the Somali
National
Security
Forces;
OP27
Urges
increased
cooperation by
the FGS, FMSs
and the
African Union
Mission in
Somalia
(AMISOM), as
set out in
paragraph 6 of
resolution
2182 (2014),
to document
and register
all military
equipment
captured as
part of
offensive
operations or
in the course
of carrying
out their
mandates;
OP28
Calls upon the
FGS and FMSs
to enhance
civilian
oversight of
their security
forces, to
continue to
adopt and
implement
appropriate
vetting
procedures of
all defence
and security
personnel,
including
human rights
vetting, in
particular
through
investigation
and
prosecuting
individuals
responsible
for violations
of
international
law, including
international
humanitarian
law, and in
this context
recalls the
importance of
the
Secretary-General’s
Human Rights
and Due
Diligence
Policy in
relation to
the support
provided by
the United
Nations to
Somali
security
forces;
OP29
Decides that
the SMG will
continue the
investigations
started by the
SEMG related
to the export
to Somalia of
chemicals that
may be used as
oxidisers in
the
manufacture of
improvised
explosive
devices, such
as the
precursors
ammonium
nitrate,
potassium
chlorate,
potassium
nitrate and
sodium
chlorate with
a view to
considering
further
action, and
calls on
Members States
and the FGS to
cooperate with
the SMG in
this regard;
OP30
Underlines the
importance of
timely and
predictable
payment of
salaries to
the Somali
security
forces and
calls on the
FGS to
continue to
implement
systems to
improve the
timeliness and
accountability
of payments
and supply of
provisions to
the Somali
security
forces, and
welcomes the
progress to
date on
biometric
registration;
OP31
Recalls the
need to build
the capacities
of the Somali
National
Security
Forces, in
particular the
provision of
equipment,
training and
mentoring, in
order to
develop
credible,
professional
and
representative
security
forces to
enable the
gradual
handing over
of security
responsibilities
from AMISOM to
the Somali
security
forces in line
with the
transition
plan, and
encourages
further donor
support and
coordination
as set out in
the Security
Pact;
OP32
Requests the
Secretary-General
to conduct a
technical
assessment
regarding the
arms embargo,
with options
and
recommendations
for improving
implementation,
by 15 May
2019;
Threats to
peace and
security in
Somalia
OP33
Condemns
Al-Shabaab’s
increased
revenue from
natural
resources
including the
taxing of the
illicit sugar
trade,
agricultural
production and
livestock,
further
expresses
concern at the
group’s
involvement in
the illicit
charcoal
trade, and
welcomes SMG
reporting on
this issue;
OP34
Requests the
FGS to
coordinate
with the SMG
to facilitate
interviews of
suspected
members of
Al-Shabaab and
ISIL (also
known as
D’aesh) held
in FGS
custody, in
order to
assist the SMG
with its
investigations;
OP35
Welcomes the
efforts that
the FGS has
made to
improve its
financial
management
procedures
including the
successful
completion of
two
International
Monetary Fund
(IMF)
Staff-Monitoring
programmes and
the
commitments to
further reform
made under the
third
Staff-Monitored
programme,
encourages the
FGS and FMSs
to maintain
the pace of
reform to
increase
transparency,
accountability,
comprehensiveness
and
predictability
in revenue
collection and
budget
allocations,
and expresses
concern at the
generation and
distribution
of counterfeit
Somali
currency;
OP36
Welcomes
efforts by the
FGS to address
corruption
including the
development of
anti-corruption
legislation,
expresses
concern at the
continued
reports of
corruption and
diversion of
public
resources
including
reports of
financial
impropriety
involving
members of the
FGS, FMSs and
Federal
Parliament
which pose a
risk to
state-building
efforts, and
in this
context
underlines
that
individuals
engaged in
acts which
threaten the
peace and
reconciliation
process in
Somalia may be
listed for
targeted
measures;
OP37
Recognises
that
addressing
outstanding
constitutional
issues around
power and
resource
sharing
between the
FGS and FMSs
is crucial for
Somalia’s
stability,
calls upon the
