Afghan
Gov't Role in Guesthouse Killings Was Left Undisclosed by UN, Execution
of US Citizen Alleged
By
Matthew Russell Lee, Exclusive
UNITED
NATIONS, April 14 -- After the killing of five UN staff at the
Bakhtar Guesthouse in Kabul last October and since, the UN has cast
the blame for all the deaths on Taliban insurgents, who attacked the
guesthouse.
Inner City Press was told by sources in
Afghanistan that,
in fact, Afghan government security forces were responsible for most
of the deaths, including the "summary execution" of UN
Security Officer, Louis Maxwell, a U.S. citizen.
Wednesday
in
response to questions from Inner City Press, the UN Spokesperson's
Office confirmed the UN's heretofore undislosed awareness of the
controversy, and later said that a board of inquiry has been
established and Mr. Maxwell's family consulted.
Inner
City Press'
sources in Afghanistan, however, say that the UN Secretary General
Ban Ki-moon has shown a decided lack of enthusiasm to raise the issue
to the Afghan government. Three of the four other UN staff killed, in
this account, were killed by Afghan national security forces.
At
Wednesday's noon
briefing, Mr. Ban's spokesman Martin Nesirky said that Ban has raised
it to Afghanistan. Inner City Press asked, why didn't Mr. Ban or the
UN publicly say that their previous account, that all five deaths
were caused by the Taliban, had been called into question, including
by a video shot by Germans in Kabul and shown on Der Spiegel's web
site?
Inner
City Press is
told that Louis Maxwell, who resisted the attackers and thus allowed
many others to successfully escape, was summarily executed at point
blank range by an Afghan National Army member while in their custody,
unarmed and not offering any resistance. The extra-judicial killing
was captured on video by a staff member of the German Embassy and
copies were provided to UN investigators. The video has since been
posted on the German 'Der Spiegel' media site although they have
failed to realize (or at least publish) what exactly it is they are
airing.
"In
the aftermath of the incident many Afghan security forces are
interviewed on camera by the local Afghan media and one Army Officer
admits killing an 'Arab' terrorist outside the guesthouse. (Mr.
Maxwell was an African American). Irrespective of whether he was
mistaken for one of the attackers, his killing was nothing short of
murder.
UN's Ban in wake, Nov. 2, 2009, Kai Eide in
background, disclosure not shown
The source continues, UN SG Ban has refused to allow the issue to be
raised with
the Afghan government for political reasons and wants the US
authorities to handle the 'problem.'"
While
the UN is
now belatedly saying they are investigating, the approach seems at
odds with the stated commitment to staff safety, and to truth. We
will continue to pursue this. Watch this site.
Update: while, after
the noon briefing, the UN Spokesperson's Office read out a statement
that the FBI is involved and nothing more will be said, the question
remains why false impressions were left -- and also, what was known
when, and what was done. Developing.
UN's
response to Inner City Press after the April 14 noon briefing:
From:
UN Spokesperson - Do Not Reply <unspokesperson-donotreply@un.org>
Subject:
Your questions on Louis Maxwell
To:
Inner City Press
Date:
Wed, Apr 14, 2010
(further
response on Louis Maxwell)
The
United Nations has followed due process in investigating the death of
staff in Afghanistan last October by instituting a Board of Inquiry
after an initial fact-finding by staff in Kabul and New York. The
United Nations has been in contact with the responsible Afghan
authorities in the course of its inquiries. The Board will submit its
report in due course. Further actions by the United Nations will
depend on its findings. The specific circumstances in which Louis
Maxwell died are currently being investigated and it would be
premature to comment further at this stage.
The
United Nations is also cooperating with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in its inquiries into the incident. The United Nations
has briefed the Maxwell family on the progress of its initial
inquiries and is determined to support the family.
* * *
At
UN, Leaked Memo Shows Low Morale and Commuting in Afghan Mission
Amid Arrivals of de Mistura and from Dubai
By
Matthew Russell Lee, Exclusive
UNITED
NATIONS, February 22, updated -- A UN memo leaked to Inner City Press
about
the UN's embattled mission in Afghanistan UNAMA paints a picture of
low morale and a closed down recruitment system as relocated staff
prepare to return from Dubai, to Afghan locations from which they'll
have to commute.
The
memo, sent out
by UNAMA chief of staff Peter Schmitz on February 22 and nearly
immediately forwarded to Inner City Press, concerns relocation and
safety issues in the continuing aftermath of the "Bakhtar Guest
House tragedy...
in which the UN was directly
targeted for the first time."
It announces that
by the end of February, 30
additional housing units will be become available. They will,
however, be where "the commute takes a lot of time" and
exposes staff "to additional risks."
The
memo
acknowledges that "in the second half of 2009, virtually no new
staff joined the mission. Partly, we have ourselves to blame." Now, the
UN in Afghanistan and Iraq (UNAMI) have been "given the
special authority to issue mission specific one year contracts."
