In
Mali France
Evaded
"Algerian
Element" in
SCR 2085,
Hostage Taking
Followed
By
Matthew
Russell Lee
UNITED
NATIONS,
January 19 --
When the UN
Security
Council's
Resolution
2085
on Mali was
negotiated
last month,
safeguards
were proposed
and
agreed too,
steps that had
to be taken
BEFORE
military
action began.
As
Inner City
Press reported
at the time,
Operative
Paragraph 11
was
called "the
Algerian
element" by
one of its
African
sources
on the Council
-- an
acknowledgment
that a
military
offensive in
Mali
without
following such
steps could
destabilize
neighboring
Algeria.
But
when France
began bombing
Konna in Mali
on January 11,
none of the
safeguards had
been followed.
Instead, what
followed was a
large
scale and now
deadly hostage
taking in
Algeria.
We
have waited to
write and ask
this until, as
French defense
minister
Jean-Yves
Le Drian has
now announced,
there are no
more French
hostages
in the In
Amenas natural
gas compound
in Algeria.
But
simultaneously
at the ECOWAS
summit, French
foreign
minister Laurent
Fabius
has again
claimed that
France's
military
intervention
is "in
the framework
of
international
legality." It
wasn't and
isn't.
The
"Algerian
element" in
UNSC
Resolution
2085, agreed
to be
France, wasn't
followed, and
death there is
what happened.
Who is to
blame?
Consider
Operative
Paragraph 11
of Resolution
2085,
particularly
its final
clause:
"11.
Emphasizes
that the
military
planning will
need to be
further
refined
before the
commencement
of the
offensive
operation and
requests that
the
Secretary-General,
in close
coordination
with Mali,
ECOWAS, the
African Union,
the
neighbouring
countries of
Mali, other
countries in
the region and
all other
interested
bilateral
partners and
international
organizations,
continue to
support the
planning and
the
preparations
for the
deployment of
AFISMA,
regularly
inform the
Council of the
progress of
the process,
and requests
that the
Secretary-General
also confirm
in advance the
Council's
satisfaction
with the
planned
military
offensive
operation."
Starting
on
January 12,
Inner City
Press asked
the UN: did
France get
Secretary
General Ban
Ki-moon to
"confirm in
advance the
Council's
satisfaction
with the
planned
military
offensive
operation"
-- the details
of which it
seems Ban
wasn't
informed of?
Were
those steps
and safeguards
only
applicable to
AFRICAN
intervenors?
At
the Security
Council on
January 14, French
Permanent
Representative
Araud
erroneously
told Inner
City Press
that there
was no French
letter to the
UN, only a
Malian letter.
But
there WAS a
French letter,
and it did not
mention UN
Charter
Article
51, which
later became
France's after
the fact fig
leaf for the
bombing.
On January 18,
the French
mission
spokesman did
not permit
Inner City
Press to ask
Araud a single
question,
unlike on
January 14 and
unlike the other
speakers on
January 18,
from Valerie
Amos through
Navi Pillay to
Security
Council
president
Masood Khan,
who told Inner
City Press
that France
had not
updated the
Council on
Mali since
January 14.
Claiming
that the
request of the
Malian
authorities is
also dubious,
since as Araud
himself
admitted
to Inner City
Press, coup
leader
Amadou Sanogo
has an
official role
in the Malian
military.
Again:
the safeguards
in UNSC
Resolution
2085, agreed
to be France,
weren't
followed, and
death is what
has followed.
Who is to
blame? Watch
this
site.
, 