FGS and the
FMSs to work
constructively
together to
address these
issues in an
inclusive
manner, and
encourages the
FGS and FMSs
to implement
the
outstanding
elements of
the National
Security
Architecture
agreement,
including
decisions
around the
make-up,
distribution
and command
and control of
the security
forces and
resource-sharing;
OP38
Reaffirms
Somalia’s
sovereignty
over its
natural
resources;
OP39
Reiterates its
serious
concern that
the petroleum
sector in
Somalia could
be a driver
for increased
conflict,
welcomes the
political
agreement on
petroleum and
mineral
resource-sharing
reached by the
FGS and the
FMSs in June
2018, and
underlines the
vital
importance of
the FGS and
FMSs putting
in place,
without undue
delay,
resource-sharing
arrangements
and credible
legal
frameworks to
ensure that
the petroleum
sector in
Somalia does
not become a
source of
increased
tension;
Somalia
Charcoal ban
OP40
Reaffirms its
decision
regarding the
ban on the
import and
export of
Somali
charcoal, as
set out in
paragraph 22
of resolution
2036 (2012)
(“the charcoal
ban”),
welcomes
efforts of
Member States
to prevent the
import of
charcoal of
Somali origin,
reiterates
that the FGS
and FMSs shall
take the
necessary
measures to
prevent the
export of
charcoal from
Somalia, urges
Member States
to continue
their efforts
to ensure full
implementation
of the ban,
and further
reiterates
that
individuals
and entities
engaged in
acts which
violate the
charcoal ban
may be listed
for targeted
measures;
OP41
Reiterates its
requests in
paragraph 18
of resolution
2111 (2013)
and paragraph
16 of
resolution
2431 (2018),
that AMISOM
support and
assist the FGS
and FMSs in
implementing
the total ban
on the export
of charcoal
from Somalia,
and calls upon
AMISOM to
facilitate
regular access
for the SMG to
charcoal
exporting
ports;
OP42
Welcomes the
efforts of the
Combined
Maritime
Forces (CMF)
to disrupt the
export and
import of
charcoal to
and from
Somalia, and
further
welcomes the
cooperation
between the
SMG and CMF in
keeping the
Committee
informed on
the charcoal
trade;
OP43
Expresses
concern that
the charcoal
trade provides
significant
funding for
Al-Shabaab,
and in that
context
reiterates
paragraphs 11
to 21 of
resolution
2182 (2014),
and further
decides to
renew the
provisions set
out in
paragraph 15
of resolution
2182 (2014)
until 15
November 2019;
OP44
Condemns the
ongoing export
of charcoal
from Somalia,
in violation
of the total
ban on the
export of
charcoal,
calls on
Member States
to share
information
with the SMG,
requests
Member States
to seize
within their
territorial
waters and
ports, in
accordance
with their
national
legislation
and consistent
with
international
law, vessels
carrying
charcoal in
violation of
the charcoal
ban, with the
Member State
seizing the
vessel
requested to
inform the
Committee
within thirty
days regarding
the status of
the crew
members and
arrangements
that have been
made to
prevent the
vessel from
contributing
to future
violations of
the charcoal
ban, further
requests the
SEMG to
continue to
focus on this
in their next
report and
propose
further
measures,
taking account
of human
rights
concerns, and
expresses its
intention to
consider
further
measures if
violations
continue;
OP45
Encourages the
United Nations
Office on
Drugs and
Crime to
continue its
work with the
FGS, within
its current
mandate, under
the Indian
Ocean Forum on
Maritime Crime
to bring
together
relevant
Member States
and
international
organizations
to develop
strategies to
disrupt the
trade in
Somali
charcoal;
Humanitarian
access in
Somalia
OP46
Expresses
grave concern
at the ongoing
humanitarian
situation in
Somalia and
its impact on
the people of
Somalia,
commends the
efforts of the
United Nations
humanitarian
agencies and
other
humanitarian
actors to
deliver
life-saving
assistance to
vulnerable
populations,
condemns in
the strongest
terms attacks
against
humanitarian
actors and any
misuse of
donor
assistance and
the
obstruction of
the delivery
of
humanitarian
aid,
reiterates its
demand that
all parties
allow and
facilitate
full, safe and
unhindered
