From
Sri
Lanka Report,
UN Outright
Removed Over
5,000 Dead
& Summary
By
Matthew
Russell Lee,
Exclusive
UNITED
NATIONS,
November 15 --
The scandal of
the UN's
amateur
blacking-out
of portions of
its report on
its actions
and inactions
in Sri Lanka
in 2009 which
pointed the
finger at
envoy Vijay
Nambiar,
ex-humanitarian
chief John
Holmes and
Secretary
General Ban
Ki-moon
himself is
worse that
Inner City
Press reported
yesterday.
Now
Inner City
Press has
learned of
significant
portions of
the
penultimate
draft of the
report which
were omitted
(and added)
even
to the "final"
redacted
version. Inner
City Press has
also
obtained the
removed
Executive
Summary, and
publishes it
in full below,
as a public
service and
hope for
accountability.
From
the final
redacted
report-- which
after
complaints
the UN has re-posted
online
here -- in
Paragraph 22 a
final line
"The RC told a
13
February
meeting of the
IAWG-SL that
as many as
3,000 people
may have
been killed
since 20
January" was
removed.
From
Paragraph 82 a
final line "At
the time the
COG was
reporting
5687 killed
and 10,067
injured of
which 1964 and
3571 were
confirmed"
was removed
from the
"final"
version, even
as redacted.
As
self-servingly,
to Paragraph
39 the line "a
step that was
widely
praised" was
added in to
the final
version --
trying to play
up,
ironically,
Ban Ki-moon's
UN's
transparency.
Not
only did the
UN pull out,
and then
conceal
casualty
figures -- the
coverup and
breakdown was
systemic afterward,
in terms of messaging in the UN and Ban Ki-moon and
his
Peacekeeping
chief
accepting one
of the
responsible
Generals,
Shavendra
Silva, as a UN
Senior Advisor
on
Peacekeeping.
Meanwhile,
the
Executive
Summary which
was removed
said that "the
UN's
failure to
adequately
counter the
Government’s
under-estimation
of
population
numbers in the
Wanni, the
failure to
adequately
confront
the Government
on its
obstructions
to
humanitarian
assistance,
the
unwillingness
of the UN in
UNHQ and
Colombo to
address
Government
responsibility
for attacks
that were
killing
civilians, and
the tone
and content of
UN
communications
with the
Government and
Member
States on
these issues,
contributed to
the unfolding
of dramatic
events...
"Events
in
Sri Lanka mark
a grave
failure of the
UN to
adequately
respond to
early warning
and the
evolving
events during
the final
stages of the
conflict and
its aftermath,
to the
detriment of
hundreds of
thousands
of civilians."
That's
putting
it mildly. And
who will be
held
accountable?
Here
as
a public
service from
Inner City
Press is the
complete
Executive
Summary which
the UN
removed:
Executive
Summary:
Assessment of
the UN’s
Actions in Sri
Lanka
Between
August
2008 and May
2009, as the
war between
the Government
of Sri
Lanka and the
Liberation
Tigers of
Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) entered
its
final stages,
an estimated
360,000 or
more civilians
were crowded
into an ever
smaller part
of ‘the Wanni’
area of
Northern Sri
Lanka where
many died as a
result of
sustained
artillery
shelling,
illness and
starvation.
Almost 280,000
survivors were
forcibly
interned in
military-run
camps outside
the area of
conflict. The
UN
responded
mainly through
its
humanitarian
assistance and
development
frameworks;
its political
and human
rights roles
were limited.
Despite the
gravity of
events, UN
Member States
did not
formally
consider the
situation
until the war
ended. During
the final
stages,
and the
aftermath from
May 2009
onward, the UN
provided
assistance to
IDPs in
internment
camps, even as
IDP rights and
UN principles
of
intervention
were not
respected.
Most IDPs were
eventually
allowed to
return home.
(Annex III
provides a
detailed
account of
events and UN
actions)
In
April
2011, the
Secretary-General’s
Panel of
Experts (POE)
on
accountability
in Sri Lanka
issued a
report
recommending a
review of
the UN’s own
actions. In a
letter to the
Secretary-General,
the POE
described UN
action as a
low point for
the
organization
as a whole,
and said that
some UN
agencies and
individuals
had failed in
their
mandates and
did not uphold
the UN’s
founding
principles.