The
memo
acknowledges that since the UNAMA budget has twice doubled, it is
"important that we do not lose credibility in the eyes of the
ACABQ [Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions]
and Fifth [Budget] Committee."
The
testing time
is now. Kai Eide, the UN's top envoy who quit in the wake of
allegations he covered up Hamid Karzai's electoral fraud, will leave
on March 6, when his successor Staffan de Mistura, who even the New
York Times described as a faceless bureaucrat, will arrive. According
to the memo, "we will be able to discontinue the relocation
arrangement in Dubai by 8 March 2010 and have all staff return from
there to Kabul."
The
memo concludes
with some cheerleading to tell de Mistura what works and what
doesn't. Given the UN's lack of whistleblower protections, and di
Mistura's insider connections, will such candid recommendations be
made or implemented? We'll see. Below is the memo.
After
publishing the article above, Inner City Press asked
UN spokesman
Martin Nesirky about the memo at the February 22 noon briefing:
Inner
City Press: on Afghanistan, a memo has emerged from the Chief of
Staff of UNAMA, Mr. [Peter] Schmitz, saying among other things, that
virtually no new staff have joined the mission in the second half of
2009, and that new units are being, that the relocation from Dubai
will take place by 8 March. Can you, one, can you confirm that the
move to Dubai will be finished by 8 March? And two, how can it be,
what does it mean if the budget is doubled that no new staff have
been hired? Galaxy is closed, which used to be the way that they
recruited staff. If Galaxy is closed, what’s it been replaced by
and what are the plans to actually spend the money that’s been
allocated to UNAMA?
Spokesperson
Nesirky: Okay. A lot of questions there, and I can’t really go
into detail on each of them. What I can say is the Secretary-General
has said very clearly that he is concerned about the slow pace of
recruitment for positions in UNAMA. There were some fairly stark
reasons why that was the case, and he is certainly keen that people
should be able to take up posts as soon as possible and should be
able to apply for position as soon as possible. On the details, the
various technical parts -- I’ll have to come back to you on that.
While
still
waiting for the "technical" answers, the memo has been
syndicated by the WaPo FP, with credit, here.
The memo is below.
UN's Ban, de Mistura and Hamid Karzai, low
morale and commuting not shown
Kabul,
22 February 2010
Dear
Colleagues,
Since
15 December 2009, when we sent the last circular on the security and
relocation issues, there have been a number of developments that
should improve the situation of the Mission in the weeks and months
to come.
Secure
Accommodation and Office Space
As
you know, the need to provide secure accommodation that meets the
higher standards established after the Bakhtar Guest House tragedy,
has been a major bottleneck for UNAMA. The good news is that by the
end of this month, 30 additional housing units will be come available
in UNOCA. Moreover, a further 50 units will be completed by the end
of April. As a result, we will be able to discontinue the relocation
arrangement in Dubai by 8 March 2010 and have all staff return from
there to Kabul.
With
80 units available by the end of April, we should also be able to
accommodate the new staff coming on board over the next few months.
It
is understood that UNOCA is not an ideal location for those staff who
have their offices or frequent meetings in the center of the city.
The commute takes a lot of time and exposes them to additional risks
even though the use of armoured vehicles has now been mandatory for
some time. Therefore, we continue to look for additional
accommodation and office space inside the city and we have identified
some promising options. Once the negotiations on these options are
completed, we will inform staff who wish to be closer to the city.
Recruitment
At
the beginning of the year with the 2010 budget coming into effect,
UNAMA had a vacancy rate of 44%. The situation had reached a point
where the SRSG felt obliged to alert the Security Council that if the
staffing back log were to continue, UNAMA would not be able to
implement key elements of its mandate.
UNAMA
is not the only mission suffering from this situation. We all know
that the more stringent recruitment procedures required by the new
contractual arrangements, in particular the introduction of a review
by the newly established Field Central Review Boards (FCRB), created
delays to a degree that in the second half of 2009, virtually no new
staff joined the Mission. Partly, we have ourselves to blame because
we started too late with the implementation of the new procedures. As
a result, numerous recruitment cases were returned to the Mission by
the FCRB for further clarifications.
The
Department of Field Support and the Office for Human Resources
Management have realized that UNAMA (and UNAMI) had reached a choking
point. Therefore, we and UNAMI have been given the special authority
to issue mission specific one-year contracts to staff who have been
interviewed by the Mission and recommended to be placed on the roster
concerned for selection.
Moreover,
the Field Personnel Division (FPD) of DFS sent a team led by Masaki
Sato to assist UNAMA in addressing the back log of cases pending
endorsement by the FCRB. As of mid-February, exercising its new
authority, UNAMA has issued 53 mission specific contracts. The
selected staff should be arriving over the next two months, providing
a desperately needed respite. Nevertheless, there are still numerous
vacancies yet to be filled. Stephani Scheer, the Chief of Mission
Support, together with the team from New York and the Section Chiefs
have prioritized the vacancies and established interview panels that
will pursue the necessary recruitment steps.