access for the
timely
delivery of
aid to persons
in need across
Somalia, and
encourages the
FGS to improve
the regulatory
environment
for aid
donors;
OP47
Decides that
until 15
November 2019
and without
prejudice to
humanitarian
assistance
programmes
conducted
elsewhere, the
measures
imposed by
paragraph 3 of
resolution
1844 (2008)
shall not
apply to the
payment of
funds, other
financial
assets or
economic
resources
necessary to
ensure the
timely
delivery of
urgently
needed
humanitarian
assistance in
Somalia, by
the United
Nations, its
specialised
agencies or
programmes,
humanitarian
organisations
having
observer
status with
the United
Nations
General
Assembly that
provide
humanitarian
assistance,
and their
implementing
partners
including
bilaterally or
multilaterally
funded
non-governmental
organisations
participating
in the United
Nations
Humanitarian
Response Plan
for Somalia;
OP48
Requests the
Emergency
Relief
Coordinator to
report to the
Security
Council by 15
October 2019
on the
delivery of
humanitarian
assistance in
Somalia and on
any
impediments to
the delivery
of
humanitarian
assistance in
Somalia, and
requests
relevant
United Nations
agencies and
humanitarian
organisations
having
observer
status with
the United
Nations
General
Assembly and
their
implementing
partners that
provide
humanitarian
assistance in
Somalia to
increase their
cooperation
and
willingness to
share
information
with the
United
Nations;
Targeted
sanctions in
Somalia
OP49
Recalls its
decisions in
resolution
1844 (2008)
which imposed
targeted
sanctions and
resolutions
2002 (2011)
and 2093
(2013) which
expanded the
listing
criteria, and
notes one of
the listing
criteria under
resolution
1844 (2008) is
engaging in or
providing
support for
acts that
threaten the
peace,
security or
stability of
Somalia;
OP50
Reiterates its
willingness to
adopt targeted
measures
against
individuals
and entities
on the basis
of the
above-mentioned
criteria;
OP51
Recalls
paragraph 2
(c) of
resolution
2060 (2012)
and emphasises
that certain
misappropriation
of financial
resources is a
criterion for
designation
and applies to
misappropriation
at all levels;
OP52
Reiterates its
request for
Member States
to assist the
SMG in its
investigations,
reiterates
that
obstructing
the
investigations
or work of the
SMG is a
criterion for
listing under
paragraph 15
(e) of
resolution
1907 (2009)
and further
requests the
FGS, FMSs and
AMISOM to
share
information
with the SMG
regarding
Al-Shabaab
activities;
Reporting
OP53
Requests the
SMG to provide
monthly
updates to the
Committee
pursuant to
resolution 751
(1992), and a
comprehensive
midterm
update, as
well as to
submit, for
the Security
Council’s
consideration,
through the
Committee, a
final report
by 15 October
2019;
OP54
Requests the
Committee, in
accordance
with its
mandate and in
consultation
with the SMG
and other
relevant
United Nations
entities, to
consider the
recommendations
contained in
the reports of
the SMG and
recommend to
the Security
Council ways
to improve the
implementation
of and
compliance
with the
Somalia arms
embargo, the
measures
regarding the
import and
export of
charcoal from
Somalia, as
well as
implementation
of the
measures
imposed by
paragraphs 1,
3 and 7 of
resolutions
1844 (2008) in
response to
continuing
violations;
OP55
Requests the
Committee to
consider,
where and when
appropriate,
visits to
selected
countries by
the Chair
and/or
Committee
members to
enhance the
full and
effective
implementation
of the
measures
above, with a
view to
encouraging
States to
comply fully
with this
resolution;
OP56
Decides to
remain seized
of the matter.
Annex
1.
Surface to air
missiles,
including
Man-Portable
Air-Defence
Systems
(MANPADS);
2.
Guns,
howitzers, and
cannons with a
calibre
greater than
12.7 mm, and
ammunition and
components
specially
designed for
these;
3. Shoulder
fired
anti-tank
rocket
launchers,
such as Rocket
Propelled
Grenades
(RPGs) or
Light
Anti-Tank
Weapons
(LAWs), rifle
grenades, and
grenade
launchers,
including
ammunition for
all such
launchers;
4.
Mortars with a
calibre
greater than
82 mm;
5.