Pursuant
to the POE’s
recommendation,
the
Secretary-General
established an
“Internal
Review Panel
on UN action
in Sri Lanka”
(the Panel),
led by Charles
Petrie, tasked
with providing
an assessment
of UN
action during
the final
stages of the
conflict and
its aftermath,
identifying
institutional
and structural
strengths and
weaknesses,
and making
recommendations
to ensure a
more effective
UN response in
similar
situations.
The Panel
began work in
late April
2012 and
submitted the
present report
at the end of
September.
For
the
UN, the last
phase of the
conflict in
Sri Lanka
presented a
major
challenge. The
UN struggled
to exert
influence on
the Government
which, with
the effective
acquiescence
of a post-9/11
world order,
was determined
to defeat
militarily an
organization
designated as
terrorist.
Some have
argued that
many deaths
could have
been averted
had the
Security
Council and
the
Secretariat,
backed by the
UN
country team
(UNCT), spoken
out loudly
early on,
notably by
publicizing
the casualty
numbers.
Others say
that the
question is
less whether
the UN should
assume
responsibility
for the
tragedy, but
more whether
it did
everything it
could to
assist the
victims.
The
Panel’s
conclusion is
that events in
Sri Lanka mark
a grave
failure
of the UN to
adequately
respond to
early warning
and the
evolving
events during
the final
stages of the
conflict and
its aftermath,
to
the detriment
of hundreds of
thousands of
civilians and
in
contradiction
with the
principles and
responsibilities
adopted by
Member States
and the
Secretariat,
agencies and
programs.
Decision-making
across
the UN was
dominated by a
culture of
trade-offs –
from the
ground to UN
headquarters
(UNHQ).
Options for
action were
seen less
as
responsibilities
and more in
terms of
dilemmas.
Choosing not
to
speak up about
Government and
LTTE broken
commitments
and violations
of
international
law was seen
as the only
way to
increase UN
humanitarian
access.
Choosing to
focus Security
Council
briefings on
the
humanitarian
situation
rather than
the causes of
the crisis and
the
obligations of
the parties to
the conflict
was seen as
essential
to facilitate
Secretariat
engagement
with Member
States. There
was a
sustained and
institutionalized
reluctance
among UNCT
actors to
stand
up for the
rights of the
people they
were mandated
to assist. In
Colombo, many
senior UN
staff simply
did not
perceive the
prevention
of killing of
civilians as
their
responsibility;
and agency and
department
heads at UNHQ
were not
instructing
their staff in
Sri
Lanka
otherwise. The
UN’s failure
to adequately
counter the
Government’s
under-estimation
of population
numbers in the
Wanni,
the failure to
adequately
confront the
Government on
its
obstructions
to
humanitarian
assistance,
the
unwillingness
of the UN in
UNHQ and
Colombo to
address
Government
responsibility
for attacks
that were
killing
civilians, and
the tone and
content of UN
communications
with
the Government
and Member
States on
these issues,
contributed to
the
unfolding of
dramatic
events.
UNHQ
engagement
with Member
States
regarding Sri
Lanka was
ineffective
and
heavily
influenced by
what UNHQ
perceived
Member States
wanted to
hear, rather
than by what
States needed
to know if
they were to
respond.
Reflection on
Sri Lanka by
UNHQ and
States at the
UN was
conducted on
the basis of a
mosaic of
considerations
among which
the
grave
situation of
civilians in
Sri Lanka
competed with
extraneous
factors such
as
inconclusive
discussions on
the concept of
the
‘responsibility
to protect’
and Security
Council
ambivalence on
its role in
such
situations. In
the absence of
clear Security
Council
support, the
UN’s actions
lacked
adequate
purpose and
direction
amid the many
competing
factors.
Most
crucially,
the UN did not
use all the
political and
advocacy tools
at
its disposal.
In particular,
it did not
keep Member
States or the
public fully
informed. Nor
did it warn
the Sri Lankan
Government or
the LTTE of
the
consequences
of their
actions,
including
their
responsibility
for possible
war crimes and
crimes against
humanity.
