At
UN,
Condi Got Gambari Fired from Burma, Similar Suck Up to Sudan
Still Unacted On
By
Matthew
Russell Lee
UNITED
NATIONS,
December 11 -- UN official Ibrahim Gambari was targeted for
firing by the previous US administration, for being too close to the
military government of Myanmar, to which he was UN envoy, a cable
Wikileaked this week has shown:
“Mr.
Gambari's inappropriate claims of success regarding peripheral
issues, and his unwillingness to press the regime more forcefully for
progress have caused us to conclude that his continued involvement
undermines the good offices mission and should therefore be ended...
USUN is asked to demarche SYG Ban or Ambassador Kim to seek Gambari's
dismissal as SRSG for Burma. This demarche should occur as soon as
practical.”
What
happened next
is telling: the overly dictator friendly Gambari was transferred by
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to cover Darfur in Sudan.
There,
Gambari has gone out of his way not to investigate or report on
killing by the government of Omar al Bashir.
On December
9,
Sudan's Ambassador to the UN praised the UN Mission in Darfur and the
“seasoned diplomat” who is in charge -- Gambari.
What
has the US
Administration of Barack Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
and Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice done about Gambari? So far,
nothing.
During the
Security Council's October 2010 trip to Sudan and
Darfur, Susan Rice had multiple opportunities to give the
Administration's view of Gambari's performance, but did not.
Gambari in Darfur with Susan Rice et al., Oct 2010,
action not shown (c) MRLee
The
Wikileaked
cable, in which Condoleezza Rice directed a demarche to Ban or
“Ambassador Kim” that Gambari should be take off the Burma file,
resulted in that action. If the argument is that the current US
Mission to the UN is working behind the scene on this, so far no
results have been seen.
Tuesday,
07
October 2008, 19:48
C
O
N F I D E N T I A L STATE 107438 SIPDIS
USUN
FOR
JEFF DELAURENTIS EO 12958 DECL: 09/23/2018
TAGS
PREL,
KPAO, PHUM, BM
SUBJECT:
DEMARCHE
REQUEST: REPLACEMENT OF SRSG GAMBARI FOR BURMA MISSION
Classified
By:
IO">IO">IO PDAS James Warlick. Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).
1.
(U)
This is an action request. See para. 4.
2.
(C)
Department views the "good offices" mission of the UN
Secretary General's Special Representative (SRSG) to Burma as an
important vehicle for encouraging democratic progress in Burma.
Consequently, Department has viewed with growing concern the lack of
progress on core political steps that the UNSC called on Burma to
take such as the immediate release of political prisoners and the
opening of a meaningful, time-bound political dialogue with
democratic and ethnic minority leaders, in particular, with Aung San
Suu Kyi (ASSK), over the course of SRSG Gambari's four missions to
Rangoon. Indeed, it appears that Gambari's access to regime officials
and ability to secure results has only contracted over the course of
these missions. His access to democratic leaders has been constrained
by both the regime and more recently a loss of confidence in Gambari
among leaders of the democracy movement.
3.
(C)
Gambari appears unrealistically upbeat, pursuing and reporting
progress on peripheral matters (e.g., a possible economic forum, the
possible placement of a UN staff member in Rangoon) that are a
distraction from what the Security Council has articulated as
critical goals and identified as Gambari's mandate.
4.
(C)
Considering the key role of the good offices mission and
Gambari's inability to secure significant progress from the Burmese
regime, USUN is asked to demarche SYG Ban or Ambassador Kim to seek
Gambari's dismissal as SRSG for Burma. This demarche should occur as
soon as practical.
5.
(C)
Taking into account Gambari's usefulness in his concurrent role
as UN advisor on the International Compact with Iraq, as well as SYG
Ban's likely sensitivities in regard to a possible dismissal,
Department provides the following talking points (not/not to be left
as a non- paper) for use by USUN in this demarche:
6.
(C/rel
to UN) Begin points:
--
Over
time, the United States has become increasingly concerned that
the UN good offices mission in regard to Burma is in dire jeopardy.
--
Special
Representative Gambari's fourth and latest trip to Burma
continued a disturbing pattern of regime-managed itineraries;
restricted access to key regime officials and activists; and complete
lack of progress on the critical issues that form the core of Mr.
Gambari's mandate: the opening of a meaningful and time-bound
dialogue with democratic and ethnic minority leaders, including Aung
San Suu Kyi, toward democratization and national reconciliation, and
the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners.
--
While
the main responsibility for this lack of progress should be
attributed to regime intransigence, Mr. Gambari has not been willing
to acknowledge it. This lack of progress, Mr. Gambari's inappropriate
claims of success regarding peripheral issues, and his unwillingness
to press the regime more forcefully for progress have caused us to
conclude that his continued involvement undermines the good offices
mission and should therefore be ended.
--
We
have no wish to embarrass Mr. Gambari and have no intent to link
any removal with a lack of progress in Burma, but we would ask that
you find a way to terminate gracefully his participation in this
particular mission. In particular, we cannot support further travel
to Burma for discussions with regime leadership by Mr. Gambari as
part of the good offices mission.
--
We
urge you not to rush to name a replacement. There have been a
series of Special Representatives, none of whom have succeeded due to
regime intransigence. Absent some sign that the regime is willing to
engage seriously, we fear appointment of a new envoy could actually
encourage the regime and some of its friends to continue to emphasize
process over substance. As you requested, however, we are willing to
share ideas of possible candidates as you consider next steps.