Anti-tank
guided
weapons,
including
Anti-tank
Guided
Missiles
(ATGMs) and
ammunition and
components
specially
designed for
these items;
6.
Charges and
devices
intended for
military use
containing
energetic
materials;
mines and
related
materiel;
7.
Weapon sights
with a night
vision
capability."
On
September
29, Eritrea's
foreign
minister Osman
Mohammed Saleh
told the UN General
Assembly from
which Guterres
banned
Inner City Press:
"the
unwarranted
sanctions that
were imposed on
Eritrea in
December 2009
and 2011
respectively. With
positive winds
of peace
flowing in our
region,
several UNSC
member States are
these days
calling for
the immediate
lifting of the
deplorable
sanctions. The
diplomatic
discourse is
not however
fully
coherent. As
it happens,
some countries
are looking
for procedural
and other
pretexts and
preconditions.
The apparent
aim is to move
the goalpost
and maintain
the illegal
sanctions on
Eritrea... The
principal
architects of
the sanctions
were previous
US
Administrations
who felt that
they could use
their
unassailable
power, and raw
coercion, to
ram through
the UNSC,
punitive
measures
against a
small country
and people
to advance
their
misguided
regional
agenda. It is
worth remembering
here that
certain
officials in
the US
Administration
had mulled
imposing
similar
sanctions on
Eritrea in
1999-2000, at
the height
of the border
war with
Ethiopia, in
order to
impose
asymmetric arrangements
through
coercive
means." On
September
20,
this from
the UN
Security
Council: "The
members of the
Security
Council
welcomed the
Agreement on
Peace,
Friendship and
Comprehensive
Cooperation
signed by the
President of
the State of
Eritrea and
the Prime
Minister of
the Federal
Democratic
Republic of
Ethiopia on 16
September
2018, in
Jeddah and
expressed
appreciation
to the role
played by His
Majesty King
Salman bin
Abdulaziz Al
Saud of Saudi
Arabia, the
Custodian of
the Two Holy
Mosques, and
by the
Government of
the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia,
in
facilitating
this
agreement.
They took note
of the
commitment of
the two
countries to
open a new era
of peace,
friendship and
comprehensive
cooperation as
well as
promote
regional peace
and security. The
members of the
Security
Council also
welcomed the
meeting
between the
President of
Djibouti and
the President
of Eritrea on
17 September
2018, in
Jeddah, under
the auspices
of His Majesty
King Salman
bin Abdulaziz
Al Saud of
Saudi Arabia.
The members of
the Security
Council
express hope
that this
meeting will
open a new
chapter in the
relations
between
Djibouti and
Eritrea and
encourage the
two countries
to continue to
engage in
meaningful
dialogue. The
members of the
Security
Council noted
that these
developments
represent a
historic and
significant
milestone with
far-reaching
positive
consequences
for the Horn
of Africa and
beyond. They
commended the
leaders of the
region for
their wisdom
and courage in
their
continued
effort to
resolve
disputes and
call upon them
to sustain
these recent
efforts and
gains with a
view to
opening a new
chapter of
cooperation
thereby
ensuring
greater peace,
stability and
prosperity in
the region. In
this regard,
the members of
the Security
Council stand
ready to
support
countries of
the region in
their
endeavors. " We'll
have more on this. The UK's
Karen Pierce,
who will
become
President of
the Security
Council in two
days on August
1 (after a
Twitter
Q&A at 11
am on July 31,
watch this
site) on
Eritrea said
"It's
something the
Council needs
to discuss. I
think the
developments
are very
positive.
They're very
welcome, and
at some point
that will need
to be
reflected in
the coming
months on
sanctions. But
the Council
hasn't had a
full
discussion of
that yet, so
it's something
we need to
talk about." This with
Inner City
Press banned
and the UK
doing nothing
about it - in
fact,
the formal banner is
the UK's own
Alison Smale,
on vacation,
who never
responded to
or acknowledged a
single one of
Inner City
Press' seven
e-mail
including one
on
June
25 after
an improper ouster
by a UN Lieutenant
with retaliatory
animus,
requesting
protection.
After the July
30 meeting,
Sweden's Olof
B. Skoog
who oversaw or at
least aceepted
Press
censorship for
28 of the 31
days of his
Council presidency
read out these
Press Elements:
"The members
of the
Security
Council
welcomed the
first visit to
the Horn of
Africa by the
Chair of the
Sanctions
Committee for
Somalia and
Eritrea since
2010 in May.