A
key element in this context is the issuance of mission specific
vacancy announcements. Since the Galaxy system is closed, and since
many of those who applied previously never intended to come to
Afghanistan, FPD has established lists of candidates who indeed are
willing to join UNAMA. If we cannot find any suitable candidates on
these lists or if we know of eminently suitable candidates who are
not currently in Galaxy, mission specific vacancy announcements can
be issued.
We
will continue to get help from FPD. However, the brunt of the
time-consuming interview work will have to be borne by us. While it
is understood that the steps involved in recruiting staff seem
arduous and take time away from our daily work, we must approach this
task with a sense of urgency. If we don’t prioritize recruitment
now we will not be able to get out of this slump. Moreover, UNAMA’s
budget virtually doubled in two consecutive years, 2009 and 2010.
This not only shows that Afghanistan is still high on the
international agenda, it also places a lot of responsibility on us.
It is important that we do not lose credibility in the eyes of the
ACABQ and the Fifth Committee which placed a lot of trust in our
ability to utilize the additional resources in an effective and
efficient manner.
Field
Issues
From
my regular visits to UNAMA’s field offices, I know that our
colleagues in the field have particular hardships to endure. They
live in remote locations and their offices and living accommodations
are more often not at the standard we would like them to enjoy.
Moreover, with the new MOSS and MORSS requirements, many field
locations need to be upgraded to a higher category. Where premises
cannot be upgraded, new locations have to be found. The CMS has
established a priority engineering plan to address these issues. She
is also making every effort to improve internet and Lotus
connectivity, crucial tools of communication, particularly in remote
office locations
Reimbursement
of Additional Security Cost
The
new security requirements, in particular the need for internal guards
(Gurkhas), have increased the cost for office and accommodation
security exponentially. The Security Management Team (SMT) has before
it a proposal to increase the amount reimbursable to staff for
security upgrades. The SMT’s decision is expected shortly. Staff
should not suffer financially because of the additional security
requirements. The CMS is devising a policy for the various housing
situations to ensure that nobody will incur financial losses.
In
this context it is important, that those staff members who were the
primary lease holders for one of the many guest houses that had to be
vacated following the Bakhtar guest house tragedy, approach their
landlords to recover any rent they may have paid in advance. The
Legal Office will provide assistance, if necessary. In the event that
landlords decline to return rent paid in advance, they should make
this known to the CMS. A separate circular will be issued in this
regard providing more details.
We
should, however, keep in mind that efforts to homogenize the salaries
and entitlements of all entities in the UN System have not yet come
to pass. UNAMA staff will have lesser entitlements than the staff of
the agencies, funds and programmes. Hence, while we are trying to
interpret our rules and regulations with the maximum benefit for
staff in mind, there are things that we cannot not do within the
current regulatory framework.
Staff
Morale
Following
the Bakhtar guest house incident in which the UN was directly
targeted for the first time, we all felt somewhat depressed.
Moreover, the rather tumultuous unfolding of the elections last year
led to vehement and often unfair criticism of the Mission and UNDP
ELECT which, no doubt, left some scars on our self-esteem. How we
perceive our work and how our work is perceived by others clearly has
an effect on our morale.
Two
weeks ago, I convened a meeting with all Section Chiefs to address
these issues. They raised many of the problems mentioned above
relating to secure accommodation and staffing. They also put forward
a number of ideas and proposals that we will follow up upon in the
near future.
A
key to staff morale is also the relationship between staff and their
supervisors. Particularly in the remote locations in the field with
little opportunity for other than office related activities,
inter-personal relations can become strained. Such situations should
be addressed in an open and transparent spirit in discussions with
the supervisor. No purpose is served if conflicts are left to fester
and then turn into formal complaints to the Conduct and Discipline
Unit. I would appeal to all managers and supervisors to actively
engage with their staff and to nip interpersonal conflicts in the
bud.
New
Leadership
Mr.
Staffan de Mistura has been appointed as the new Special
representative of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan. He will have
in-briefings in New York during the first week of March and is
expected to arrive in Kabul in the course of the second week. Kai
Eide will leave on 6 March. A new Deputy Special Representative for
Pillar I is expected in early April.
For
quite some time, UNAMA has been suffering from the fact that one or
the other position of the leadership troika was vacant. With the full
complement of senior leaders in place, we should be able to make
UNAMA’s structures work in the way that they were designed to.
Invariably,
a new SRSG will make changes and adjustments. Change can be a
challenge, but it should also be considered as an opportunity. We
should all strive to help the new SRSG to settle in and take on his
heavy responsibilities. Please be frank in pointing out to him what
you believe works and what doesn’t. There is always room for
improvement.
There
are many challenges ahead, but with an open and collegial approach we
can master them.
Cheers!
Peter
Schmitz
Chief
of Staff
UNAMA
Kabul