As
Sri
Lanka Letter
to UN, Press
Blurs Silva
Role in PoE
Report, UN
Omits to Check
By
Matthew
Russell Lee
UNITED
NATIONS,
February 10 --
For two weeks
Inner City
Press has
covered
the selection
to the UN
"Senior
Advisory Group
on
Peacekeeping
Operations" of
Sri Lankan
General
Shavendra
Silva, whose
Division 58 is
named in UN
Secretary
General Ban
Ki-moon's Panel
of
Experts'
report on
alleged war
crimes in Sri
Lanka.
Late
on February
9, after Inner
City Press
published
brief
questions and
answers with
Silva,
Sri Lankan
Permanent
Representative
Palitha Kohona
and Ban
himself,
the Sri Lankan
Mission sent a
letter to
Inner City
Press,
with copies to
Ban's
spokesman
Martin Nesirky
and the
President of
the UN
Correspondents'
Association.
These cc's may
be as
interesting
as the letter
itself. We
publish the
letter in
full, here,
and
respond to it
below.
The
Sri Lankan
mission takes
issue with
Inner City
Press'
citation to
Ban's Panel of
Experts
report,
writing that
"Ambassador
Shavendra
Silva pointed
out during
UNCA's
screening of
'Lies agreed
upon,' that
the POE
report had
inaccurately
represented
the facts with
regard to the
Divisions
involved.
Nowhere in
paragraph 73
and 90 of the
Report does
it make any
reference to
his own
Division being
responsible
for
shelling the
No Zones or
the PTK
hospital."
The
simplest
rebuttal is
simply to
example the
Panel of
Experts report
itself,
online,
which we will
now quote
from:
In
Paragraph
62, Silva
appears: "six
major
battalions
were active
in the final
stages of the
war,
including...
the 58th
Division
(commanded by
Brigadier
Shavendra
Silva)." That
is Silva's
Division.
Here's
from
Paragraphs 90
through 92 of
Ban's Panel of
Experts
report:
90.
Fighting
in the area
intensified as
part of the
expressed
efforts by
the 55th and 58th
Divisions
to capture PTK
by 4
February... in
the week
between 29
January and 4
February, PTK
hospital was
hit
every day by
MBRLs and
other
artillery,
taking at
least nine
direct
hits. A number
of patients
inside the
hospital, most
of them
already
injured, were
killed, as
were several
staff members.
Even the
operating
theatre was
hit. Two ICRC
international
delegates were
in
the hospital
when it was
shelled on 4
February 2009.
The shelling
was
coming from
SLA positions.
92.
The
GPS
coordinates of
PTK hospital
were well
known to the
SLA, and
the hospital
was clearly
marked with
emblems easily
visible to
UAVs.
On 1 February
2009, the ICRC
issued a
public
statement
emphasizing
that
"[w]ounded and
sick people,
medical
personnel and
medical
facilities are
all protected
by
international
humanitarian
law. Under
no
circumstance
may they be
directly
attacked."
That
is a war
crime, and it
is attributed
in Ban's Panel
of Experts
report to
Silva's 58th
Division, as
well as the
55th. That, it
seems, is the
Sri Lankan
mission's
defense: that
war crimes
were committed
by other
Divisions
(too). Fine,
then: the
reference to
Paragraph 90
should be
to 90-92, with
62 as the
intro to
Silva.
Likewise,
the Sri
Lankan mission
crows that a
lawsuit
against Silva
was dismissed
without
stating that
it was
strictly on
grounds of
diplomatic
immunity: that
Silva is now
an Ambassador
to the UN. The
decision
by Judge
Oetken
concludes:
"Notwithstanding
the gravity of
the
allegations
made by the
plaintiffs in
this case, the
diplomatic
immunity
mandated by 22
U.S.C. §
254d precludes
this Court
from
considering
the merits of
their claims
against Silva,
at least while
he is cloaked
with immunity
as a United
Nations
representative."
On
the killing of
surrenderees,
the Sri Lankan
mission takes
issue with the
inference
Ban's Panel of
Experts draws:
2.
The
“White Flag”
incident
170.
Various
reports have
alleged that
the political
leadership of
the
LTTE and their
dependants
were executed
when they
surrendered to
the
SLA.[81] In
the very final
days of the
war, the head
of the LTTE
political
wing, Nadesan,
and the head
of the Tiger
Peace
Secretariat,
Pulidevan,
were in
regular
communication
with various
interlocutors
to negotiate a
surrender.
They were
reportedly
with a group
of around
300 civilians.
The LTTE
political
leadership was
initially
reluctant
to agree to an
unconditional
surrender, but
as the SLA
closed in on
the group in
their final
hideout,
Nadesan and
Pulidevan, and
possibly
Colonel
Ramesh, were
prepared to
surrender
unconditionally.