The members of
the Security
Council noted
that the Chair
was not able
to visit
Eritrea during
his visit.
The members of
the Security
Council
welcomed the
continued
commitment of
the Federal
Government of
Somalia to
political and
security
reforms, and
to improving
weapons and
ammunition
management in
order to
comply fully
with the terms
of the partial
lifting of the
arms embargo.
The members of
the Security
Council looked
forward to
further
progress in
this regard,
and reiterated
their
readiness to
support this
process
including
through the
Sanctions
Committee and
the Somalia
and Eritrea
Monitoring
Group.
They strongly
commended the
historic
signing of the
Joint
Declaration of
Peace and
Friendship by
the leaders of
Eritrea and
Ethiopia on 9
July, and the
commitment by
both parties
to jointly
endeavour to
ensure
regional
peace,
development
and
cooperation.
The members of
the Security
Council
supported and
encouraged
Ethiopia in
line with the
commitment
made by the
Prime Minister
of Ethiopia to
help in
normalizing
relations
between
Eritrea and
Djibouti in
the same
spirit that
helped
facilitate the
historic
agreement
between
Ethiopia and
Eritrea.
The members of
the Security
Council
further
welcomed the
announcement
that Eritrea
and Somalia
would work
together to
foster
regional peace
and stability.
The members of
the Security
Council
reiterated
their
readiness to
support the
region in
these
efforts." Inner
City Press, thanks
to Guterres
and Smale with
many assists, could
not ask any questions.
We'll have
more on this.
On
July 27, US
Vice President
Mike Pence
issued this
read out: "The
Vice President
met today with
Ethiopian
Prime Minister
Dr. Abiy
Ahmed. The
Vice President
reaffirmed the
United States’
longstanding
partnership
with the
people of
Ethiopia and
applauded the
historic
reform efforts
by Prime
Minister Abiy,
including
improving
respect for
human rights,
reforming the
business
environment,
and making
peace with
Eritrea. The
Vice President
encouraged
continued
Ethiopian
leadership in
resolving
regional
conflicts in
the Horn of
Africa, as
well as
strengthening
U.S.-Ethiopia
trade and
investment.
The two
leaders
underscored
their
countries’
shared values
and their
commitment to
building an
even stronger
partnership in
the days
ahead."
On July 12, hours before his
belated press conference
arranged to be without press,
Guterres rather than OCHA head
Lowcock bragged about and took
credit for public money
directed to Ethiopia: "The
UN’s Central Emergency
Response Fund (CERF) released
today US$15 million to
urgently scale up humanitarian
assistance to people affected
by escalating inter-communal
violence in Ethiopia.
Historical tensions between
communities in southern
Ethiopia escalated in April
2018 and led to large-scale
displacements, damage of
properties and loss of
life. Close to one
million men, women and
children are currently being
sheltered with already food
insecure relatives or residing
in cramped public buildings
without adequate food and
water and substandard
sanitation and hygiene
facilities. “Under the
leadership of Dr. Abiy Ahmed,
new measures to bring unity
and reconciliation have
spurred great enthusiasm
within the country and high
international praise,” said UN
Secretary-General António
Guterres. “However, the impact
of inter-communal tensions
presents a challenge for the
new leadership. Nearly one
million people are displaced
and require urgent help,
especially during this rainy
season. It is critical to act
immediately and that is why
CERF is releasing $15 million
to enable urgent aid." In the
past, such announcements were
done by OCHA. But Guterres
needs a win, and so wants
"better" press coverage that
he has allowed the roughing
up, and now has banned, the
Press. It
is easy to impose sanctions,
at least on country like
Eritrea, but very hard to take
them off even when the
original reasons, support for
Al Shabaab in Somalia, is
gone. Cote d'Ivoire on July 10
carried the water of Djibouti;
others including the penholder
the UK have their own reasons.
The about-face of Ethiopia -
which hasn't changed its UN
Ambassador despite the changes
in Addis Ababa - didn't move
the needle. Meanwhile Inner
City Press, which exposed the
use of the UN's Panel of
Experts to call for regime
change, remains banned from
even entering the UN.