Systemic
failure
in Sri Lanka
can be
distilled into
the following:
(i) a UN
system that
lacked an
adequate and
shared sense
of
responsibility
for
human rights
violations;
(ii) an
incoherent
internal UN
crisis-management
structure
which failed
to conceive
and execute a
coherent
strategy in
response to
early warnings
and subsequent
human
rights and
international
humanitarian
law (IHL)
violations
against
civilians, and
which did not
exercise
sufficient
oversight for
UN
action in the
field; (iii)
senior staff
on the ground
who lacked the
necessary
armed
conflict,
political and
IHL experience
to deal with
the challenge
presented by
Sri Lanka, and
who were given
insufficient
support; (iv)
the
ineffective
dispersal of
coordination
of UN action
and monitoring
of human
rights and IHL
violations
across several
different UNHQ
entities in
Geneva and New
York with
overlapping
mandates; (v)
inadequate
political
support from
Member States
and
inadequate
efforts by the
Secretariat to
build such
support; and
(vi)
a framework
for Member
State
engagement
with human
rights and IHL
protection
crises that is
outdated and
often
unworkable.
Overview
of
Recommendations
The
Panel’s
Terms of
Reference
imply that it
should gather
lessons from
an historical
event that has
passed.
However, the
magnitude of
the
violence in
the Wanni,
following
decades of
strife and
injustice,
continue to be
felt by Sri
Lanka’s
communities.
Sri Lanka’s
peaceful and
stable
progress will
require a
process of
accountability
and
reconciliation
and a
political
solution to
the
long-standing
grievances of
all
communities,
as well as a
response to
ongoing and
new concerns,
and prevention
and protection
in the future.
Working
closely with
the Government
of Sri Lanka,
the UN needs
to take on
this further
challenge.
This
report’s
recommendations
for the UN
system are
designed to be
politically
feasible and
resource
neutral, while
encouraging
profound
changes in the
institution’s
approach to
similar
situations in
the
future. The
broad lines of
the
recommendations
include the
need to:
Restate
the
vision of the
UN: The
Secretary-General
should restate
a vision
of the UN’s
most
fundamental
responsibilities
to include the
defence of
human rights.
The vision
should help
frame strategy
and
policy
responses by
senior levels
of the
organization
to situations
of massive
human rights
violations.
Embed
a
UN human
rights
perspective
into UN
strategies:
The UNHQ needs
stronger
capacity to
include human
rights, IHL
and
international
criminal law
perspectives
in overall
analysis and
strategy for
any
situation. It
should also
have stronger
capacity to
build
political
support from
Member States
for addressing
grave
concerns.
Strengthen
the
management of
the UN’s
crisis
response: To
ensure
coherent UNHQ
oversight for
UN strategy
and action,
the
Secretary-General
should
strengthen
management of
the
whole-of-UN
response to
situations of
massive human
rights
violations.
Promote
accountability
and
responsibility:
All staff
should be
fully informed
of, and have
easy access
to, procedures
under which
allegations of
serious
misconduct by
staff can be
reported and
promptly
investigated.
Improve
UN
engagement
with Member
States and
building of
political
support:
For every such
crisis, the
Secretary-General
must have an
array of
options that
will permit
him to fully
inform Member
States and
suggest
appropriate
actions.
Better
address
violations of
privileges and
immunities:
When a Member
State
engages in
sustained
actions
against UN
personnel and
institutions,
including
violations of
UN privileges
and
immunities,
the
Secretary-General
should review
options for
response by
the
Secretariat
and invite
Member States
to consider
what action
they
could also
take.
Coming
at
the beginning
of his second
term, the
Secretary-General’s
decision to
commission an
internal
review is an
extremely
courageous
step. The
Panel believes
that the
report’s
findings and
recommendations
provide an
urgent and
compelling
platform for
action.
The UN’s
failure to
adequately
respond to the
events in Sri
Lanka
should not
happen again.
When
confronted by
similar
situations,
the
UN should be
able to meet a
much higher
standard in
fulfilling its
protection and
humanitarian
responsibilities.
In support of
this
effort, the
Panel strongly
urges that its
report be made
public.
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