This
intention was
communicated
to officials
of the United
Nations and of
the
Governments of
Norway, the
United Kingdom
and the United
States,
as well as to
representatives
of the ICRC
and others. It
was also
conveyed
through
intermediaries
to Mahinda,
Gotabaya and
Basil
Rajapaksa,
former Foreign
Secretary
Palitha Kohona
and senior
officers in
the SLA.
171.
Both
President
Rajapaksa and
Defence
Secretary
Basil
Rajapaksa
provided
assurances
that their
surrender
would be
accepted.
These
were conveyed
by
intermediaries
to the LTTE
leaders, who
were advised
to raise a
white flag and
walk slowly
towards the
army,
following a
particular
route
indicated by
Basil
Rajapaksa.
Requests by
the LTTE
for a third
party to be
present at the
point of
surrender were
not
granted.
Around 6.30
a.m. on 18 May
2009, Nadesan
and Pulidevan
left
their hide-out
to walk
towards the
area held by
the 58th
Division,
accompanied by
a large group,
including
their
families.
Colonel
Ramesh
followed
behind them,
with another
group. Shortly
afterwards,
the BBC and
other
television
stations
reported that
Nadesan and
Pulidevan had
been shot
dead.
Subsequently,
the Government
gave
several
different
accounts of
the incident.
While there is
little
information on
the
circumstances
of their
death, the
Panel believes
that the LTTE
leadership
intended to
surrender.
The
(false)
assurances
"conveyed by
intermediaries"
were conveyed
through Ban
Ki-moon's own
chief of staff
Vijay Nambiar,
who has
declined
numerous
requests from
the Press to
answer
questions
about
his role.
Kohona, too,
the head of
Sri Lanka's
mission, is
named in
the paragraphs
above.
(Inner City
Press was
already the
first to
report that
the reference
to "Defence
Secretary
Basil
Rajapaksa" was
an error by
the UN.)
Now
it must be
stated, with
all due
respect but to
provide
context to the
cc's, that it
is not
disputed that
Kohona
had a prior
financial
relationship
with the
President of
UNCA; and
that Ban
Ki-moon's own
chief of staff
is at least a
witness to the
above-described
war crime.
What's strange
is that Inner
City Press has
previously,
including in
the Q&A
after UNCA
screened in
UN, without
the normal
approval
process the
government's
"Lies Agreed
To" as a
rebuttal to a
documentary
that was NOT
screened
inside the UN,
asked Silva
about war
crimes, and published all
his answers.
But only now
does the Sri
Lankan mission
write to Ban's
spokesman and
UNCA, not only
the President
with whom PR
Kohona has a
previously
financial
relationship,
but also other
UNCA members,
who in turn
forwarded it
more
widely.
Is the heat
on?
Ban
& Silva,
Kohona back to
camera,
Mission letter
not yet shown
(c) MRLee
On
February 10,
after received
the
above-quoted
letter at 11
pm the night
before,
Inner City
Press asked
Ban's
spokesman
Martin Nesirky
about letters
received, as
partially
recorded in
the UN's
transcript:
Inner
City
Press: I wish
I had been
able to follow
this up with
Mr. Ladsous
when asked
about this
selection of
Shavendra
Silva, who is
inthe
Secretary-General’s
report on Sri
Lanka as the
head of a
division,
said that 'the
matter is
being
considered
further.' I
wasn’t clear
what that
meant by the
Secretariat,
or by the Asia
Group or by
Sri
Lanka. I
wanted to know
if you can
find out what
that is, and
also I
have been at
least CCed on
a number of
letters that
have been
addressed to
the
Secretary-General
about this
issue, of
taking what
people seem to
see as an
alleged war
criminal and
making him an
adviser, or
selecting him
or allowing
him to be
selected, and
I
wanted to know
how many
letters have
you received
and is it
being
reconsidered,
where does
this stand?
Spokesperson
Nesirky:
The Secretary-General
himself told
you, as you
know, that
this is a
decision by
Member States.
At this point,
that is the
end
of the story,
okay.
Inner
City
Press: So
there is no
effort by the
Secretariat,
in any way, to
speak to the
Asia Group or
to the country
of Sri Lanka?
Spokesperson
Nesirky:
I also heard
what Mr.
Ladsous said,
the
Under-Secretary-General,
as I was
sitting right
next to him..
Then,
on camera,
Nesirky said
he would
inquire into
what this
meant, saying
clearly
"and I'll
check if
there's
anything
further on
that." But
that is not in
the UN's
transcript.
Watch video,
here at
Minute
15:58, and
watch this
site.