Fox
News story here
("UN roughs
up, ejects,
bans reporter
from
headquarters:
Caught on
tape");
petition to
Guterres here;
GAP blogs I
and II (“Harassment
of US
Journalist
Intensifies at
the UN”). The
UN under
Antonio "Winds
of Change"
Guterres is
corrupt.
And it is hard to know the
UK's reasons, not only in
light of the telling chaos of
Boris Johnson's resignation,
but due to secrecy. The UK
denied Inner City Press'
request under the Freedom of
Information Act 2000 for
documents, and banned it from
its Mission's "background
briefing," ostensibly finding
tape recorder holders for
Japanese media which write
more about US rappers than the
UN to be more "international
media" that Inner City Press.
The P2 are a joke. Back on 14
November 2017 before the
Security Council voted again
on Somalia and Eritrea
sanctions, Inner City Press
asked the penholder on the
resolution, the UK's
then-Ambassador Matthew
Rycroft, if there is any
evidence of Eritrea supporting
Al Shabaab and if not, why not
at least separate the two
sanctions regimes. Rycroft
acknowledged there is no
evidence, but said discussions
on separating the two hadn't
been successful. Video here.
Fromthe UK transcript: Inner
City Press: On the Eritrea
sanctions, is there any
evidence that Eritrea has been
supporting Al Shabab? And if
there’s not, why aren’t there
two separate sanctions
regimes? Does the UK favour
that? Amb Rycroft: "We did
explore that actually with our
Council colleagues and there
wasn’t the appetite on the
Security Council to do that. I
think there has been progress
on the Al Shabab issue.
There’s no evidence at the
moment that the Eritrean
authorities have been
supporting Al Shabab, and we
very much welcome that. But as
you know, there are other
aspects to why there is a
sanctions regime on Eritrea,
and what we urge the
authorities there to do is to
engage with the monitoring
group, to engage with the
chair of the sanctions
committee, so that those
people can come back with that
positive evidence which they
say is there, and that would
help change the dynamic in the
Security Council." Later on
the morning of November 14,
after four abstentions from
the combined sanctions, Inner
City Press was informed by a
well-placed wag that the UK
was not opposed to splitting
the two: "the UK would rather
get 15-0 votes for Somalia
then all these abstentions
because of the Eritrea issue."
We hope to have more on this.
Back in May 2017, Rycroft said
"six months ago, the Security
Council was quite divided on
whether there should be
sanctions or not on Eritrea.
Before the next decision on
the sanctions regime on
Eritrea, coming up in
November, we are going to do a
review today of whether there
should be a sanctions regime.
We, as penholder on that
issue, are seeking to find a
way to unite the Security
Council so that there can be
some specific measures in a
roadmap that the authorities
of Eritrea would need to meet
in order to lift the sanctions
regime. Our national position
is that the conditions are not
yet right to lift the
sanctions. But that if Eritrea
did some of the things which
we will set out today then we
would look at it on the basis
of the evidence."
When
the UN Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in the
State of Eritrea Sheila
Keetharuth held a press
conference at the UN on October
28, Inner City Press went to ask
her if she considered the impact
of sanctions on Eritrea.
Video here. She
answered only in terms of arms
embargo, they said she simply
chose not to look at the issue.
On November 10, when Somalia
Eritrea sanctions were voted on,
five countries abstained:
Angola, China, Egypt, Russia and
Venezuela. Eritrea's charge
d'affaires made a statement,
which we've
published on Scribd, here.
Before the vote, Inner City
Press asked UK Ambassador
Matthew Rycroft a question; he
spoke about the Somalia Eritrea
sanctions helping to limit
support to Al Shabaab. Video
here. But the current lack
of evidence of Eritrean support
to Al Shabaab has been
repeatedly cited. And there are
new reports calling
the SEMG and its former
officials into question, here.
We'll have more on this.
By contrast to
Keetharuth, the Rapporteur on
the Democratic People Republic
of Korea Tomas Ojea Quintana
answered detailed questions from
Inner City Press about sanctions
including unilateral sanctions
on coal sales, for example. Is
there no consistency between UN
Special Rapporteurs? Video
here.
***
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