--
There
is talk of your ramping up your personal involvement on Burma,
or perhaps even visiting. We think you could play an important role
but understand you will have to consider carefully how you would
engage. Although a trip by you could be useful, we believe it's
critical that the groundwork be laid so you can be confident that
your visit will result in tangible progress.
--
We
understand that the Burmese are unlikely to make major concessions
as a condition for your visit. However, we do not believe you should
go without a strong indication ahead of time that your visit would
coincide with some tangible, positive steps. Steps that we recommend
you insist upon are: the release of high-profile political prisoners;
the release of Aung San Suu Kyi or at least the easing of her house
arrest; insistence that you and any subsequent Special Representative
will be able to determine your own schedules, including meeting with
Aung San Suu Kyi, political prisoners, activists, and whomever else
you wish; and that you will have access to the senior most leadership
of the Burmese regime; agreement on specific steps to begin a
dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and other democratic and ethnic
leaders; and a guarantee that any Special Representative will be
granted a multiple entry visa.
End
points.
RICE
* * *
On
Darfur,
As
UNAMID Covers Up Killings by Sudan, ICC Reports Them
By
Matthew
Russell
Lee
UNITED
NATIONS,
December
9 -- After the UN refused
to release what it knows
about the killing of civilians at Tabarat and the destruction of
Soro
and other villages in Darfur in September, the International Criminal
Court's report unveiled in the Security Council on December 9 names
13 other destroyed villages (with Soro transliterated as “Souroo”),
and has witness quotes what it calls the government sponsored killing
in Tabarat (which it calls Tabra).
After
ICC
prosecutor
Luis Moreno Ocampo's presentation to the Security Council
on Thursday, Inner City Press on camera asked both him and Sudan's
Permanent Representative to the UN Dafallah Osman about the Tabra
killings and the destruction of villages.
Sudan's
Ambassador
said
that the killings were “tribal,” involving
kidnapping and promises to pay blood money. He praised UNAMID and its
leader Ibrahim Gambari (calling him a “seasoned diplomat”).
Inner
City
Press
asked if he thought UNAMID should release what it knows about the
Tabra killings. This, he did not answer, instead ranging from saying
that Ocampo's report shows NGOs were engaged in “espionage” to
claiming that Radio Dabanga was disseminating destabilizing and even
“genocidal” information.
Ocampo
had
stood
several yards away, unlike with the previous Sudanese Ambassador
Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem Mohamed, whom Ocampo stood right next to
during their final stare down. When Ocampo came to the microphone,
Inner City Press asked him if he thought UNAMID was in essence
covering up Sudan's and Bashir's acts by not reporting on them.
Ocampo
said
that
UNAMID is under threat, that's why it doesn't report. This means
that UNAMID is not reporting, which is its job. What will Ban
Ki-moon, the Security Council and Obama administration do?
ICC's LMO close to Sudan's last Ambassador,
new backing away mirrored by UN- & US?
Earlier
on
Thursday,
Mark Hanis of the Genocide Intervention Network / Save
Darfur Coalition on a press conference call said Obama, Hillary
Clinton and Joe Biden campaigned on (among other things) protecting
civilians in Darfur, and named Samantha Power and Susan Rice as
officials. Hanis called them “disappointing” so far. Inner City
Press asked what UNAMID should do. Report, Hanis said. But UNAMID
does not.
On
both December
8
and 9, Inner City Press asked UN spokesman Martin
Nesirky about
fighting and death in Darfur, including in Tabarat / Tabra:
Inner
City
Press:
a request made to UNAMID [African Union-United Nations
Hybrid Operation in Darfur] for the report that they were supposed to
do on the Tabarat killings of 2 September, near Tawilla, the one that
the Secretary-General summoned Mr. [Ibrahim] Gambari to speak about.
Anyway, somebody that asked him was told that there is no report for
external dissemination available on it, and I just wonder, what is
the UN’s final finding? Did it do the right thing, in apparently
not getting out to the site despite the warning by relatives of those
killed? Are all such reports confidential, and in which case, how is
the Security Council or the international community to assess the
level of violence and killing in Darfur if these new reports never
come out?
Spokesperson
Nesirky:
Well,
that’s a very long question.
Question:
This
is the only time I’ll ask it, but if there is anything the UN
can say about those killings, I’d like to know.
Spokesperson:
Well,
I hear your question, I think, and let’s look into what the
Mission tells us.
More
than a full
day later, UNAMID has said nothing. When Inner City Press asked
again about UNAMID on December 9, Nesirky claimed he had already
answered questions, including about attacks the Sudanese government
had just bragged about.
In
assuming
Presidency of the Security Council for December, Susan Rice told
Inner City Press that UNAMID (and UNMIS) are required to investigate
and report on attacks on civilians. Does that mean report to the
public, as the ICC does? What will Susan Rice and the US Mission do?
The
press had been
told that Susan Rice would speak at the stakeout, where Ocampo and
Sudan's Ambassador did. But she did not. A reporter given advance
notice that she would not come was told that “one country” had
blocked the elements to the press that she would have read. But she
could have spoken, especially after what Sudan's Ambassador said,
including denying things that the US Mission has previously said,
about the Council's interlocutors being harassed and Radio Dabanga's
Khartoum office being shut down.
Footnote:
Inner
City
Press also asked Ocampo about Guinea -- he said he is
watching “national proceedings” -- and Kenya, where witnesses are
under threat. Ocampo answered by bragging that none of his witnesses
have been injured. But how about retaliated against, given what
Sudan's Ambassador said about the NGOs. Watch this site.